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Abstract 
At the end of World War II, the federal government bestowed one of the richest 
rewards ever given a mass mobilized army in the form of the Servicemen's Readjustment 
Act of 1944, better known as the OJ. Bill ofRights. The OJ. Bill offered veterans 
generous loans, education benefits, and unemployment insurance to help them readjust to 
civilian life. The bill is widely lauded as one of the most important federal acts of the 
twentieth century. Further 0.1. Bills followed for veterans of the Cold War including 
those who served in Korea and Vietnam. Despite their continued impact on the lives of 
veterans and on society, the later bills have received very little public or academic 
attention. No major study examines the later OJ. Bills beyond the World War II 
generation. This dissertation helps fill that void by examining the political origins of the 
Vietnam era OJ. Bills of 1966, 1972, and 1974. Specifically, this dissertation explores 
the debates over veterans' education benefits at the federal level during the Vietnam era. 
After the passage of the 1966 OJ. bill, many Vietnam era veterans complained 
that their benefits fell short of those offered the World War II generation. As a result, the 
Vietnam era 0.1. Bills often get dismissed as a part ofa wider pattern of government 
neglect of the Vietnam veteran. This study provides a context for understanding why the 
benefits did not, at first, reach the same generous heights as the previous OJ. Bills and 
challenges the standard narrative that the government abandoned the Vietnam veteran. 
The government, particularly the Senate, did make considerable efforts to improve the 
Vietnam veteran's benefits. Although a succession ofpresidents and congressmen 
limited the government's generosity because of their ideological or economic 
convictions, numerous increases in the level of funding followed the 1966 bill, making 
iv 
veterans' benefits far more comparable to those offered World War II veterans. 
Following the increases, Vietnam era veterans claimed their education benefits in far 
greater numbers than their World War II predecessors. Because so many Vietnam 
veterans decided to return to school, this study shows that the G.I. Bill needs to be a 
central part of their homecoming story. 
v 
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Introduction 
CONTINUING THE STORY OF THE G.!. BILL 
Were it not for this program, veterans might have found themselves unemployed, 
standing in a bread line .... The GI Bill changed America, it may have changed 
the world. 
Senator Bob Dole 
Ever since the passage of the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act, or G.!. Bill of 
Rights, which offered returning World War II servicemen and women an unprecedented 
slew ofbenefits for educational and vocational advancement, as well as home and 
business loans, no other federal law of the twentieth century has attracted such 
unqualified and universal praise for its redeeming effects on society. Politicians and 
historians repeatedly cite the -bill's contribution to easing the nation's postwar social and 
economic pressures and hail its transformative effects on the lives of those that prospered 
under its beneficence. On the twentieth anniversary of its signing, President Lyndon 
Johnson praised the G.!. Bill for "increase[ing] the strength of our Nation by enlarging 
the opportunities of our people." According to Johnson, the bill provided "600,000 
engineers and scientists, 360,000 school teachers, and 700,000 business and executive 
personnel."} More recently, historian Jennifer Keane in Doughboys, The Great War, and 
The Remaking ofAmerica (2001), describes the 1944 G.!. Bill as "the most sweeping 
piece of social legislation in American history .,il Others suggest that the G.!. Bill ranks 
alongside the Northwest Ordinance and the Homestead Act as the most significant act 
}Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Statement by the President on the 20th Anniversary of the G.!. Bill ofRights," June 22, 
1964. 
2 Jennifer Keane, Doughboys, The Great War, and The Remaking ofAmerica. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001), x. 
1 
ever passed by the government in the promotion ofdemocracy and social equality? As if 
the title ofhis book leaves the reader in any doubt ofhis exalted opinion of the G.I. Bill, 
Michael J. Bennett in When Dreams Came True: The G.I Bill and the Making ofModern 
America (1996) states, "I feel I cannot overstate the value and meaning of the G.I. Bill. 
Its sweep was so vast, its impact so particular, that only one conclusion seems self-
evident: The bill made a reality of Jefferson's concept ofcreating independent yeomen.',4 
Veterans remember fondly the unexpected bounty that greeted them after their separation 
from service. Bob Dole, who used his benefits to attend law school before establishing a 
distinguished record as a congressman and senator for Kansas, recalls, "Were it not for 
this program, veterans might have found themselves unemployed, standing in a bread 
line.... The GI Bill changed America, it may have changed the world.',s 
Such adulation sets the G.I. Bill as the capstone of the sacred "Good War/Greatest 
Generation" narrative of World War II. In popular mythology and in many academic 
studies of the war, America united for one monumental and heroic effort to fight back the 
dark forces ofNazi totalitarianism and Japanese aggression after suffering a diabolical 
and underhanded attack in December 1941. After a hard fought victory, the warriors 
returned home to a grateful nation and joyous parades. As just reward for their effort, the 
government bestowed on them perhaps the greatest riches ever provided a mass 
mobilized army in the form of the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill then allowed World War II 
3 Harold M. Hyman, American Singularity: The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the 
1862 Homestead-Morrill Act, and the 1944 G.l Bill (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1986). 
4 Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came True: The G.l Bill and the Making of 
Modern America (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), x. 
5 Bob Dole, foreword to Milton Greenberg, The G.l Bill: The Law That Changed 
America (New York: Lickle Publishing, 1997), 8. 
2 
veterans to better their lives and created a new generation of leaders and innovators 
propelling the nation to even greater heights in the postwar years.6 
This narrative contains much truth. The 0.1. Bill did have an enormous impact on 
the lives of veterans, on higher education, and on the economy. Out of 15.6 million 
eligible World War II veterans, 7.8 million used their benefits for education and training. 
Over 2.2 million attended schools at the college level, the remainder received below 
college education, vocational training, or farm training at a cost to the government of 
over 14.5 billion dollars. Over 2.3 million obtained the low-interest home loans and 
approximately 75,000 received the farm or business loans. These provisions helped 
forestall a widely feared post-World War II economic depression, expanded the home-
owning middle class, and forever changed the nature of higher education in the United 
States. 
Despite its undeniable significance, the 0.1. Bill remains understudied. Only a 
handful ofmonographs exist on the bill. Its brevity notwithstanding, Keith Olson's The 
G.l Bill, Veterans and Colleges (1974) remains the most comprehensive scholarly study 
over thirty years after its initial publication. David Ross's Preparing For Ulysses: 
Politics and Veterans During World War //(1969) discusses the legislative origins of the 
bill. Bennett's When Dreams Came True (1996) provides a less academic overview, 
6 For one of the most recent and popular manifestations of the Oood War idea-­
popularized in Studs Terkel's "The Good War": An Oral History o/World War //(New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984)--see Tom Brokaw's The Greatest Generation (New York: 
Random House, 1998). For one of the few qualifiers on the success of the 0.1. Bill, see 
David H. Onkst, '''First a Negro ... Incidentally a Veteran': Black World War Two 
Veterans and the 0.1. Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944-1948," Journal o/Social 
History 1998 31 (3): 517-543. Onkst claims that racism and poor administration negated 
the effects of the 0.1. Bill for black veterans in the Deep South. 
3 
while Milton Greenberg's The G.l Bill: The Law That Changed America (1997) offers a 
sanguine reminiscence on the effects of the bill on society and on individuals. Most 
recently, Mark Van Ells in To Hear Only Thunder Again: America's World War II 
Veterans Come Home (2001) discusses the impact of the 0.1. Bill in the wider context of 
the coming home experience of World War II veterans in the Wisconsin area and Jennifer 
Keane's Doughboys (2001) examines the central role of the World War I generation in 
the formulation of the bill. As incomplete as the study of the 1944 OJ. Bill remains, the 
story of later 0.1. Bills is even less known? 
Most people are aware of the first 0.1. Bill passed in 1944. Few are as familiar 
with the bill that followed in 1952 for Korean Conflict Veterans or the 1966, 1972, and 
1974 OJ. Bills-the focus of this study-that followed for Vietnam era veterans.8 No 
single published monograph exists on the Korean or Vietnam era 0.1. Bills. Indeed, very 
few studies exist on the OJ. Bills at all beyond the World War II generation. For 
example, in their recent textbook Social Welfare: A History ofthe American Response to 
7 Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came True: The G. 1 Bill and The Making of 
Modern America (New York: Brassey's Inc., 1996), Milton Oreenberg, The G.l Bill: The 
Law That Changed America (New York: Lickle Publishing, 1997), Jennifer Keane, 
Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking ofAmerica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), Keith Olson, The G.l Bill, The Veterans, and The Colleges 
(Lexington: University Press ofKentucky, 1974), David B. Ross,Preparingfor Ulysses: 
Politics and Veterans During World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1969), Mark D. Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again: America's World War II 
Veterans Come Home (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books: 2001). 
8 In this study the term "Vietnam era veteran" refers to all veterans that served 
from August 4, 1964 through May 7, 1975. The term "Vietnam veteran" refers only to 
those veterans that served in the Southeast Asia Theater during this time. Vietnam era 
veteran is used most often to describe the benefits offered to all veterans under the 
Vietnam era bills because the bills made no distinction between where a veteran served. 
Vietnam veteran is used where the specific problems of combat theater veterans is 
discussed. 
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Need (2005), authors June Axxin and Mark J. Stem offer a detailed discussion of the 
development ofveterans benefits after the Civil War, World War I, and World War II, 
but they dismiss Vietnam era benefits with one statement: "Veterans ofVietnam in 
particular paid the price ofour unhappiness with that war.,,9 Keith Olson's book 
discusses the Korea and Vietnam era 0.1. Bills, but only in a cursory manner. Moreover, 
Olson's book appeared in 1974, long before the final chapter on the Vietnam era bills 
could be written; the government did not pass the most generous Vietnam era bill until 
December 1974 and the majority ofVietnam veterans did not return to school until after 
1974. A brief overview of available government programs for Vietnam era veterans 
appeared in Sar A. Levitan and Joyce Zickler's Swords Into Ploughshares: Our G.L Bill, 
but again this book only appeared in 1973. Similarly, the few unpublished dissertations 
on the later bills appeared in the mid 1970s and suffer from a lack of long-range 
perspective. 10 
Several studies allude to the educational attainment ofVietnam era veterans. 
Josefina Card's Lives After Vietnam: .Personal Impact ofMilitary Service (1983) 
discusses the educational levels of a sample group ofVietnam veterans relative to their 
non-veteran peers. Similarly, several articles discuss the impact education benefits on 
9 June Axxin, and Mark J. Stem. Social Welfare: A History ofthe American 
Response to Need, 6th Edition (Boston: Pearson! Allyn and Bacon, 2005), 302. 
10 Three studies-both unpublished and both almost 30 years old---offer limited 
insight into the Vietnam era bills. Joseph Herbert Pervis wrote a 70 page thesis on The 
Vietnam Era Veteran in College in 1974 at Kansas State, and Kenneth E. Fisher wrote a 
dissertation at Florida State University onA Comparative Analysis ofSelected 
Congressional Documents Related to Educational Benefits Legislated for The Veterans of 
World War II, The Korean Conflict, and The Vietnam Era Under the G.I Bill in 1975. 
Finally, David Bodenger's Ph.D. dissertation Soldier's Bonuses: A History ofVeterans 
Benefits in the United States, 1776-1967 written at Penn. State in 1972 covers only the 
very early years of the Vietnam era. 
5 
veterans since World War II.II The only allusions to the impact of the bill in more recent 
studies tend to be brief and contradictory. Jennifer Keane, in Doughboys suggests that: 
World War II veterans benefited from and contributed to a postwar economic 
boom that kept the unemployment rate below 5 percent. The singularity of this 
historical moment is underscored by life-course research on the Vietnam War. 
Military service did not have the same positive effect on the socioeconomic status 
ofVietnam veterans. Substantial aid to college-bound students in the 1960s and 
1970s and scaled-back veterans' benefits meant that military service once again 
became time lost for veterans rather than the path to increased occupational and 
educational opportunities. 12 
By contrast, Eric T. Dean Jr., in Shook Over Hell: Post Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and 
the Civil War (1997) hails the achievement of the Vietnam era bills by noting: 
By 1977 over 64 percent ofVietnam vets had used the GJ. Bill (compared with 
55 percent by World War II veterans and 43.4 percent by Korean War veterans) 
and a greater percentage of these Vietnam veterans used the G.!. Bill to pursue 
higher education than ever before (60 percent, compared with 51 percent of 
Korean War veterans utilizing the bill and 30 percent ofWorld War II veterans). 
By 1976 the source of the largest amount of federal aid for the nation's college 
students was not the Office ofEducation but the Veterans Administration. I3 
None of these studies offers any substantive discussion of the historical context or 
legislative background of the later bills. Such divergent interpretations in recently 
11 Sar A. Levitan and Joyce Zickler, Swords Into Ploughshares: Our G.L Bill 
(Salt Lake City: Olympus Publishing Company, 1973), Card, Josefina J. Lives After 
Vietnam: Personal Impact ofMilitary Service (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1983). Studies on the impact of the bill on veterans include Jere Cohen, David 
R. Segal, and Lloyd V. Temme: "Military Service Was an Educational Disadvantage to 
Vietnam-Era Personnel" Sociology and Social Research 1986 70(3): 206-208, "The 
Impact of Education on Vietnam-Era Veterans' Occupational Attainment" Social Science 
Quarterly 1992 73(2): 397-409, and "Military Service and Educational attainment in the 
All-Volunteer Force" Social Science Quarterly 1995 76(1): 88-104, and Joshua D. 
Angrist, "The Effect ofVeterans Benefits on Education and Earnings," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 199346(4): 637-652. 
12 Keane, Doughboys, 213. 
13 Eric T. Dean Jr., Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam and the 
Civil War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 13. 
6 
published books reveal the lack of a definitive understanding of the Vietnam era bills and 
point to the need for more thorough analysis. 
A cursory look at the available statistics suggests that the 0.1. Bills of 1966, 1972, 
and 1974 potentially had an enormous influence on the liv("s ofretuming veterans and on 
the nation's social, political, and economic landscape. The 1984 Veterans Administration 
Annual Report notes that over 72 percent ofVietnam era veterans-those who served 
between August 4, 1964 and May 7, 1974-claimed their education benefits under the 
0.1. Bill, more than half of this total for a college level education. Vietnam era veterans 
used their education benefits at a considerably higher rate than either World War II 
veterans (51 percent) or Korean Conflict veterans (43 percent). Moreover, the cost to the 
government of education benefits under the post-1966 bills exceeded 38.5 billion dollars, 
almost two-and-a-halftimes the cost of the World War II 0.1. Bill.14 Clearly, given the 
sheer numbers of veterans involved and the cost of the program, the story of the 0.1. Bill 
does not stop with the World War II generation. 
Much as the praise heaped on, the World War II bill stems from the "Oood War" 
narrative of that war, the failure to explore the later 0.1. Bills era stems, in part, from the 
dominant "Bad War" narrative of the Vietnam War. Vietnam veterans-those that 
served in the Southeast Asia Theater-went to college in similar numbers to those 
veterans that served elsewhere during the Vietnam era, but their story is rarely told. In 
the standard Vietnam War narrative, an arrogant and misguided government sent tens of 
thousands of idealistic young men to their deaths for a cause that few believed in, not 
14 Veterans Administration Annual Report, 1984 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Oovernment Printing Office, 1984), 81. 
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even the South Vietnamese people the Unites States was supposed to be helping. The 
government then stabbed its own soldiers in the back by placing political constraints on 
their fighting capabilities, denying them any chance for victory. Then, when the Vietnam 
veterans came home, they faced nothing but contempt from an uncaring public and a 
government that cared little for their sacrifices. Shunned by society, many then retreated 
into worlds of isolation and despair. IS 
Reinforcing the stereotype, for several decades after the war, academic studies 
that dealt in any way with the government treatment of the Vietnam veteran or the 
Vietnam veteran's homecoming experience concentrated almost exclusively on the 
negative. In doing so, they have contributed to a widely-held cultural image of the 
Vietnam veterans as maladjusted. Examples of such works include Murray Polner's No 
Victory Parades: The Return ofthe Vietnam Veteran (1971), Robert J. Lifton's Home 
From the War: Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims Nor Executioners (1973), David E. 
Bonior, et al The Vietnam Veteran: a History ofNeglect (1983), and Myra McPherson's 
Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation (1983). Similarly, Jonathan 
Shay's Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing ofCharacter (1994) 
perpetuates the image ofVietnam veterans as emotionally crippled. More recently, Shay 
continued this line of argument in Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trial of 
15 For some of the best books on the mythmaking to come out of the Vietnam War 
see John Hellman, American Myth and the Legacy ofVietnam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth ofthe Frontier in 
Twentieth Century America (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993), H. Bruce Franklin, 
MIA, or Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, New York: L. Hill Books, 1992) and Jerry 
Lembcke, The Spitting Image: Myth Memory, and the Legacy ofVietnam (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998). 
8 
Homecoming (2002). All of these studies define the Vietnam veteran's experience as 
unique. They emphasize such a factors as the 'unseen' nature of the enemy in Vietnam, 
the inability to form emotionally supportive 'buddy' groups due to constant troop 
rotation, and the public and governmental neglect of veterans upon their return home as 
making the Vietnam veteran a uniquely troubled figure in American history:6 
Beginning in the early 1970s, the media and popular culture amplified the 
maladjusted veteran stereotype. Newspapers and newsmagazine shows regularly carried 
stories ofveteran problems. 17 Movies such as Coming Home (1978), First Blood (1982), 
and Born on the Fourth ofJuly (1989) depicted the Vietnam veteran as emotionally and 
physically crippled. Television shows, novels, and pulp fiction perpetuated the 
stereotype with innumerous depictions ofVietnam veterans struggling to come to terms 
with their wartime experiences and unable to adjust to post-service life. 18 Clearly, there 
is no room to incorporate any positive aspects of the G.l. Bill into such a narrative. 
16 David E. Bonior, Steven M. Champlin, and Timothy S. Kolly. The Vietnam 
Veteran: A History ofNeglect (New York: Praeger, 1984), Robert J. Lifton, Homefrom 
the War: Vietnam Veterans, Neither Victims nor Executioners (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1973) Myra Macpherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted 
Generation, New Edition, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), Murray Polner, 
No Victory Parades: The Return ofthe Vietnam Veteran (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and 
Winston, 1971). Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing 
ofCharacter (New York: Atheneum, 1994), and Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma 
and The Trial ofHomecoming (New York: Atheneum, 2002). 
17 See, for example the wealth ofnegative press stories collected in Source 
Material on the Vietnam Veteran (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974). 
18 See Michael Anderegg (ed.), Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and 
Television (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), James William Gibson, 
Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary culture in Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1994) and Mark Boulton, Repatriation Through Film: The Role ofthe American 
Film Industry in Changing Public Perceptions about Vietnam Soldiers and Veterans 
since the late 1970s (Masters Thesis, University ofSouthern Mississippi, 1997). 
9 
According to the standard narrative, Vietnam veterans would be too busy overcoming 
their own demons to even think about going back to school. 
As with the World War II narrative, the Vietnam narrative contains elements of 
truth. Many veterans did return with problems not of their own making. But recently, a 
number of studies have begun to reexamine the Vietnam veteran homecoming 
experience. Eric T. Dean Jr.'s Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam and the 
Civil War (1997) reveals that Vietnam veterans may not have experienced any unique 
psychological burdens and that any problems they may have experienced were a normal 
and temporary consequence ofwartime service. According to Dean, Vietnam veterans 
lead more successful and productive lives than their non-veteran peers. He argues that 
the unstable veteran image has persisted due to political, social, and cultural motives ofa 
variety of special interests. B.G. Burkett makes a similar claim, albeit more forcefully, in 
his book Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed o/its Heroes and its 
History (1998). According to Burkett, Vietnam veterans have become some of the most 
successful members of their generation, having achieved greater economic and personal 
success and have contributed more as leaders of society than their non-veteran 
counterparts. Based on a wealth ofprimary source research, Burkett suggests that 
Vietnam veterans have lower suicide and unemployment rates than non-veterans and that 
the vast majority served honorably and came home to normal successful lives. Such 
studies suggest the need for a more thorough and objective reevaluation of the Vietnam 
10 

veteran homecoming experience and a need to question the dominant stereotype of 
government neglect and veteran maladjustment.19 
This dissertation adds to the debates on the Vietnam veteran's readjustment and 
the government's treatment of Vietnam veterans by placing 0.1. Bill b~k into their 
homecoming story. The emphasis is on the origins ofthe Vietnam era G.l Bills and the 
debates that occurred at the foderallevel that led to their distinctive character.2o 
Moreover, this study focuses only on the higher education benefits offered under the 
Vietnam era bills. As was true for World War II veterans, Vietnam veterans could claim 
a wide range ofbenefits including money for vocational training and home loans. For 
veterans, however, education benefits are the best known and most appreciated of the 0.1. 
Bill benefits and were, by far, the most contested feature of the Vietnam era bills. All of 
19 Eric T. Dean Jr, Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam and the 
Civil War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), B.O. Burkett and Olenna 
Whitley, Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed ofits Heroes and its 
History ~allas: Verity Press, 1998). 
2 Because ofrestraints of time and resources, this dissertation does not explore 
fully several vitally important issues that seem worthy of further study. As such, the 
scope and aims of this project are limited. For example, this dissertation does not 
examine in any great detail how the benefits changed veterans' lives. Nor does this study 
examine the impact of the bills on higher education. Oiven the vast amounts ofmoney 
the government poured into higher education following the 19660.1. Bill-far more than 
under the World War II O.I. Bill-the impact on higher education must have been 
considerable. Finally, this study does not discuss the later bills in the context of the 
development of the welfare state in America. Because of an almost continuous draft 
from 1940 through 1973 and the extension of benefits to veterans' dependents, a large 
minority of the population, perhaps as many as a third, could potentially claim a vast 
array ofbenefits including health care and education benefits during the Vietnam era. 
The fact that the defenders of freedom could enjoy access to what was, in effect, one of 
the most expensive and elaborate socialist systems in the western hemisphere with barely 
a voice raised in objection demands further attention. Each of these issues seems worthy 
of a discreet monograph, but they are covered only tangentially here because they would 
have required would a new set of research questions and methods and extensive 
additional research. I hope that this work might encourage such further investigations. 
11 
the major political debates between Congress and the White House and the clamor in the 
press over the Vietnam era bills revolved around the level of education benefits offered. 
At the end of the 1960s and throughout much of the 1970s, education benefits became the 
touchstone by which many veterans judged their treatment by the government. 
Unlike the original 1944 0.1. Bill, the Vietnam era 0.1. Bills were conceived and 
molded almost exclusively by politicians in Washington D.C. World War I veterans, and 
in particular the American Legion, had played a central role in the passage ofthe original 
bill. Stung by their experiences as World War I veterans, the Legion pushed tirelessly for 
the passage ofa generous benefits package for World War II veterans. By contrast, 
Vietnam veterans placed little pressure on the government and World War II veterans 
seemed reluctant to fight for their successors. In general, Vietnam veterans never 
organized on any great scale to force the government into offering similar rewards. Older 
established veterans organizations, in particular the "Big Three" of the American Legion, 
Veterans ofForeign Wars, and Disabled Veterans ofAmerica, supported the Vietnam 
veterans, but they tended to have the interests ofWorld War II veterans at heart and never 
threw the full weight of their lobbying machine into the fight to secure generous benefits 
for Vietnam Veterans. Because of this vacuum, the Vietnam era bills emerged largely 
from the initiatives of individual politicians such as Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), Vance 
Hartke (D-IN), and Alan Cranston (D-CA) in the Senate. Thereafter, the bills had to 
negotiate a treacherous path through the House Veterans Affairs Committee headed by 
the obstinate Olin Teague (D-TX), and pass an often obstructionist White House 
influenced by a parsimonious Budget of the Bureau and Office of Management and 
Business, and a less than munificent Veterans Administration. The political 
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compromises made at the highest levels of government set the stage for the both 
problems and the promise of the later bills. The debates between the Congress and the 
White House determined how much veterans would receive and ultimately dictated the 
success or failure of the program. To analyze these political debates, the source base for 
this study is comprised predominantly ofpresidential papers and printed congressional 
materials. These sources reveal clearly the different ideological and economic concerns 
and the background compromises made by Congress, the White House, and the vested 
federal agencies that gave the bills their final form. 
This focus on the political origins of the bills accomplishes several goals. First, it 
adds a new understanding to the story ofgovernment treatment of the returning Vietnam 
veteran. The OJ. Bill during the Vietnam era was not, at first, as generous as the original 
1944 bill, but this initial low level of funding did not result from simple government 
neglect. Numerous economic and ideological reasons lay behind the government's 
actions that mitigate, in part, the lower benefits offered during the early years of the 
program. These reasons include Lyndon Johnson's desire for universal education 
benefits and Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford's attempts to reverse the nation's economic 
downturn. The conclusions of this study do not overturn completely the narrative of 
neglect, but they certainly make it more complicated. Problems clearly existed in the 
formulation of the Vietnam era GJ. Bills. This study does, however, provide a context 
for understanding these problems without the kind of hyperbole and emotion that has 
infused many previous discussions of the government's treatment ofveterans. 
The government never completely turned its back on Vietnam veterans in terms of 
education benefits and an unprecedented number ofveterans did make use of federal 
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benefits to improve their lives. In many ways, the later 0.1. Bills offered greater 
opportunities to Vietnam veterans than the much-vaunted 1944 bill had provided World 
War II veterans. The government created a slew ofnew programs designed to help lower 
income veterans and conducted an extensive outreach effort to inform veterans of their 
entitlements. Vietnam era veterans also had longer than any previous generation of 
veterans to claim their benefits. Ultimately, certain factors-many outside of the 
government's control, such as the spiraling costs ofhigher education and the uneven 
costs ofeducation across different states-compromised the usefulness of the benefits for 
many veterans and reduced the quality of education they could attain. The government 
was slow to recognize such problems and often failed to appreciate the specific needs of 
the Vietnam generation ofveterans. But even though the later 0.1. Bills were never the 
same kind ofunqualified success as the original bill, Vietnam veterans did at least have 
recourse to a program that allowed millions to better their lives. 
Second, this study adds an important and neglected story to the narrative ofthe 
Vietnam veterans' homecoming experience. As evidenced by their participation rates, 
Vietnam veterans proved far more interested in returning to school after service than their 
World War II counterparts. Ofcourse, one major reason for this discrepancy is that 
higher education had become a much more integrated part of life in the 1960s and 1970s 
than it had been in 1945. Even so, the fact that so many Vietnam veterans used their 0.1. 
Bill benefits for education suggests that most were determined to improve their lives and 
not just drop out of society. Contrary to the standard narrative, if you wanted to find a 
Vietnam veteran in the mid 1970s you would have much more success looking in your 
local college or university than you would looking in a jail, or a homeless shelter, or a 
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drug rehabilitation clinic. The fact that so many Vietnam veterans did choose to return to 
school despite initially receiving lower benefits than the World War II generation further 
testifies to their resolve. Despite their problems, the later OJ. Bills should still playa 
central role in our understanding of the Vietnam veteran's post-service experience. 
Third, examining the story ofveterans' benefits in the Vietnam era helps put the 
experience of the Vietnam veteran into the broader context of the veteran experience in 
America. In particular, the story allows greater comparisons to be made with previous 
and current generations of veterans. There were differences in the form and amount of 
benefits offered between the original 0.1. Bill and later versions, but the purposes of the 
bills remained the same, and the government obligation toward veterans for service 
remained. Moreover, the Vietnam veteran's thirst for education and desire for self­
improvement suggests a commonality in the veteran experience with the World War II 
generation that is rarely acknowledged in the standard "Oood W arlBad War" narrative. 
Finally, because this story takes place inside the Beltway in Washington, it offers 
a new dimension to our understanding ofpost-1945 political history. By examining the 
attitudes of successive presidents toward veterans' benefits, this study offers a new 
perspective on their ideological and economic outlooks. This story also reveals the 
contradictions between public professions of support for veterans and the reality of the 
behind-the-scenes maneuverings to put a cap on the government's generosity. 
Repeatedly, Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford gave glowing public 
testimonies to veterans, praising them for their contributions to securing the nation's 
freedom. But there were limits to their gratitude, as each president, for different 
ideological or economic reasons, sought to reduce the amount ofbenefits offered. 
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A cast of politicians on Capitol Hill contributed to this process of working out 
exactly how much the nation owed its warriors for their service. They faced daunting 
questions-questions that had dogged presidents and politicians for centuries before 
them-over what constitutes a just reward for putting one's life on hold to fight for the 
nation's self..professed goal of defending liberty throughout the globe. In making these 
difficult decisions in troubled times, in quantifying the veteran's sacrifice, they really 
were trying to put a price on freedom. 
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Chapter 1 
ANTECEDENTS: FEDERAL DEBATES OVER VETERANS' BENEFITS UP TO 1964 
Though undying gratitude is the meed [sic] ofevery one who served, it is not to 
be said that a material bestowal is an obligation to those who emerged from the 
great conflict not only unharmed, but physically, mentally and spiritually richer 
for the great experience. 
President Warren Harding 
no person, because he wore a uniform, must thereafter be placed in a special class 
of beneficiaries over and above all other citizens. The fact ofwearing a uniform 
does not mean that he can demand and receive from his Government a benefit 
which no other citizen receives. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Military service in time ofwar or peace is an obligation of citizenship and should 
not be considered inherently a basis of future Government benefits. 
Bradley Report 
The Vietnam era G.I. Bills emerged from the precedents established during the 
centuries ofdebate over what a society owes its citizens for military service. Taking their 
cue from the 1593 English Acte for Reliefes of Souldiours, the American colonies passed 
laws promising to pay benefits to veterans injured in the line of service. Virginia passed 
the first such law in 1624, the Plymouth colony followed in 1636, and by 1777 all 
colonies with the exception ofConnecticut pledged to care for their disabled veterans. I 
In August 1776, just weeks after cleaving from the British Empire, the Continental 
Congress made the first steps toward codifying the federal government's obligation to 
veterans when it passed legislation providing for halfpay for life for disabled veterans. 
Such payments for veterans injured defending the national interest proved to be one of 
least controversial areas in future contests over veteran funding. The idea that the rest of 
I June Axxin and Mark J. Stem, Social Welfare: A History o/the American 
Response to Need, 6th Edition (Boston: Pearson! Allyn and Bacon, 2005), 30-31. 
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society should compensate any citizen whose life goals and means of earning a living 
might have been compromised defending the national interest enjoyed wide acceptance. 
By offering assistance to injured veterans, the government ensured that the burden of 
military service could be distributed in some small measure more equally across society. 
Although a slight hike in taxes hardly equates to the loss of a limb or other injury, the 
idea ofdisability compensation recognized that wartime hardships should not be limited 
to the few. 
The Continental Congress also extended the colonial tradition of offering land 
grants to soldiers that agreed to enlist for the duration of the war, although in part these 
land grants represented an attempt to induce mercenaries to defect from the British. In 
1780, the Congress codified the principle ofproviding assistance for veterans' 
dependants when it pledged to give halfpay for seven years to the widows and orphans of 
Revolutionary War officers. All veterans received mustering out pay. 
The provision ofbenefits to non-disabled Revolutionary War veterans was far 
from automatic and the debates over who should receive benefits raised questions over 
patriotism and military service that would resonate right up through the Vietnam era. 
Jack Resch's Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and 
Political Culture in the Early Republic (1999) reveals that Thomas Jefferson and many of 
his supporters were apprehensive about the corrosive effect on the nation's moral 
character ofoffering pensions and payments to non-disabled veterans.2 For Jefferson and 
his followers, virtuous citizen-soldiers who required no recompense for performing their 
2 Jack Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, 
and Political Culture in the Early Republic (Amherst: University ofMassachusetts Press, 
1999). 
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civic republican duty fought and won the Revolution. Pensions, they suggested, 
constituted an unnecessary reward and many feared that they might lead to the corrupting 
traditions ofOld World standing armies. 
Moreover, some feared that creation of special privileges for veterans would set 
them apart from the rest of society and thus undermine the democratic intent of the 
Revolution. At the core of revolutionary ideology stood the repudiation of class privilege 
and status associated with the Old World.3 The creation of a distinct and privileged 
group ofveterans might foreshadow the formation kind of stratified society rejected in 
1776. Even as late as 1818, when Congress debated the passage of the Revolutionary 
War Pensions act, North Carolina senator Nathaniel Macon warned that offering pensions 
to those not injured in service was "repugnant to the principles ofour Government, and at 
war with good sense and public justice.',4 The military exigencies of the War of 1812, 
combined with widespread press reporting of veteran hardship eventually overrode such 
objections, and in 1818 Revolutionary War veterans became the first ever recipients of a 
large scale federal pension program in the United States. Early in the program eligibility 
extended only to veterans demonstrating need, but in 1832, all veterans received pensions 
regardless of financial condition. 
Offering inducements and ongoing payments for veterans established one of the 
more controversial principles of veterans' benefits. As Jefferson and Macon had 
suggested, every citizen in a participatory democracy could and should owe some 
3 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins ofthe American Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Gordon Wood, The Radicalism 
ofthe American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
4 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 107. 
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obligation to the state, including military service. At key points over the next 200 years, 
many presidents and politicians questioned whether rewarding citizens to defend their 
nation undermined this democratic principle. As benefits grew more elaborate and 
generous, the questioning grew correspondingly louder. 
The precedents established by the Revolutionary War extended to the wars of the 
nineteenth century. Veterans ofboth the wars of1812 and the Mexican War of 1845 
received immediate land grants and disabled veterans received compensation. The issue 
ofpensions got resolved less quickly. Not until 1871 did veterans of the War of 1812 
receive pensions. Mexican War veterans had to wait until 1887. 
Union veterans of the Civil War received similar benefits to their predecessors, 
but the benefits became more generous and eligibility requirements more liberal. 
Disabled Union soldiers received disability compensation at a rate determined by their 
rank and the degree of their disability. Instead ofoutright land grants, the government 
gave veterans preferential treatment under the Homestead Act by allowing them to count 
a period equal to the duration of their service toward the length oftime required for them 
to own the land. For the first time, veterans also received preferential treatment when 
applying for federal employment. Injured and disabled veterans also received medical 
care through the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. 5 
5 Background to nineteenth century and World War I benefits from Axinn and 
Stem, Social Welfare, David Bodenger, Soldier's Bonuses: A History ofVeterans 
Benefits in the United States, 1776-1967 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Pennsylvania State 
University, 1972), Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political 
Origins ofSocial Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1992), Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode ofthe 
Great Depression (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing, 1972), and Amy W. Knight 
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Factors other than need led to the expansion ofCivil War benefits. The lobbying 
efforts ofpension lawyers contributed to the passage of the Arrears Act of 1879 that 
allowed Civil War veterans to claim benefits retroactively for service related injuries. 
TIle Republican Party, keen to expand the spoils-base of their patronage network, and the 
Grand Army of the Republic, the powerful Union veterans' organization, then helped 
push through the Dependant Pensions Act of 1890 that decreed that veterans could claim 
disability benefits even if their injury did not occur whilst in service. In effect, the 
provisions of the 1890 act established a permanent pension system for aging veterans.6 
Because ofmore liberalized benefits, the costs to government skyrocketed by the end of 
the nineteenth century. By one estimate, veterans' pensions alone accounted for almost 
43 percent of all government expenditures by 1893.7 
The provision of liberal benefits to veterans while much of the country struggled 
to adjust to the economic pressures of industrialization set veterans apart as a special 
class in the United States. As Theda Skocpol notes in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: 
The Political Origins ofSocial Policy in the United States (1992), veterans avoided the 
stigma attached to government handouts because society deemed that they had earned 
their benefits through military service. Many western countries responded to 
industrialization by offering benefits to their poor. The United States never followed suit 
and the government eschewed nationwide relief to their most needy. But veterans had 
now solidified their privileged position in society, establishing in Skocpol' s words, "a 
and Robert L. Worden, Veterans Benefits Administration, An Organizational History, 
1776-1994 (Collingdale, Philadelphia: Diane Publishing Company, 1995). 
6See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, and Mary Dearing, Veterans in 
Politics: The Story ofthe G.A.R. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952). 
7 Daniels, The Bonus March, 11. 
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moral ordering of claims on the federal government's largesse.',s The Civil War 
established the precedent ofproviding generous benefits for veterans, but the enormous 
costs of benefits also raised the question ofjust how much should veterans be 
compensated for service. These questions intensified after World War I. 
The cost and inefficiency-including allegations of fraud-of the nineteenth 
century benefits system prompted a change in the philosophy and distribution ofbenefits 
during World War 1. The 1914 War Risk Insurance Act offered merchant seamen at risk 
from submarine attacks low cost insurance to compensate them or their families in the 
event ofdeath or disability. Following the recommendations of Woodrow Wilson's 1917 
Council ofNational Defense the government extended this provision to all of the nation's 
soldiers hoping this measure would preclude the need for costly pensions at some point 
further down the road. Veterans' dependants also received allotments paid for by the 
soldiers and the government. The government, for the first time, offered vocational 
training for disabled veterans. By offering training, the government attempted to give 
veterans the kind of advancement in life they could have received had they not entered 
the military and remained in public life learning a trade. The provision of vocational 
benefits set another significant precedent for future veterans' benefit packages. In 1919, 
veterans became eligible for medical care for service-connected injuries (in 1924 veterans 
could receive medical care for non-service connected injuries in addition). But in the 
8 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 149. 
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aftermath ofthe conflict, the most contentious debates over funding centered on the issue 
of a cash bonus for veterans.9 
Proponents of the bonus argued that servicemen earned less in military service 
than they would have as civilians and should be compensated through a one-time cash 
payment. This idea that citizens should be compensated for service resurrected questions 
about civic obligation in a participatory democracy. When vetoing a proposed bonus in 
1924, Calvin Coolidge argued, "Patriotism which is bought and paid for is not patriotism. 
. .. Service to our country in time ofwar means sacrifice. It is for that reason alone that 
we honor and revere it. To attempt to make a money payment out of the earnings of the 
people to those who are physically well and financially able is to abandon one of our 
most cherished ideals.,,10 For Coolidge, the concept ofpaying citizens to fight in defense 
of their national interests ran antithetical to the cherished image of the citizen soldiers of 
Revolutionary War taking up arms to fight for the common good in the face ofexternal 
threats. The Minuteman was at risk ofbecoming a Hessian mercenary. 
Other critics of the bonus made their arguments with similar allusions to the 
nation's ideological heritage. In the heady laissez faire atmosphere of the early 1920s, 
Warren Harding and other fiscal conservatives, such as influential Treasury Secretary 
Andrew Mellon, warned that the creation of an entrenched system of benefits might make 
9 For further discussion on interwar benefits see Bodenger, Soldier's Bonuses, 
Daniels, The Bonus March, Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen, The Bonus Army: An 
America Epic (New York: Walker & Company, 2004), William P. Dillingham, Federal 
Aid to Veterans, 1917-1941 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1952), Jennifer 
Keane, Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking ofAmerica (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), and Donald J Lisio, The President and Protest: Hoover, 
Macarthur, and the Bonus Riot (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994). 
10 Dickson and Allen, Bonus Army, 28. 
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veterans a special interest welfare group. Harding even took the unusual step of 
appearing on Capitol Hill in an attempt to dissuade the Senate from voting on a bonus 
bill. ll Despite the seemingly healthy state of the nation's finances, Harding's arguments 
also contained warnings of the financial burden of the bonus. In his message before the 
Senate he warned that such a measure might "emperil [sic] the financial stability of our 
country.,,12 In his veto message, Harding reiterated the view that the government owed 
fewer obligations to able-bodied veterans when he stated: 
Though undying gratitude is the meed [sic] ofevery one who served, it is not to 
be said that a material bestowal is an obligation to those who emerged from the 
great conflict not only unharmed, but physically, mentally and spiritually richer 
for the great experience. 
As his glowing assessment of wartime service might reveal, Harding never served on the 
front lines. The arguments put forward by Harding and Coolidge--one financial, the 
other ideological-failed to resonate in Congress as both the House and Senate voted to 
override Harding's veto, albeit by small margins. Following the override, the 
government issued World War I veterans a certificate for a bonus to be paid in 1945. But 
the arguments against veteran privilege did not go away. 
Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, hardly renowned for keeping a tight reign on the 
nation's finances, fought against giving veterans a privileged status. Before he took 
office, the infamous Bonus March of 1932 and the ensuing violent struggles would have 
left Roosevelt in no doubt as to the need for government handouts in the veteran 
community in the wake of the Great Depression. Despite the protests, one of Roosevelt's 
11 Daniels, Bonus March, 29. 

12 Quoted in ibid., 29. 
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first acts after entering the White House was to place a moratorium on veterans' benefits 
in order to reevaluate the nation's finances. According to one estimate, at the time of the 
decision veterans comprised only 1 percent of the population while claiming almost 24 
percent of the budget.13 Under his Economy Act of 1933, Roosevelt cut all veterans 
benefits to able-bodied veterans and even slashed benefits for disabled veterans. In 
making his decision, Roosevelt listened carefully to director of the budget Lewis 
Douglas. Douglas, a former Arizona congressman, served in France in World War I, but 
believed that veterans should not be given open ended rewards if their lives had not been 
impaired in any way. In October 1933, Roosevelt addressed the American Legion 
Convention in Chicago and argued forcefully against sweeping veteran benefits. He 
claimed: 
no person, because he wore a uniform, must thereafter be placed in a special class 
of beneficiaries over and above all other citizens. The fact of wearing a uniform 
does not mean that he can demand and receive from his Government a benefit 
which no other citizen receives. It does not mean that because a person served in 
the defense ofhis country, performed a basic obligation of citizenship, he should 
receive a pension from his Government because of a disabili7 incurred after his 
service had terminated, and not connected with that service. 1 
Even as he sought to establish a sweeping welfare state, Roosevelt consistently opposed 
direct handouts to veterans. In 1935, he vetoed Congress's attempts to allow early 
payment of the bonus to needy veterans. In his lengthy veto message he claimed that the 
benefits already offered World War I veterans had proved sufficient and argued that 
veterans would be better served through the general uplifting of the nation's fortunes: 
13 Dickson and Allen, Bonus Army, 208. 

14 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

"Address to the American Legion Convention, Chicago Illinois," October 2, 1933. 
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The veteran who suffers from this depression can best be aided by the 
rehabilitation of the country as a whole. His country with honor and gratitude 
returned him at the end of the war to the citizenry from which he came. He 
became once more a member of the great civilian population. His interests 
became identified with its fortunes and also with its misfortunes. 
Roosevelt never questioned the service and sacrifice veterans had given the nation. What 
he did doubt was that military service should give veterans a license to perpetually calion 
the government in times of hardship. Roosevelt never opposed giving veterans some 
assistance. He proposed that the government should help veterans to help themselves by 
channeling them into New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps. 
During the less well known and less contentious Bonus March of 1933, he placated many 
veterans by offering them transportation and assistance in signing up for CCC projects.IS 
But to Roosevelt, giving veterans a direct handout for services that should be a natural 
obligation ofcitizenship seemed like too much of a boondoggle. He had no problem in 
passing universal legislation that helped the most desperate and needy in society, 
including veterans, but he did not believe that veterans deserved to be singled out for 
privileged treatment. Ultimately, Congress did not share FDR's views. Following 
stories ofveteran hardship in the press, including some high profile suicides, they clawed 
back most of the cuts made under the Economy Act and in 1936 overrode the President's 
veto of the Bonus.16 Twelve years after it was promised, but nine years before it was due, 
the veterans got their bonus. 
Given the contentious nature of the veteran question during the interwar years, 
Washington started planning early for the potentially tumultuous return ofmore than 
15 See Daniels, Bonus March, 229-230, and Keane, Doughboys, 202. 
16 Dixon and Allen, Bonus Army, 209. 
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fifteen million veterans after World War II. The specter of the Bonus March heightened 
fears of what might happen if the economy could not absorb the returning veterans. Early 
veterans' measures mirrored closely those offered World War I veterans. The Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940 gave an early palliative by guaranteeing that veterans 
could return to their jobs after service, while the National Life Insurance Act of 1940 
offered servicemen and women life and disability insurance. Dependants of soldiers 
received allotments under the Servicemen Dependants Allowance Act of 1942. Finally, 
the Mustering Out Pay Act of 1944 offered some immediate relief to discharged soldiers 
in the form of small direct handouts. 17 But given the sheer numbers ofveterans involved 
in the war effort and the precarious nature ofthe economy, a clear need existed for a 
more comprehensive benefits package. 
Although many politicians tried to resurrect the idea of a bonus, most 
proscriptions for compensating veterans emphasized training and education. I8 
Roosevelt's Armed Forces Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for 
Service Personnel, formed in November 1942 and headed by Brigadier General Frederick 
G. Osborn, advocated education benefits as a means to help veterans reintegrate back into 
society. Similarly, the National Resources Planning Board conducted numerous studies 
into the potential problems facing returning veterans and in the summer of 1943 called 
for a comprehensive package of training and education benefits. These proposals found 
favor in the White House. Roosevelt retained his opposition to the idea of adjusted 
17 See Axxin and Stern, Social Welfare, and Keith Olson, The G.I Bill, The 
Veterans, and The Colleges (Lexington: University Press ofKentucky, 1974). 
18 See David B. Ross, Preparingfor Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World 
War //(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969),67-87. 
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compensation or direct handouts for veterans. Instead, he favored offering veterans 
education and training outlets so that they could craft better lives for themselves upon 
their return. In a message to Congress in October 1943, Roosevelt stated that the new 
benefits should extend the principle that veterans should be compensated for time lost 
from civilian life when he noted: 
Every day that the war continues interrupts the schooling and training ofmore 
men and women, and deprives them of the education and skills which they would 
otherwise acquire for use in later life. Not only the individual welfare of our 
troops, but the welfare of the Nation itself, requires that we reverse this trend just 
as quickly as possible after the war. Vocational and educational opportunities for 
veterans should be of the widest range. 19 
Before the end of the war, over 600 separate bills entered Congress promising 
veterans everything from medical coverage to education benefits to furlough pay?O None 
gathered much momentum until the American Legion intervened. Formed as a vetemn 
advocacy group in 1919 and comprised mainly ofWorld War I veterans, Legion 
members knew better than most the needs of the returning soldier. Harry Colmery, a 
World War I veteran and former Legion National Commander, drafted a "Bill ofRights 
for O.I. Joe and O.I. Jane," which included provisions for such benefits as unemployment 
insurance, funding for higher education or employment training, and horne 10ans?1 
After the bill's introduction to Congress on January 1, 1944, the Legion 
conducted an intensive lobbying media campaign to gain public and political support. 
19 Public Papers, Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on the E~ucation ofWar 
Veterans," October 27, 1943. 
20 Keane, Doughboys, 208. 
21 See William Pencak, For God and Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989) and Thomas A. Rumer, The American ~ 
Legion: An Official History, 1919-1989 (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1990). 
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William Randolph Hearst threw the considerable weight ofhis newspaper conglomerate 
behind the Legion's cause. In a letter to the New York Journal American, he called on 
the nation's politicians to "think less about their own personal 'place in history' and think 
more about the men whose heroism and self sacrifice make the place possible.,,22 Hearst 
later wrote, "Republics are proverbially ungrateful. ... It fights its wars with children ... 
and when it has mutilated them or blinded them, refuses to care for them adequately or 
even to try properly to rehabilitate them and make their lives more endurable and 
useful.,,23 
There were some opponents of the bill. Some educators feared-misguidedly­
that an influx ofveterans might dilute of the quality of the nation's college students. The 
Disabled American Veterans opposed widespread benefits for fear that the more pressing 
needs of disabled veterans might be ignored to accommodate the financial burden of the 
new measures. But most Americans agreed that something had to be done to aid their 
returning warriors. The Roosevelt administration initially favored a proposal by Utah 
senator Elbert D. Thomas that provided even more liberal education benefits than the 
Legion's bill, but the basic tenets ofboth bills were similar enough to make compromise 
relatively easy to achieve. In Congress, Mississippi Representative John Rankin raised 
most of the objections, questioning, for example, which agency should administer the 
benefits, whether the legislation compromised states rights, and whether the emphasis on 
education benefits prejudicial to Southern and Western veterans who might nonnally 
22 Quoted in Ross, Preparing/or Ulysses, 80. 
23 Ibid., 80-81. 
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eschew higher education.24 Prejudice also lay at the heart ofRankin's objections as he 
bristled at the thought of equal benefits for all races. But for such an all-encompassing 
piece of legislation, and especially when compared with the previous and later debates 
over veteran benefits, the G.I. Bill enjoyed a relatively smooth passage through Congress. 
On June 22, 1944 President Roosevelt signed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act into 
law. In his signing remarks Roosevelt claimed that the bill "gives emphatic notice to the 
men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them 
down." He reiterated the main justification for the bill by noting that veterans "have been 
compelled to make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the 
rest of us, and are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems. ,,25 
Although it built on the precedents ofprevious veterans' legislation, the scope of 
benefits offered under the G.I. Bill was unprecedented. Returning veterans had the 
option ofclaiming unemployment insurance for the first fifty-two weeks after discharge 
at a rate of twenty dollars a month. Over nine million out of approximately 15.4 million 
eligible veterans joined what became known as the "52-20 Club." Unemployment 
insurance offered veterans a welcome respite before deciding what to do next with their 
lives. On average, these veterans used their benefits for only seventeen weeks before 
finding employment or furthering their education. In addition, over 2.3 million took 
advantage of the low-rate home loans. The bill also offered veterans loans to start 
businesses or invest in farming. However, by some distance the education benefits 
24 See Ross, Preparing/or Ulysses, 89-125. 

25 Public Papers, Roosevelt, "Statement on Signing the G.I. Bill," June 22, 1944. 
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remain the most well known and, among veterans, the most appreciated aspects of the 
G.1. Bill. 
Before World War II, a college education tended to be the preserve of wealthier, 
generally white Americans. But the educational benefits offered under the G.1. Bill 
forever changed the nature ofhigher education. The bill offered veterans the opportunity 
to attend the college of their choice irrespective of race, class, or gender. Consequently, 
higher education became far more democratized as Americans from all walks of life 
entered school, many becoming the first in their family to do so. Once they had chosen 
the school they wished to attend, veterans received up to 500 dollars a year for tuition and 
a single veteran received a monthly stipend of fifty dollars to live off (this amount 
increased to sixty-five dollars in 1946 and seventy-five dollars in 1948). A veteran who 
claimed dependants received a proportionally higher payment. The generous tuition 
payment allowed veterans to attend even the most elite colleges as Time magazine noted 
when it asked the rhetorical question "why go to Podunk U ifyou can go to Yale.,,26 To 
claim benefits, a veteran had to have served at least ninety days and have left the service 
a total with an "other than dishonorable discharge." In return, the veteran received 
benefits for one full year plus a period equal to the time of their service up to a total of 
forty-eight months. By the program's end on July 25, 1956, approximately 2.2 million 
veterans had used their benefits for higher education. A further 3.4 million attended other 
institutions of learning such as vocational schools, and about 1.4 million received on-the­
job training. 
26 Milton Greenberg, The G.L Bill: The Law That Changed America (New York: 
Lickle Publishing, 1997),44. 
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The genius of the 1944 O.I. Bill lay in its ability to reward veterans generously 
while managing to avoid most ofthe complaints leveled against previous benefits 
packages. Compared with veterans ofprevious wars, the World War II veteran became 
the most rewarded soldier the United States had ever sent into battle. Yet, compared with 
previous and future debates over veteran benefits, the debates over the 1944 bill were 
remarkably muted. By placing training and education at the center of the veterans' 
readjustment needs instead of a simple cash bonus or an open-ended commitment to a 
future pension, legislators avoided the charge that veterans were being transformed into a 
privileged social class. Opponents of a welfare state including William Randolph Hearst 
could support the concept of giving veterans an opportunity to better themselves rather 
than a handout. Although in practical terms, the opportunities given veterans created, in 
the words ofhistorian Jennifer Keane, ''the most privileged generation in American 
history," the O.I. Bill was a politically acceptable and widely lauded answer to the 
veteran question.27 
The original Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 laid the broad conceptual 
framework for the OJ. Bills that followed. The idea that veterans should be offered 
educational and vocational benefits and home loans as recompense for military service 
ultimately became a central feature of the benefits packages offered to all post-World 
War II veterans. The OJ. Bill raised the expectations of future veterans as to what they 
might expect after coming home from war. But the provision of later OJ. Bills was far 
from automatic and there were significant differences between the World War II bill and 
the later Vietnam era bills. Many of the more controversial aspects of the Vietnam era 
27 Keane, Doughboys, 212. 
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bills originated in the debates over the Korean Conflict G.1. Bill and in the broader 
federal debates over veteran funding that took place at the mid and late 1950s. 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the 1944 G.I. Bill garnered almost 
universal praise for what it did for the veterans and for the nation's economy. But 
beneath the seemingly perfect surface of this iconic legislation stirred currents of 
discontent. Not surprisingly, given the scale and cost of the first G.1. Bills, the 
government charged several agencies with conducting investigations into the bill's 
successes and failures. Both the Veterans Administration (VA) and the General 
Accounting Office conducted inquiries into the efficacy of the legislation. In addition, 
several committees in Congress held formal hearings on the bill?8 The House Select 
Committee to Conduct a Study and Investigation of the Educational, Training and Loan 
Guarantee Programs ofWorld War II Veterans produced the report destined to have the 
biggest impact on later versions of the G.1. Bill. This investigation also marked the 
emergence of Olin Teague (D-TX) as one of the most influential figures in veterans' 
affairs in the mid twentieth century. ' 
Known widely as "Tiger" Teague, Teague had covered himself in glory as an 
infantryman during World War II before entering politics. He went ashore with the D­
Day invasions on June 6, 1944 and went on to win the Silver Star with two clusters, a 
Bronze Star, and the Purple Heart with two clusters. He had achieved the rank ofcolonel 
upon his discharge in September 1946. He entered Congress that same year, and served 
as the Democratic representative for the Sixth Congressional District in Texas until 1977. 
When asked why he entered public service, Teague once commented, "I landed on Utah 
28 Olson, G.l Bill, 105. 
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Beach and saw hundreds ofbodies stacked up. I started thinking about what causes hell 
like that, and I decided it was government. I decided I wanted to do something about 
Over an eighteen-month period from 1950 to 1952, Teague's committee heard 
testimony from VA officials, educators, veterans, and other parties affected by the G.!. 
Bill. The Committee uncovered widespread cases of fraud by education institutions. 
Because the original bill paid tuition directly to accredited institutions, many colleges and 
training establishments arbitrarily raised their tuition rates. The government guaranteed 
payment of tuition up to 500 dollars per year. By pushing tuition rates close to the 500­
dollar level, the offending institutions attempted to maximize their return. from the flood 
ofveterans that swelled their rolls in the aftermath of the war. Further stories emerged of 
fly-by-night schools offering specious courses just to attract veterans and cash in on the 
benefits windfall. 30 
The scrutiny of the 1944 OJ. Bill at the beginning of the 1950s took on an 
increasingly prescient tone. By the time Teague's committee handed their report to 
Congress in February 1952, the Cold War had already turned hot in Korea, and 
discussions had already begun over the possibility ofresurrecting the program for a new 
cadre ofveterans. At first, the government was reluctant to extend benefits to 
participants ofan undeclared war. One month after the war's start, the House Veterans 
Committee rebuffed an attempt by Teague to pass a bill providing benefits for Korean 
29 Quoted in the New York Times, January 24, 1981, 16. 
30 Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, Volume I, (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), 1349. 
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veterans along the same lines as those offered World War II veterans. But as Korea 
devolved into a very real war in all but name, the calls for equitable benefits grew louder. 
By March of 1952, Congress had tabled thirty-three separate bills designed to 
extend benefits to Korean conflict veterans.31 The three bills given greatest consideration 
in the House Veterans Affairs Committee differed in the amounts they offered and in the 
way the benefits were to be administered. H.R.6377 proposed an extension of the same 
benefits offered under original 1944 bill. Korean Conflict veterans would receive the 
same 500-dollar a year sum to pay for tuition and fees in addition to a seventy-five dollar 
a month stipend for living expenses. The American Legion, so instrumental in the 
passage of the original act, understandably favored this option. A second bill, H.R.5040, 
tabled by John Rankin, proposed that the government would pay only half of a veteran's 
tuition costs up to a total of300 dollars. Rankin proposed a five-dollar increase in the 
monthly living stipend to offset the reduction in tuition benefits. The third proposal 
departed most radically from the original bill and proved to be the most contentious. 
Based on his findings as head of the House investigation into the 1944 bill, 
Teague proposed a bill that contained one controversial position that he would stick to 
throughout his involvement in the veterans' benefits debates in the coming decades. 
Despite his professed unease with the "hell" that governments inflict upon their citizen­
soldiers, Teague proved equally as concerned with the attempts to defraud the 
government uncovered by his committee. He came to believe that the best way to curb 
such fraudulent incidents would be to make any future payment of education benefits 
directly to the veteran themselves and not to the institutions. The veterans would then 
31 New York Times, March 16, 1952, Ell. 
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have the discretion to spend their benefits at the institution of their choosing. This 
measure, Teague opined, would eliminate the incentive for institutions to raise their 
tuition rates while still giving veterans full discretion to choose their course of study. He 
incorporated this view into his 0\Vll proposed Korean G.I. Bill, H.R.6425. Teague 
suggested that a fixed monthly sum of 110 dollars paid directly to the veteran should 
cover adequately all of the veteran's educational needs. As with all of the education 
benefit proposals, the monthly allowance increased depending on the number of 
dependants. 
Teague's measure attracted immediate criticism. Some educators realized that 
veterans might favor lower cost public colleges instead 'of more expensive private 
institutions. The American Legion expressed concerns that under either Rankin or 
Teague's bills, the failure to pay tuition costs in full might discourage veterans from 
entering higher education.32 The New York Times questioned whether the veterans might 
be forced to avoid courses that required higher out ofpocket expenses for books or 
materials if they were forced to cover all of their expenses out of a fixed monthly sum.33 
Representatives of some colleges with higher tuition rates, understandably, feared that the 
rewards reaped under the original bill would be lowered substantially as veterans might 
favor more inexpensive options. Despite such criticism, the version of the bill that finally 
emerged from House Committee on Veterans Affairs at the end of May 1952 retained the 
central contested feature of Teague's bill that decreed that money for tuition should be 
paid directly to the veteran. 
32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid. 
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Before the bill went before Congress, some representatives and educators 
launched one final offensive to try to prevent its passage. Both Teague and Rankin stood 
behind the bill that emerged from the House Veterans Affairs Committee. But when they 
attempted to obtain a "closed rule" vote for the bill, whereby no amendments could be 
added, the House Rules Committee stalled. They insisted that the Committee on 
Veterans Affairs consider an amendment tabled by Illinois Republican Representative 
William Springer to add a direct tuition payment amendment to the bill. Teague called 
Springer's measure an assault on "the heart ofmy bill," and vowed to fight it. While the 
House stalled, officials at some private schools convened in an attempt to dissuade the 
House from passing Teague's measure. University of Southern California President Fred 
D. Fagg Jr. appealed to the heads ofprivate institutions to write to Congress in support of 
Springer's amendment. Ultimately, the arguments against the bill made little impact. On 
June 5, the House voted by an overwhelming 361-1 to pass the bill. Even Springer voted 
for the bill. The only dissenting vote came from Maryland Republican James Devereux, 
a brigadier general who had spent almost all of World War II as a prisoner ofwar, who 
objected to the Rules Committee's decision to forbid amendments and limit debate on the 
bill to only forty minutes on the House floor. The Senate passed the bill by voice vote on 
June 28, and on July 16, President Truman signed Public Law 82-550, the Veterans' 
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952.34 
The Korean G.I. Bill did not quite reach the generous heights of the 1944 bill. In 
part, the reason for this more parsimonious approach to benefits was a perception that the 
34 Congress and the Nation, Vol. I, 1348. 
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first OJ. Bill had been overly generous.35 In congressional hearings on veterans benefits, 
some educators admitted that the economic need for a GJ. Bill following Korea would be 
far less than it had been after World War II. The expanding postwar economy seemed to 
offer more opportunities for veterans to reintegrate without the need for additional 
government assistance. A spokesman for the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and 
Universities admitted that the "situation [was] entirely different from ... the end of 
World War II.,,36 In its final form, the Korean GJ. Bill offered benefits to veterans who 
served after June 27, 1950 until the official declaration of the end of the conflict (this date 
would come on January 31, 1955). 
The 1952 bill provided education benefits of 110 dollars per month for a veteran 
with no dependants. This sum increased to 135 dollars for one dependant, 160 for two or 
more. Benefits could be claimed for a period equal to one-and-a halftimes the veteran's 
service up to a maximum of thirty-six months. As Teague had sought, veterans had to 
pay for all of their tuition costs, books, supplies, and living expenses out of their monthly 
stipend. Korean veterans also received similar home loan benefits to those offered World 
War II veterans. The provision for unemployment insurance remained, but Korean 
veterans had less time than their "52-20" predecessors to form a "club," receiving twenty-
six dollars a month for only twenty-six weeks. 
Veterans had received benefits in an inconsistent manner for centuries until the 
passage ofthe World War II G.I. Bill, but with the passage of similarly sweeping 
legislation for Korea veterans the government set a precedent and created a heightened 
35 Olson, G.I Bill, 106. 
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expectation among future generations of veterans ofwhat the nation owed them for their 
sacrifice during a time of war. Certainly most Vietnam veterans, when it came their turn 
to answer the nation's call, would have had some expectations of recompense for their 
service. But even though the Korean G.1. Bill helped set the precedent in terms of 
function and form of later G.1. bills, the passage ofbenefits for Vietnam veterans was by 
no means automatic. From the mid 1950s onwards, the debate over who should be 
eligible for benefits gained renewed impetus in the government. In particular, questions 
arose over whether benefits should continue to be offered to veterans who suffered no 
perceptible physical or economic harm from their military service. Few people denied 
that disabled veterans should receive recompense for their sacrifice. To that end, the 
government continued to extend disability benefits throughout the 1950s. But the 
provision ofgeneral benefits to all servicemen and women received far greater scrutiny. 
On January 14, 1955 President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order 
10588 creating a special Commission on Veterans Pensions to "carry out a 
comprehensive study of the laws and policies pertaining to pension, compensation, and 
related non-medical benefits for our veterans and their dependants.,,37 In a later letter of 
clarification, Eisenhower spoke of the need "for a constructive reappraisal of the 
standards under which such benefits should be provided." Noting the exponential growth 
of the veteran population and the growth of universal national welfare programs, 
Eisenhower noted, "It is our duty to arrange our affairs so that future generations will 
inherit an economic and social structure which is fundamentally sound and in which 
37 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
"Letter to Omar Bradley from President Eisenhower," March 5, 1955. 
39 
obligations, including those owed to veterans and their survivors, are distributed 
equitably and not as an unwelcome burden.,,38 As an old soldier, Eisenhower's 
motivation to reevaluate veterans' benefits sprang not from some desire to cheat the 
veteran from their dues. Instead, the Bradley Commission represented part of his broader 
economic agenda to reassess federal spending in an attempt to reduce the government's 
outlay and balance the budget. 
Eisenhower also had strong ideological reasons to reexamine veterans' benefits. 
Despite his conservative convictions, he accepted that he could never roll back the New 
Deal and once told his brother, "Should any party attempt to abolish social security and 
eliminate labor laws and fann subsidies, you would not hear of that party again. ",39 
Indeed, Eisenhower added over 10 million to social security rolls and increased public 
housing programs.40 He did, however, object to what he saw as the pandering to special 
interest groups of his predecessor Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower thought that Truman 
had given too many concessions to fanners, unions, and racial liberals. Decrying overt 
governmental interference in the economy, Eisenhower noted, "a paternalistic 
government ... can gradually destroy, by suffocation in the immediate advantage of 
subsidy, the will of a people to maintain a high degree of individual responsibility.,11:1 
Harking back to the republican spirit ofThomas Jefferson, Eisenhower believed that such 
groups should set aside their selfish interests for the sake of the common good, aiming for 
38 Ibid. 
39 Quoted in Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as 
Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 
40 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume II, The Presidency (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1984), 158. 
41 Quoted in Chester Pach and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency ofDwight D. 
Eisenhower (University Press of Lawrence, Kansas, 1991), 31. 
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what one biographer describes as a "corporate commonwealth, ... a harmonious society 
free of class conflict, selfish acquisitiveness and divisive party politics. ,,42 Eisenhower 
expressed this view in his attempts to lower farm subsidies and his philosophy led him to 
question the ever expanding slate of benefits and special privileges offered veterans. In 
questioning how far the government's generosity should extend to its protectors of 
freedom at the expense ofother sectors of society, Eisenhower shared a similar 
ideological heritage with Jefferson and FDR. Eisenhower hoped that the Bradley 
Commission could develop a new guiding philosophy that would make veterans benefits 
more equitable for all of society. 
For more than a year, the Bradley Commission gathered demographic data on the 
nation's veterans, interviewed public officials concerned with veterans' benefits, and sent 
out thousands of questionnaires to veterans to gauge their readjustment needs. Their final 
report became one of the most important documents on veterans' benefits to emerge in 
the mid twentieth century .43 The Commission examined the philosophy behind 
continuing veteran pensions, and all veterans' benefits in general. Its findings influenced 
public policy for the next decade and had a direct bearing on the debates surrounding the 
Vietnam era G.1. Bills. 
42 Richard Damms, The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-1961 (London: Longman, 
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Eisenhower appointed Omar N. Bradley to head the commission. Following his 
success in leading the First Army in the D-Day Normandy invasion, Bradley enjoyed an 
illustrious postwar career. He served as the head of the Veterans Administration from 
1945 through 1948 and guided the agency through its difficult task of helping over fifteen 
million World War II veterans reintegrate back into society. Bradley went on to serve as 
Army Chief of Staff in 1948, became the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
1949, and attained the rank of five-star general in 1950.44 
Initially slated to submit their findings on Novenlber 1, 1955, the Bradley 
Commission delayed giving their report to the White House until April 23, 1956. Noting 
that previous benefits had accrued in a somewhat ad ho'c fashion, the Commission 
"endeavored to develop a philosophy and guiding principles, on the basis of which our 
national obligations to veterans can be discharged generously. ,,45 Some of the guidelines 
suggested by the Commission in determining the government's obligation to veterans 
included the idea that benefits should continue to be used as a means of"equalizing 
significant sacrifices that result directly from wartime military service.,,46 To that end, 
the Commission lauded the efforts ofthe G.1. Bill as the "best way to meet the 
Government's obligation to nondisabled war veterans" by offering "constructive 
assistance when it is most needed.,,47 The GJ. Bill, the report concluded, "as a whole has 
fully discharged the Government's obligation to nondisabled veterans and has provided 
44 Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). 
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benefits that in many cases more than balanced any handicaps resulting from military 
service.,,48 
But the Commission also noted that the "rehabilitation of disabled veterans and 
their reintegration into useful economic and social life should be our primary 
objective.,,49 With that in mind, the Commission recommended some controversial 
measures to reduce the government's commitment to veterans who suffered no 
perceptible hardships as a result ofmilitary service. The Commission stated, "Military 
service in time ofwar or peace is an obligation of citizenship and should not be 
considered inherently a basis of future Government benefits." While recognizing that 
military service required some sacrifice on the part of individuals, the Commission found 
that finite readjustment benefits such as the GJ. Bill proved sufficient compensation for 
veterans for their service but that ongoing benefits such as pensions constituted a "special 
privilege."so Moreover, the Commission argued that the establishment ofa 
comprehensive social security system in the United States precluded the need for 
generous veteran pensions. 
The Commission also called for restrictions on the eligibility of veterans for 
future readjustment benefits. Specifically, the Commission warned against providing a 
full slate ofbenefits for veterans serving during peacetime. With veterans and their 
dependants comprising almost half of the entire population by the mid 1950s, the costs of 
such a measure would prove prohibitive. Consequently, the Commission proposed that 
"the Government's postservice obligation to peacetime ex-servicemen should be limited 
48 Ibid., 15. 

49 Ibid., 11. 
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to compensation and assistance for such significant disabilities as may arise directly out 
ofmilitary service. ,,51 Peacetime veterans should continue to receive medical care and 
re-employment assistance, but the Commission argued, "military service does not involve 
sufficient interruption to the educational progress of servicemen to warrant a continuation 
of a special educational program for them. ,,52 
The Bradley Commission fulfilled its brief to reexamine veterans' benefits in the 
context of the nation's changing demographic and economic situation. Their proposals 
sought to establish a realistic framework in which to craft future benefit packages. They 
agreed with the long established traditions of providing medical care to veterans and 
enacting measures to compensate them for time lost from civilian life. But the 
Commission also realized that given the sheer number of veterans in the nation and the 
growth of general welfare programs there ought to be limits to the government's 
obligation. In practical terms this meant a reevaluation of the tradition of offering 
ongoing pensions and a new philosophy of grading entitlements based on how much a 
veteran has actually suffered from military service and how much their life had been 
disrupted. 
Any attempt to interfere with veterans' benefits invariably raises the ire of the 
veterans' organizations. The American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars make it 
their primary objective to ensure that veterans retain their special privilege status. The 
VFW did not even wait for the publication of the Bradley Report before denouncing it. 
At the end of August 1955,20,000 VFW followers marched through Boston during their 
51 Ibid., 16. 

52 Ibid., 17. 
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annual national encampment in front of an estimated 500,000 spectators. That same day, 
the VFW adopted a resolution which castigated the government for failing to enact 
increases in "hospital facilities and in compensation and pension benefits for veterans." 
The VFW then claimed that the Bradley Commission had been convened "with the 
obvious purpose of finding ways and means to reduce veteran benefits. ,,53 Two days 
after the Bradley Commission submitted its report, the House Veterans Affairs 
Committee shelved a benefits bill until they could consider the report. 1. Addington 
Wagner, the American Legion's National Commander, responded by calling the action 
"unwise, unnecessary and illogical." In July 1956, the Legion spewed even more vitriol, 
passing a resolution that denounced the Bradley Report as "an abortive monstrosity.,,54 
Some veteran organizations took a more levelheaded view of the Bradley Report. 
In a 1957 letter to the New York Times, Kenneth Birkhead, Executive Director of the 
progressive American Veterans Committee, called for a more rational approach to 
veterans benefits when Congress debated H.R.52, a measure that would have given the 
same benefits to a veteran with flat feet as a veteran with a 90 percent service related 
disability.55 Deriding the lobbying actions of established older veterans' organizations 
such as the American Legion, Birkhead noted, "the bill was pressured through Congress 
by the old-line veterans' organizations who are more concerned with the amount of 
money they can get from the Government than with providing for real needs." Casting 
53 New York Times, August 31, 1955, 14. 
54 Ibid., July 22, 1956, 6. 
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"'Citizens First, Veterans Second': The American Veterans Committee and the Challenge 
ofPostwar 'Independent Progressives,'" War & Society (Australia) 2004 22(2): 75-94, 
and Robert L. Tyler, Robert, "The American Veterans Committee: Out of a Hot War and 
Into the Cold," American Quarterly 1966 18(3): 419-436. 
45 
his constituents as the "thinking veterans" versus the "professional veterans" Birkhead 
agreed with the Bradley Commission's central contention that veterans' benefits needed 
to be more rationally thought out and more related to actual need. He concluded, 
"Understanding of these problems by thinking veterans and citizens who are not blinded 
by the brass of some self serving veterans' organizations can have a decisive effect in 
assuring that Congress will not bow again to this pressure. ,,56 Indeed, there were signs 
that Congress was beginning to change its perspective on veterans' benefits. 
Soon after the release of the Bradley Report, the House Committee on Veterans 
Affairs narrowly passed H.R.7886, a bill calling for an increase in pensions for World 
War I veterans from just over sixty-six dollars a month for those under the age of sixty­
five to eighty-five dollars a month. Those over the age of sixty-five would receive 105 
dollars a month instead ofjust over seventy-eight dollars a month. The American Legion 
lobbied hard for the passage of the bill. But Olin Teague, still head of the Committee, 
opposed the measure on the grounds that it contravened the principles laid out by the 
Bradley Commission. The House eventually passed a watered down version of the bill, 
but the Senate took no action before the adjournment of the 84th Congress, effectively 
killing the measure. Other veteran groups opposed the bill as well. The Disabled 
American Veterans and AMVETS organizations both denounced the measure for its 
emphasis on providing benefits for able-bodied veterans potentially at the expense of 
those with greater needs. The influence of the Bradley Report reached beyond Congress 
and the veterans' organizations. 
56 New York Times, September 1, 1957, 106. 
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Unsurprisingly, given Eisenhower's disdain for the government's privileging of 
specific groups in society, the Commission's fmdings found a receptive audience in the 
White House. Eisenhower expressed his disapproval of H.R. 7886, and in his annual 
budget message to Congress in January 1958 he called for a reconsideration of "laws 
providing veterans benefits and services which now overlap other growing public benefit 
and welfare programs."S1 The following year, he recommended a needs test for 
determining eligibility for veterans' pensions. In his 1961 Budget message, Eisenhower 
recognized that peacetime veterans should remain a separate category in determining 
readjustment benefits because they "undergo fewer rigors and hazards than their combat 
comrades."s8 Because of the minimal disruption to their civilian lives and educational 
opportunities while serving in peacetime conditions, Eisenhower accepted the 
Commission's contention that readjustment benefits to peacetime veterans should be 
curtailed. 
At the end ofhis presidency, Eisenhower sought to put these principles into 
practice. Under the aegis of the Bradley Report, for the first time since Franklin 
Roosevelt's hastily enacted and quickly repealed Economy Act of 1933, the White House 
sought to cut veterans' benefits. In April 1959, Eisenhower submitted a proposal to 
Congress to tie future pension payments to the economic needs of veterans. With some 
modification, Congress accepted the President's proposals. Under Public Law 86-211, 
57 Public Papers, Eisenhower, "Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal 
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the new pension system took into account such factors as a veteran's annual income, net 
worth, and spouse's income in determining eligibility and rates. 
The debates surrounding the veterans' benefits should have had a limited impact 
on the passage ofa G.l. Bill for Vietnam veterans. Even the Bradley Commission 
accepted the need for readjustment benefits for veterans that had served in a combat zone. 
But the Vietnam veteran's access to benefits became complicated by attempts in 
Congress at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s to pass a Cold War OJ. Bill that would 
offer benefits to all veterans irrespective ofwhen and where they served. 
On July 29, 1959 the Senate voted on a bill, S.1138, to provide education benefits 
and housing assistance to aid peacetime veterans. Senator Ralph Yarborough, another 
Texas Democrat and World War II veteran, led the crusade for the bill. Initially, he 
proposed to give veterans a monthly living stipend of 110 dollars for higher education, 
but an eleventh-hour amendment converted these stipends to loans if a veteran failed to 
remain in the top 50 percent of their class. The bill gave similar benefits to those offered 
Korean Conflict veterans but without mustering out pay. A veteran also had to serve six 
months or more instead of the ninety day requirement for Korean veterans to become 
eligible. The bill also offered home and farm loans, but not business loans. Yarborough 
opened the debate on the floor of the Senate by resurrecting the argument that all citizens 
should compensate those who serve in the military. He argued that as a result of the 
ongoing "threat ofwar" created by the Cold War "it becomes a matter of great national 
concern when some individuals have to carry a grossly disproportionate share of the 
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burden of citizenship."s9 Yarborough tried immediately to head off the ubiquitous cries 
that veterans' benefits verged on selective welfarism by noting that the G.I. Bill, with its 
provision of training benefits, was "typically American" because of its "emphasis on self­
help individual initiative.,,6o Samuel James Ervin, Democratic senator from North 
Carolina led the opposition to the bill on the Senate floor. His arguments emphasized the 
considerable costs of Yarborough's bill. Claiming to speak on "behalfofa group of 
Americans who are sometime [ s] forgotten, namely the American taxpayers," Ervin 
warned of the dangers of creating "the greatest debt ever thrust upon posterity by any 
generation.,,61 Despite its obvious costs, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 57-31. 
Forty-eight Democrats and only nine Republicans voted for the bill. Reflecting their 
different economic philosophies, twenty-one of the more fiscally conservative 
Republicans and ten (mainly southern) Democrats voted against it. 
In a letter to the New York Times, Yarborough further made his case that the need 
for a peacetime draft during the Cold War necessitated a package ofveterans' benefits. 
He claimed that because so many men could obtain college and marital deferments "only 
about 45 percent of our young men must bear the burden of military service" and should 
be compensated for time lost from civilian life. "The cold war G.I. Bill," he went on, 
"corrects this injustice by helping these young veterans continue their education after its 
substantial interrupti on. ,,62 
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Outside of the Senate, few others shared Yarborough's enthusiasm for a Cold War 
G.!. Bill. The veteran community failed to mobilize behind the measure. Only the VFW 
actively supported the hill. Other veteran organizations seemed reluctant to share their 
hard-fought rewards with those who had never faced fire. Most importantly, the House 
remained unconvinced by Yarborough's arguments. The Senate-passed bill went to the 
House Veterans' Affairs Committee, but despite extensive hearings it was never reported 
out and died in committee. 
The bill received a cool reception in the White House. Both the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations used the conclusions of the Bradley Report to justify their 
opposition, claiming that peacetime service did not incur enough sacrifice on the part of 
veterans to justify readjustment benefits. In his budget message to Congress in January 
1960, Eisenhower proclaimed: 
Peacetime ex -servicemen are recognized as being in a different category from 
wartime veterans because of the different conditions under which they serve. 
Those who serve in peacetime undergo fewer rigors and hazards than their usual 
comrades. The disruption of their educational loans and careers is minimized 
under peacetime selective service procedures. While on active service they now 
receive substantial pay and benefits, and they return to civilian life under more 
favorable conditions after receiving valuable training while in service.... 
I oppose the establishment of special educational and loan guarantee 
programs for peacetime ex-servicemen. Such benefits are not justified because 
they are not supported by the conditions of military service.63 
Eisenhower was not averse to plowing federal dollars into higher education. Indeed, he 
instigated and signed into law one of the most significant education bills ever passed to 
that point, the 1958 National Defense Education Act. Up until the 1944 G.I. Bill, the 
63 Public Papers, Eisenhower, "Annual Budget to Congress: Fiscal Year 1961," 
January 18, 1960. 
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federal government had played only a limited role in funding education preferring instead 
to keep it a state and local issue. The few notable exceptions included the 1862 Morrill 
Act which offered land grants for the establishment of colleges, the 1917 Smith-Hughes 
Act which encouraged vocational programs, several emergency New Deal programs and 
the 1940 Lanham Act which offered assistance to "impacted areas" needing help 
accommodating military installations.64 Repeatedly, in the aftermath of World War II, 
attempts to pass bills on Capitol Hill providing for widespread aid to education ran afoul 
ofstates'-rights Southerners, Northern fiscal conservatives, and Catholic lobbyists who 
feared that such funds would only go to public schools.65 The government made further 
encroachments into education in 1950 passing the College Housing Act which offered 
low interest loans for college housing construction and by establishing the National 
Science Foundation which offered students grants for scientific research. Several times 
during the 1950s Congress expanded the provisions of the Lanham Act. None of these 
measures came close to Eisenhower's National Defense Education Act in promoting 
federal involvement in higher education. 
The NDEA offered loans to promising students in the areas of math, science, and 
foreign languages.66 The act also provided funds for summer training for the nation's 
science teachers and the production of textbooks by eminent scientists. The act aimed to 
revitalize the nation's scientific and technological base in the wake of the Soviet 
launching of Sputnik in October 1957. One Eisenhower scholar notes that the act 
64 Congress and the Nation, Vol. 1, 1196. 

65 Ibid., 1195. 

66 See Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik 
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"established the precedent of federal involvement in education," while another calls it 
"the most important federal contribution to schooling since the land grant colleges were 
established.,,67 Therefore, rather than opposing government funds to higher education, 
Eisenhower's opposition to a new G.!. Bill came more from his ideological opposition to 
bestowing the government's largesse on veterans that had merely performed their civic 
duty and suffered no real hardship as a result. Deeming peacetime service as unworthy of 
great reward, Eisenhower saw a more pressing need to nurture the nation's scientific 
community than to pass a peacetime G.!. Bill. The contrast between the warm reception 
given the 1944 and 1952 GJ. bills in Washington and the blunt rejection of the peacetime 
bill outside of the Senate revealed that the House and White House clearly placed 
peacetime veterans in a different category to wartime veterans in determining federal 
obligations to military personnel. 
Similarly, despite voting for the S.1138 whilst serving in the Senate in 1959, John 
F. Kennedy gave no further support to such a measure after entering the White House. In 
one of his few public statements on veterans' benefits he reiterated the Bradley Report's 
main contention that, "Our first concern in veterans programs is that adequate benefits be 
provided for those disabled in the service of their country .,,68 The Veterans 
Administration also opposed widespread benefits to peacetime veterans. V A 
Administrator 1.S. Gleason indicated that his agency favored proposals circulating on 
Capitol Hill to extend vocational readjustment benefits to disabled veterans, but he 
67 Damms, Eisenhower Presidency, 68, and William 0 Neill, "Eisenhower and 
American Society" in Gunter Bischof and Stephen Ambrose (eds.) Eisenhower: A 
Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge" Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 105. 
68 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, John F. Kennedy, "Annual 
Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1963," January 18, 1962, 
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agreed with President Kennedy that such benefits should not be offered to non-disabled 
peacetime veterans.69 
The peacetime G.!. Bill resurfaced in the Senate on a couple of further occasions 
at the start of the 1960s. S.349, the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1961 received a brief 
outing on August 24, 1962. Essentially, the bill contained similar provisions to the one 
passed in the Senate in 1959, but the 1961 version did not even get that far. A succession 
of senators rose to argue against the bill. Ohio Democrat Frank Lausche highlighted the 
lack of support in the White House, the V A and in the veteran community. Strom 
Thurmond (D-SC) cited the opposition to the bill in the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and 
in the Department ofDefense (DOD). Thurmond read a letter to the Veterans 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare from the BOB highlighting 
the training and skills a soldier can attain while on service and arguing, "compared with 
wartime, the draft has a lesser impact on the disruption of education and career plans.,,70 
Thurmond also read a letter from the Department ofDefense that revealed their fears that 
extensive benefits would hinder their manpower requirements. According to the DOD, 
"Programs of educational and vocational assistance encourage personnel to leave military 
service immediately after accruing the maximum benefits which can be gained. This 
results in a serious handicap to the Armed Forces in their efforts to attract and retain 
69 Letter to Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) from J.S. Gleason, May 19, 1961, 
Folder "The Early Proposals," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative 
Background New OJ. Bill, 1966, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Veterans 
with service-connected disabilities did receive more liberal benefits at during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. 
70 Letter from the Bureau ofBudget to the Chainnan of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Veterans' Affairs Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, entered into the 
Congressional Record by Strom Thurmond, Congressional Record-Senate, August 24, 
1962, 17524. 
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qualified personnel on a career basis.,,?l Yarborough read several letters in support of the 
measure, but after several hours of debate the Senate shelved the bill without it even 
going to a vote. 
Finally, in April 1963, the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings on S.5, a further attempt to pass a peacetime 
OJ. Bill. Here again, the V A Administrator Gleason reiterated his views that "service 
under current conditions does not present on a widespread basis the same rigors and 
hazards as does wartime service; . . . I do not believe these readjustment programs, 
education, training and loan, are needed at the present time.,,72 The lack of support 
among the V A, veterans' organizations, and the White House killed any further proposals 
to introduce a new 0.1. Bill. 
Many of the peacetime veterans understandably favored any measure that might 
bring them into the fold ofthe privileged. David R. Davies, a first-year student at the 
Wisconsin State University in Whitewater served with the army from October 1959 
through February 1962. In July of 1964, Davies wrote President Lyndon Johnson to 
explain his financial struggles after leaving the service. He complained that the army had 
provided him no special skills and that he was forced to delay his ''ultimate goal" of 
attending college and had to take up a series of menial jobs. Speaking up in support of 
S.5, Davies wrote, "I sincerely hope that your administration will review the potential 
71 Letter from the Department ofDefense to the Chairman ofthe Senate 
Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, entered by 
Strom Thurmond in ibid. 
72 Statement of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs Before the Subcommittee 
on Veterans' Affairs Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 
April 10, 1963, Folder "The Early Proposals," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963­
1969, Legislative Background, New OJ. Bill, 1966. LBJ Library. 
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value of theis [sic] vitally needed legislation. I think it would be tragic for [a] bill of this 
kind to be perpetually by-passed by seemingly more important legislation. ,,73 The mother 
ofone concerned veteran wrote Johnson to inform him "Were I not employed, it would 
be impossible for our son to continue his education. We are not alone in this, there are 
many young men who having served their country, would like to go to school.,,74 
Early on in his presidency, Johnson gave little indication of supporting a new OJ. 
Bill. He did, however, mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the original O.I. 
Bill with a ringing endorsement of its contribution to society. "The 0.1. Bill," he wrote, 
increased the strength ofour Nation by enlarging the opportunities ofour people .. 
. . On this occasion, let us remember the valor of the men and women for whom 
the bill was intended-those who led us to victory in war. Let us also recall the 
vision ofthose who proposed and passed this legislation. And let us also, at this 
time, renew our own commitment to carry forward the work of peace which they 
so successfully began. 75 
When he made these comments, the Commander-in-Chiefhad his troops scattered 
throughout the globe, but there seemed no immediate reason to consider a new O.l. Bill. 
To be sure, the situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated rapidly since Johnson took 
over the presidency. But even in this most dangerous of the Cold War's contact points, 
the United States had only several thousand personnel stationed and few anticipated the 
massive investment ofmen and material that would follow. Over the next ten years, the 
73 Letter to President Johnson from David R Davies, July 14, 1964, Folder 
"LENA3," Box, 163, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation Gen LENA 2 
11122/63, LBJ Library. 
74 Letter to President Johnson from Josephine Natale, May 19, 1964, Folder 
"LENA3," Box, 163, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation Gen LENA 2 
11122/63, LBJ Library 
75 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Statement by the President on the 20th Anniversary of the OJ. Bill of Rights," June 22, 
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government would call on the services ofover three million of its citizens to serve in 
Southeast Asia. The debates over funding for veterans of the conflict would resurrect 
questions of military obligation and the enormous costs of veterans' benefits. The 
administrations of Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford would attempt to balance 
the problem ofgiving soldiers equitable rewards for service with the nation's social and 
economic needs. Each president would bring different economic philosophies and 
ideological views to the veteran question; to a varying degree, each one would attract 
criticism from the press, the public, and the veterans' community for their treatment of 
veterans. With the escalation of the Vietnam War, a new and bitter chapter in the long 
history ofveteran benefits loomed. 
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Chapter 2 
YARBOROUGH'S CRUSADE: THE 1966 "COLD WAR" G.I. BILL 
I appeal to you to include the five million veterans of the Cold War in your 
plans for the Great Society. They are the only Americans denied a fair 
opportunity in life by their own government. 
Senator Ralph Yarborough 
it doesn't seem to me that you ought to have to go into uniform and go to boot 
camp, and spend 2 or 3 years in the service in order for your Government to have 
an interest in your education .... I think we just must not rest until each child­
GI or no GI, boy or girl, rich or pooF-has the opportunity to get the kind of 
education that he needs and that his country needs for him to have in order to 
defend it. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson 
By the end of 1964, the United States had over 23,000 service personnel stationed 
in South Vietnam and nearly 150 men had already given their lives. As the nation's 
crusade gathered momentum in Southeast Asia, Ralph Yarborough saw the opening to re­
launch his own crusade to secure a new G.I. Bill of Rights. Throughout his public career, 
Yarborough had always displayed an affinity for the oppressed. In his early career as 
district judge for the Fifty-third Judicial District in Austin, Texas he consistently ruled 
against racial discrimination, corporate greed, and political corruption. He was a finn 
supporter ofFranklin Roosevelt and the New Deal during the 1930s. During World War 
II he traveled with Patton's Third Army across northern Europe as part of the Judge 
Advocate General's office. He later became military governor of the Honshu province 
dwing the postwar occupation of Japan. Although at thirty-eight he was too old to be 
drafted when Pearl Harbor was attacked, Yarborough considered it his civic duty to 
serve. Following the war, he returned to public life and remained an ardent supporter of 
the New Deal's liberal legacy even as Texas politics veered further right at the end of the 
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1940s and 1950s. After three unsuccessful-but close-runs at the governorship of 
Texas, Yarborough became the junior senator for Texas behind Lyndon Jolmson in 1957. 
He was one ofonly four senators from the former Confederate states to refuse to sign the 
"Southern Manifesto" supported by 101 House representatives and senators in 1956 in 
opposition to the Supreme Court's Brown versus the Board of Education decision. In 
1957, he and Johnson also becanle the first senators from Texas to vote for a civil rights 
bill. 1 
When he became Chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee of the Labor 
and Public Welfare Committee Yarborough found a new noble cause. The Senate did not 
yet have the equivalent of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, and so Senate 
deliberations of veterans' bills came through Yarborough's committee. Despite his 
previous failures at getting a Cold War G.1. Bill passed, in 1964 he chose the occasion of 
Veterans Day to telegram Lyndon Johnson to urge his consideration of a new program of 
education benefits for veterans. Cleverly appealing to Johnson's burgeoning sense of 
social justice, he wrote, "On this Veteran's Day I appeal to you to include the five million 
veterans of the Cold War in your plans for the Great Society. They are the only 
Americans denied a fair opportunity in life by their own government.',2 On January 6, 
1965, Yarborough again put his ideas into practice as he introduced yet another Cold War 
G.1. Bill, S.9. Patterned after the Korean Conflict G.1. Bill and closely resembling his 
1 Patrick Cox, Ralph W Yarborough: The People's Senator (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2001), 150. Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver, and Albert Gore Sr. were the 
other three southern senators to vote against the "Southern Manifesto." 
2 Telegram from Ralph Yarborough to Lyndon Johnson, November 11, 1964, 
Folder "LENA 3," Box 163, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation Gen 
LENA 2 11/22/63, LBJ Library. 
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previous attempts at a Cold War G.I. Bill, S.9 offered educational and vocational 
assistance to veterans that had served between January 31, 1955 and July 1, 1967 if they 
had served for more than 180 days and left the service in good standing. Benefits would 
be paid for a period equal to 1.5 times the length of service. The single veteran would be 
able to claim 110 dollars a month for education, 135 dollars if they claimed one 
dependant. The day after submitting the bill, Yarborough wrote Johnson to remind him, 
"No other group in our society has done as much for their government for so little, at so 
great a cost to themselves.,,3 He also took his message to the press, outlining his hope for 
"A Fair Deal for the Cold War Soldier" in an article for Harper's Magazine. In the 
article, Yarborough called for public support for the new bill as he urged "a great many 
Americans to demand it-in the name ofboth justice and common sense.',4 Arguing for 
the potential economic benefits ofa new bill, Yarborough noted that the original G.1. Bill 
had provided the nation approximately "625,000 engineers, 375,000 teachers, 165,000 
natural and physical scientists, and 220,000 workers in medicine and related fields."s In 
an argument that would resurface repeatedly in the debates over veteran funding to 
follow, he claimed that the extra earning potential of those trained would ensure that by 
1970, the GJ. Bill would have paid for itself because of the extra income taxes paid back 
to the government. The GJ. Bill, he concluded, represented "one of the government's 
3 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Ralph Yarborough, January 7, 1965, Folder 
"LENA 11/22/63-12/31/65," Box 161, Lyndon B. Jolmson Papers, 1963-1969, 
Legislation Ex. LENA 2 11/22/63, LBJ Library. 
4 Ralph Yarborough, "A Fair Deal for the Cold War Soldier," Harper's Magazine, 
January 1965, 81. 
S Ibid. 
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few profit-making ventures.',6 Finally, he suggested that such a program could eliminate 
the millions of dollars paid out in unemployment compensation to veterans discharged 
without any easily marketable skills. 
Despite such argunlents, Johnson remained unmoved. One internal White House 
memo laid out the administration's five-point opposition.7 The last three of the five 
points were pragmatic. Point number three made the observation that there was no 
massive demobilization as had occurred after World War II and that most veterans 
acquired some marketable skills while in service, therefore there was less need to help 
veterans readjust to civilian life. Point number four noted that veterans' organizations 
had little interest in the new legislation as they tended to devote their efforts to securing 
benefits for "hot-war veterans." Point number five reiterated the Department ofDefense 
position that a peacetime 0.1. Bill might dissuade service personnel from making a career 
out ofthe military. These last three arguments added little of substance to the debates 
that had already taken place in the wake of the Bradley Report. But points one and two 
revealed a more deep-seated philosophical opposition to a new 0.1. Bill in the Johnson 
administration. 
The first objection raised in the White House memo was that "An expansive 
program only for ex-servicemen undercuts the strategy ofpersuading the Congress to 
ensure full educational advantages for all.',s The cost ofa new 0.1. Bill threatened the 
administration's plans for universal education programs such aid as grants, loans, and 
6 Ibid. 
7 Memorandum for Bill D. Moyers from Phillip S. Hughes, December 15, 1964, 
Folder "Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, New 0.1. Bill, LBJ Library. 
8Ibid. 
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work-study programs. Johnson's attempts to transform America into a Great Society 
contained numerous proscriptions to aid those citizens still marginalized because of their 
race, lack ofeducation, or endemic poverty. Through federal legislation and programs as 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and Medicare and Medicaid, Johnson 
hoped to refocus the nations' resources to help those citizens most greatly in need. He 
did not count peacetime veterans among them. 
Heavily influenced by the social programs of the New Deal, Johnson wanted his 
Great Society to provide every citizen a more equitable share of the nation's considerable 
wealth. He saw education as an integral way of achieving this goal. According to 
biographer Irving Bernstein, Johnson believed that education "offered equality of 
opportunity, a level playing field, to young people who lived in poverty, to blacks, to 
Mexican-Americans, and to women, an appealing concept to a democratic populist.,,9 
With federal investment directed at the sectors of society that need most assistance, 
education could give every American the opportunity to better their lives, irrespective of 
their social condition. In a speech delivered in Boca Raton in October 1964, Johnson 
outlined his vision for the future ofhigher education in America when he called for "a 
new future of full equity in educational opportunity for all Americans." He added: 
advanced education is no longer a luxury just to be enjoyed by the child of the 
banker, or by the children of fortunate families .... To deny it to the children of 
poverty not only denies the most elementary democratic equality, it perpetuates 
9 Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The Presidency ofLyndon Johnson (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 183. 
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poverty as a national weakness. And it denies our democracy and our great free 
enterprise system of government.IO 
The administration feared that providing education benefits solely for ex-servicemen and 
women might jeopardize more universal education programs that would benefit those 
with a greater need than the average peacetime veteran. 
The second objection outlined in the memo more clearly reflected Great Society 
ideology as the administration protested, "The G.I. Bill approach is not selective-not 
according to need, not according to ability, not according to motivation. ,,11 The original 
G.I. Bill had unquestionably turned veterans into a privileged class. But the government 
and the public accepted the provision of such rewards because those veterans had faced 
fire. A peacetime bill might upset 10hnson's goal of creating a more equal society by 
unfairly rewarding those veterans whose lives had not been seriously impaired by service. 
For 10hnson, there still existed many other sectors of society that were far more deserving 
offederal support. As with many ofhis social programs, 10hnson harked back to the 
New Deal and the same universalist approach to veterans benefits adopted by Franklin 
Roosevelt. Like Roosevelt, 10hnson questioned whether veterans---especially peacetime 
veterans-should be placed on a pedestal when the needs of so many other sectors of 
society for government aid seemed more pressing. Later in his Boca Raton speech, 
10hnson highlighted the success of the original bill, but only to illustrate the potential of 
providing universal education benefits. He praised "The proud achievement of the GI 
bill," but added: 
10 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Remarks in Boca Raton at the Dedication of Florida Atlantic University," October 25, 
1964. 
11 Ibid. 
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it doesn't seem to me that you ought to have to go into uniform and go to boot 
camp, and spend 2 or 3 years in the service in order for your Oovernment to have 
an interest in your education. And yet there is not a Member ofCongress today 
that would look back on that 01 bill and say, "We made a mistake in making that 
great adventure and that great decision." The 01 bill challenges us to programs of 
loans and scholarships enabling every young man and woman who has the ability 
to move beyond the high school level. So I think we just must not rest until each 
child-GI or no 01, boy or girl, rich or poof-has the opportunity to get the kind 
ofeducation that he needs and that his country needs for him to have in order to 
defend it. 12 
As his legislative agenda soon proved, Johnson was not averse to throwing the weight of 
the government behind those who needed extra assistance, but he remained unconvinced 
that peacetime service justified such benevolence. 
As Yarborough tried to gain momentum for a new OJ. Bill, Johnson busied 
himself trying to push through one of the most significant measures of his Oreat Society. 
The Higher Education Act of 1965 promised to give teeth to Johnson's dream of 
universal education. In one dramatic stroke, the act overturned centuries of federal 
reluctance to getting involved in higher education. The act gave direct scholarships to 
those students demonstrating financial need and offered federal insurance on student 
loans and subsidies for interest on the loans. Students from middle and lower income 
families could benefit from the act's work-study provisions whereby the government 
would cover the majority ofthe costs of employing students in university or community 
service positions. In addition, the act offered funds for universities to improve their 
buildings and facilities and aimed to improve quality of the nation's teachers by 
establishing the Teacher Corps. 13 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hugh Davis Graham, The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the 
Kennedy and Johnson Years (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1984). 
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Johnson's desire to see the act pass tempered his support for introducing new 
benefits for veterans. Because of the enormous scope and cost ofHigher Education Act, 
Johnson feared that Congress might be less likely to pass it if they were also presented 
with an expensive new GJ. Bill in addition. One week after Yarborough submitted S.9, 
Johnson made no mention ofveterans in his message to Congress on his vision for 
education in America. He reiterated his universalistic approach to federal education 
assistance as he called for "better education to millions ofdisadvantaged youth who need 
it most [and] ... the best educational equipment and ideas and innovations within reach 
of all students.,,14 Similarly, in response to Yarborough's Veterans Day letter to Johnson, 
Lee White, Associate Special Council to the President, informed Yarborough that 
"greater assistance must be given to those potential college students who would not 
otherwise be able to secure higher education ... of course, the proposed programs would 
not bar veterans.,,15 Under legislation such as the Housing Act and Higher Education 
Act, veterans could claim federal assistance to help them reintegrate into society, and 
Johnson hoped these general benefits would suffice. Yarborough remained convinced 
that their sacrifice deserved more. 
As Yarborough and the White House hit an impasse, the Veterans Administration 
worked on a compromise program. In the late fall of 1964, VA Administrator John S. 
Gleason, indicated that his agency was beginning to break with the administration and see 
the merits of Yarborough's proposals. On November 19, 1964 Gleason informed the 
14 Public Papers, Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress: 'Toward Full 
Educational Opportunity,'" January 12, 1965. 
15 Letter to Ralph Yarborough from Lee C. White, January 15, 1965, Folder 
"Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 
1963-1969, Legislative Background, New GJ. Bill, LBJ library. 
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White House that the proposed new benefits could, in fact, serve to enforce the ideals of 
the Great Society and not betray them by helping to elevate the national education level. 
Gleason now accepted Yarborough's argument that military service incurred sacrifice on 
the part of the veterans. He informed Johnson's special assistant Bill Moyers that 
peacetime benefits "would be a valuable and feasible step in achieving the Great 
Society ," and that "if the President sponsors legislation to provide Federal assistance 
generally in obtaining a college education, certainly persons who served their country, 
many times at a sacrifice, during the present 'Cold War' period should have a first claim 
to benefits.,,16 Gleason acknowledged that Yarborough's previous proposals had been 
too costly, but he believed that a scaled down less expensive version, based on the 
Korean GJ. Bill model, might serve both the veterans needs and the social engineering 
goals of the administration. 
Unfortunately for Yarborough and the veterans, in December 1964 Gleason 
resigned his post to return to private business before he could get anyone in the White 
House to listen to his proposals. Jol;mson replaced him with William Driver, a career VA 
employee who had served in uniform during World War II and Korea. Driver proved less 
open to Yarborough's proposals than Gleason had become by the end ofhis tenure. Early 
in 1965, Driver presented the VA's views on S.9 and sought to establish an alternative 
that more closely fit the administration's desires. 
Driver informed senator Lister Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, that he did not agree with Yarborough that all post-Korea veterans should 
16 Memo for Bill Moyers from J.S. Gleason, November 19, 1964, Folder "Initial 
Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963­
1969, Legislative Background, New GJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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be eligible for benefits. He reiterated the White House position that this objection "does 
not depreciate in any way the need for appropriate F ederallegislation to improve the 
availability of education in this country," and endorsed the view that generally available 
federal student aid programs could compensate veterans adequately. Driver did at least 
raise the possibility ofextending benefits for those veterans serving "in a period of 
hostility, or disabled by such service." Paying benefits to those who served during times 
ofwar tended to attract little opposition among the public or in political circles. Driver 
proposed that a new G.I. Bill could be enacted for those veterans serving in "warlike 
conditions" such as those developing in Vietnam or the Dominican Republic. 17 
Driver further tried to influence the perpetually obstructionist Bureau of the 
Budget ofthe merits of such a program. He told BOB director Kermit Gordon, "The 
immediate situation in Viet Nam creates a climate favorable to enactment of legislation .. 
. Realistically and equitably, I believe we must afford some additional recognition by 
way ofwanted veterans' benefits to those members ofour armed forces serving in such 
hot spots as Viet Nam.,,18 Limiting benefits chronologically and geographically to areas 
designated by executive order as hostile would greatly reduce the cost and the political 
obstacles to enacting a new G.I. Bill. Similar proposals had already begun to enter 
Congress. On January 15, Massachusetts Republican Leverett Saltonstall introduced a 
17 Letter to Lister Hill from the Office of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 
undated, Folder "Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, New G.!. Bill, LBJ Library. 
18 Letter to Kermit Gordon from William Driver, February 12, 1965, Folder 
"Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 
1963-1969, Legislative Background, New G.!. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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bill, 8.520, that would make veterans ofhotspots eligible for benefits similar to those 
offered under previous bills. 
The BOB remained unmoved by the new proposals. The Bureau's 8am Hughes 
wrote Lee White to endorse the White House's objections to 8.9 and also to repudiate the 
VA's compromise proposal. Hughes noted that since 1963 servicemen facing hazardous 
conditions had been given an additional fifty-five dollars a month in pay. The BOB 
deemed such payments as adequate compensation and saw no reason to extend 
educational and readjustment benefits. TIle only thing to which the BOB would consent 
was an increase in disability payment and the extension of a automobile grant to veterans 
injured in peacetime service. Hughes cautioned the White House to "firmly hold the 
line" against anything more generous and fight instead for broader public benefits.19 
By the middle of 1965, the battle over 8.9 heated up and the positions of all sides 
ossified. In May, Yarborough again wrote the White House to layout his justification 
for 8.9. This time he appealed to Johnson's political savvy. Claiming that the bill would 
likely pass both houses when put to a vote, Yarborough informed the President that the 
Republicans were positioning themselves as ''the Party concerned with helping the 
fighting man." Support of S.9, he suggested, would allow the Democrats to regain the 
mantle of"friend to the GI." He ended his letter with the usual emotive plea that "Those 
19 Letter to Lee White from Sam Hughes, February 25, 1965, Folder ''LENA 
11122/63-12/31/65," Box 161, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation Ex. 
LENA 2 11/22/63, LBJ Library. 
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who are guarding freedom for all of us around the world, should come home to 
classrooms, not to unemployment lines and checks." 20 
In June, Yarborough submitted the final report of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare on S.9. Here Yarborough made his most thorough defense of the bill. 
Since the Bradley Commission, most opponents ofa Cold War G.!. Bill argued that 
military service during peacetime did not incur enough sacrifice on the part ofveterans to 
warrant readjustment benefits. In his committee report Yarborough systematically laid 
out the reasons why Cold War veterans did suffer disadvantages relative to non-veterans 
and, therefore, deserved additional compensation. He outlined the potential threats 
around the globe from the Soviet Union, China, and in Vietnam and the Dominican 
Republic as evidence that the definition of "peacetime" in the early 1960s was far 
different from the "peacetime" conditions of the 1930s. The presence of the first 
peacetime draft (other than 1940-1941) demanded that civilians faced significant 
disruptions in their lives and were denied the opportunities of the nation's "free 
enterprise, [and] individualistic way of life." Only the ongoing threat ofwar, noted 
Yarborough, demanded such sacrifices. 21 
Yarborough accepted the point that Cold War service did not involve comparable 
sacrifice to wartime service. This principle was reflected in the comparatively lesser 
amount ofassistance offered under S.9. Under previous G.I. Bills, veterans had to serve 
20 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Ralph Yarborough, May 6, 1965, Folder "Initial 
Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963­
1969, Legislative Background, New G.1. Bill, LBJ Library. 
21 Report ofthe Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to Accompany S.9, the 
Cold War Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965), 3. 
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ninety days before becoming eligible for benefits; S.9 decreed that the veterans serve 180 
days. The bill also denied business loans and mustering out pay for Cold War veterans. 
Moreover, S.9 offered only 110 dollars per month to veterans, the same amount offered 
Korean veterans over a decade previously. This amount failed to take into account the 
rising costs of tuition and living expenses in the intervening years but perhaps more 
accurately reflected the lesser readjustment needs ofpeacetime veterans. 
The committee report went on to reject calls for a benefits package that aided only 
those who served in hostile areas. Yarborough's justification was that the original 0.1. 
Bill was not meant to be a reward for facing fire. Instead, it was designed to compensate 
veterans for time lost from civilian life. Military service necessitated such a sacrifice 
irrespective ofwhere one served. In addition, because only a president could designate 
an "area ofhostility," such a declaration "would be an admission ofU.S. active military 
participation in the conflict and would be contrary to the foreign policy of the United 
States.,,22 Eventually, the committee reported out S.9 favorably, but not unanimously. 
Five senators, led by New York Republican Jacob Javits offered a minority view that 
favored Leverett Saltonstall's hotspots bill over S.9. Javits and his fellow dissenters 
remained unconvinced by Yarborough's arguments and advocated instead benefits only 
for those "who have been subjected to the hazards ofwar," adding, "it is our sincere 
belief that in accord with long established American tradition it is these veterans who are 
entitled to these benefits. ,,23 
22 Ibid., 19. 

23 Ibid., 58. 
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By highlighting the very real sacrifices made by Cold War veterans in the report, 
Yarborough undercut effectively one of the main tenets of opposition to S.9. Combined 
with the economic, military, and social engineering arguments~ S.9 was developing a lot 
ofmomentum on Capitol Hill. On July 19, 1965, the Senate voted on the measure. 
Walter Mondale opened the debate by relating how the G.I. Bill had helped him continue 
his education after service in the Korea conflict. He reiterated Yarborough's argument 
that the country was not really at peace because ofCold War tensions. Next, Hiram 
Leong Fong (R-HI), co-sponsor ofS.9, praised Yarborough for having "steadfastly and 
tirelessly led the struggle for enactment of this vital program.,,24 Fong attempted to allay 
many of the old fears over veterans' benefits. Praising 'the patriotism of those currently 
in unifonn, he lauded the Cold War O.l.s as "the Minute Men of our times." He also 
reiterated that S.9 was first and foremost a readjustment bill and not a bonus offered to 
those merely carrying out their patriotic duty. "Every American," prochimed Fong, 
"owes a duty to serve his country, but we as Members of Congress know that there is a 
corresponding responsibility on our part to take care ofthem.',2S 
But following the obligatory patriotic epithets from co-sponsors of the bill, the 
debate turned more confrontational as several senators attempted to add amendments that 
would have changed the nature and philosophy of the bill. Leverett Saltonstall 
introduced the most contentions amendment. As his own bill, S.520, had advocated, his 
amendment attempted to limit eligibility for the benefits offered under S.9 to veterans of 
hotspots. Strom Thurmond spoke up in defense of this proposal. He questioned the 
24 Congressional Record-Senate, July 19, 1965, 17304. 

25 Ibid., 17306. 
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justice of offering comparable benefits to those who had never faced fIre, and raised 
doubts over whether such military service warranted the kinds of rewards being offered. 
According to Thurmond, "It is an honor for a man to serve his country in peace or in war. 
I do not look upon one who serves in peacetime as having his life jeopardized to the 
extent that his country owes him the same kind of consideration given to veterans of 
World War II or the Korean conflict. ,,26 Yarborough, Saltonstall, and Robert F. Kennedy 
engaged in a lively debate over the problems involved in placing such limitations on 
eligibility. Yarborough and Kennedy pressed Saltonstall on such questions as whether 
veterans in areas such as the Dominican Republic, or Berlin should receive benefits, or B­
52 pilots flying out of Ouam who might happen to crash in the South China Sea, an area 
technically outside of a declared war zone. The lack ofclarity in defining such areas and 
conditions, claimed Yarborough, "shows the utter unworkability of the amendment. ,;l7 
Saltonstall finally called for a voice vote on the amendment. Thirty-six senators voted 
for it, with fifty-two against, and twelve not voting. 
Two other amendments were, then dismissed with far less discussion. Colorado 
Republican Peter Dominick had an amendment to limit benefits only to veterans of South 
Vietnam voted down by 53-31. In retrospect, this amendment had some merit because it 
could have led to higher benefits to those that needed it most, but it received little debate. 
Kentucky Republican John Cooper tried, as he had done in previous deliberations on 
Cold War OJ. Bills, to convert education benefits to loans instead of outright grants. 
This measure, Cooper suggested, would avoid rewarding those with no real interest in 
26 Ibid., 17319. 

27 Ibid., 17322-17323. 
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higher education. Unconvinced, the Senate voted it down by a vote of65-20. With the 
deliberations over, S.9 passed the Senate by a vote of69-17 . Yarborough had done his 
part, but this was not the first time a Cold War G.!. Bill had left the Senate. Now the 
administration and the House had to reverse their earlier obstinacy if the bill was to 
become law. 
While the Senate moved forward apace, Johnson remained largely silent on the 
bill, preferring instead that the Veterans Administration promote the administration's 
views on Capitol Hill. In July, Johnson dismissed the veterans' benefits issue, claiming 
there was already enough legislation to keep Congress busy for the remainder ofthe 
session. Pressure for a strong Executive position came from many concerned parties. 
William Driver informed Johnson "a recommendation by the President is justified in 
principle and would be well received both by the Congress and by the public.,,28 Bill 
Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, warned that the White House needed to 
develop a stronger position for fear that Yarborough's bill might "slip through unless we 
act.,,29 Several concerned citizens also let their feelings known to Johnson. The mother 
of one Marine iformed Johnson that her son told her ofhis hopes for the passage ofthe 
Cold War O.I. Bill because "It would help a lot ifwe felt we had something to come back 
28 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from William Driver, June 7, 1965, Folder "Initial 
Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963­
1969, Legislative Background, New OJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
29 Memo for Douglass Cater from Bill Moyers, June 15, 1965, Folder "Initial 
Administration Opposition and Substitutes-I," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963­
1969, Legislative Background, New OJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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to and felt that somebody gives a damn about us.,,Jo The uncle of another Vietnam 
soldier wrote Johnson, "a word from you to both Sen. Ralph Yarborough, and Rep. Olin 
Teague would hasten this bill [S.9] to a favorable conclusion.,,31 Jotmson still refused to 
make a strong stand on the veterans' benefits issue. Instead, he consented to a BOB 
request for an "informal and quiet working group to rack up alternatives" comprised of 
the agencies most affected by the bill.32 
The informal group worked throughout the fall and gave numerous proscriptions 
for an administration-backed bill. The Bureau of the Budget, Veterans Administration, 
Department ofHealth, Education, and Welfare, and the Department ofDefense passed 
around various proposals, and by December, the nucleus of an administration bill was 
taking shape. As the V A and the administration had always wanted, the new bill would 
limit eligibility to veterans serving in hostile areas. One suggestion for the wording of 
the bill specified that benefits should be "for the purpose ofproviding educational 
opportunities to those veterans whose readjustment problems have been accentuated by 
hazardous duty or service in areas of special hazard, such as Vietnam. ,,33 In a cost saving 
measure that clearly pleased the BOB, eligibility for benefits would be extended only as 
30 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Mrs. J.F. Orisillo, July 22, 1965, Folder 
"LENA 10/15165..3/2/66," Box 162, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation 
Ex. LENA 2, 11122/63, LBJ Library. 
31 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Roger C Walczyk, September 10, 1965, Folder 
"LENA 11/22/63-10114/65," Box 162, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, 
Legislation Ex. LENA 2, 11/22/63, LBJ Library. 
32 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Charles L. Schul1ze, Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget, July 22, 1965, Folder "Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes-II," 
Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, New 0.1. Bill, 
LBJ Library. 
33 Memo to Douglass Cater from William Driver, December 15, 1965, Folder 
"Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, 
New 0.1. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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far back as October 1, 1963. This date would have left all of the veterans who had served 
between January 31, 1955 and October 1, 1963 with no recourse to benefits. The 
Department ofHealth, Education, and Welfare proposed that veterans who had not served 
in a combat area could receive a grant for college ofup to 800 dollars per year or a lesser 
training allowance to be administered under the Manpower Development and Training 
Act.34 While the administration refined its plans, the House had also begun to move, 
albeit rather slowly. 
In 1960, Olin Teague's House Veterans Affairs Committee killed a previous 
attempt at a Senate-passed OJ. Bill, and in the fall of 1965 he seemed in no rush to pass 
the newer version. In a meeting with Sam Hughes of the BOB, White House special 
assistant Douglass Cater, and the VA's William Driver, Teague indicated that he would 
take no action on any education bill other than opening committee hearings?5 
Yarborough claimed that Teague's committee "had been dragging its feet purposely. n36 
In part, the committee's sluggishness was logistic. An astonishing 133 different House 
members had submitted 139 bills regarding veterans' education benefits. Many ofthem 
duplicated each other, but Teague's committee still had some forty-seven to consider. 
Most offered either wide-ranging benefits similar to S.9, or limited benefits only to 
34 Memo to Douglass Cater from Ralph K. Huitt, December 15, 1965 ,Folder 
"Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, 
New OJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
35 Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget, July 22, 1965, Folder "Initial Administration Opposition and Substitutes-II," 
Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, New OJ. Bill, 
LBJ Library. . 
36Quoted in the Washington Daily News, December 7, 1965, reprinted in Folder 
"LENA 1 0/15/65-3/2/66," Box 162, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation 
Ex. LENA 2, 11/22/63, LBJ Library. 
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veterans of hotspots. But the delay also resulted in part from Teague's determination to 
stamp his authority on the proceedings. 
Teague had a reputation as being "Mr. Veteran" on the Hill since making his 
name in the House investigations on the original G.I. Bill and exerted a considerable 
influence on veterans' affairs. Indeed, two of the veteran benefits bills in front of his 
committee came from Teague himself. The White House was aware of the Teague's ego. 
The BOB's Charles Schultze warned, "He would like the ball hilnself. He would just as 
soon have the Administration make only general statements about this and let his 
committee work the bill.,,37 The problem for the administration was that Teague seemed 
to be favoring a more expensive bill along the lines of Yarborough's S.9. He had already 
expressed to the White House his desire to add a provision to the VA's bill to give 
readjustment benefits to all veterans irrespective ofwhen and where they served.38 At the 
end of 1965, Teague visited Vietnam and declared that the peacetime G.1. Bill was one of 
the most important issues raised by the soldiers. Upon his return he promised that his 
committee would pass a new G.1. Bill "out of committee in January or February." He 
also claimed to be under "heavy pressure" from the BOB and DOD to pass a scaled-down 
benefits package. He publicly countered the DOD's suggestion that a new bill might 
dissuade career military personnel by claiming "The bill ought to entice more men into 
37 Recorded Telephone Conversation to the White House with Charles Schultze, 
12/31165, Folder "Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, 
Legislative Background, New G.I. Bill, LBJ Library. 
38 Memo to Douglass Cater from William Driver, December 21, 1965, Folder 
"Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, 
New G.1. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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military ranks.,,39 In December, the administration showed a draft of their bill to Teague 
before introducing it to his committee under the designation H.R.11985. Douglass Cater 
informed Lyndon Johnson that Teague's response to the bill was one of "grave 
reservations, and [he] seems to be leaning towards the Korean-type version. ,,40 
Teague's main bill, H.R.12410 reflected his preference for benefits that covered 
all veterans, but he shared the administration's concerns over the cost of Yarborough's 
bill. His bill would cost approximately 327 million dollars in its first year compared with 
360 million for S.9. Johnson's "hotspots" bill would have cost only 150 million dollars 
for the first year.41 The main savings in Teague's bill over S.9 came from reducing the 
monthly allowance from 110 dollars to 100 dollars a month, and providing benefits at a 
rate ofonly one month for every month served. S.9 offered benefits for 1.5 months for 
every month served. The BOB pushed Johnson to continue pressuring Teague into 
passing out an even less costly bill. On January 29, Schultze asked the President to "Call 
representative Teague and indicate that while we continue to support Cold War GJ. 
benefits, the bill now being considered by the Committee is unacceptable.,,42 But on 
February 1, after two hours of closed-door deliberations, Teague's Veterans' Affairs 
39 Quoted in the Washington Daily News, December 7, 1965, reprinted in Folder 
"LENA 1 0/15/65-3/2/66," Box 162, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation 
Ex. LENA 2, 11122/63, LBJ Library. 
40 Memo to Lyndon Johnson from Douglass Cater, December 28, 1965, Folder 
"Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, 
New GJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
41 Memo to Lyndon Johnson from Charles L. Schultze, February 10, 1966, Folder 
"VA Educational Program I," Box 11, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Veteran 
Affairs, General VA3, LBJ Library. 
42 Memo to Lyndon Johnson from Charles L. Schultze, January 29, 1966, Folder 
"Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background, 
New GJ. Bill, LBJ Library. 
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Committee unanhnously approved his H.R.12410. Thereafter, the passage of the bill 
moved swiftly. 
Despite the differences in cost between S.9 and H.R.12410, the Cold War OJ. 
Bill avoided going into conference. To appease Yarborough, Teague agreed to keep the 
senator's title S.9 on the bill ifhe agreed to the House's reductions in costs. Yarborough 
consented, and a final compromise version of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 
1966 went back to a vote in both houses. Teague opened proceedings in the House. He 
claimed that the bill had the support ofthe administration, the Department of Defense and 
all of the main veterans' groups. He proclaimed it "a bill that every Member can vote for 
and be happy with.,,43 
In an admission that would soon come to have significant bearing on the lives of 
veterans, Teague emphasized "that it is not the intention of this legislation to establish a 
program which completely subsidizes the cost ofa veteran's education or training 
program, as well as his living costs .... It is expected that in many cases the veteran will 
be required to make a contribution to the cost ofhis own education.,,44 With this 
statement, Teague dramatically altered the impact the future 0.1. Bills could have on the 
lives ofveterans. Even though the 19440.1. Bill never explicitly promised to pay for all 
of a veteran's education costs, in reality, it did. The generosity of the original bill 
combined with the relatively low tuition costs at the time gave veterans the option of 
attending almost any school of their choosing without having to contribute any of their 
own money. Teague now advocated low benefits because he expected Vietnam era 
43 Congressional Record-House, February 7, 1965,2331. 

44 Ibid. 
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veterans to come up with some of their own money to fund their education. By the late 
1960s, veterans that returned home expecting the same total coverage their predecessors 
enjoyed now found that the government had no intention ofpicking up all of their tab. 
Teague's unwillingness to guarantee a comparable benefits package to that enjoyed by 
World War II veterans would place a considerable burden on Vietnam era veterans 
wanting to return to school. Even though the World War II bill did not promise full 
coverage, it did give a de facto full coverage. Vietnam veterans had no such guarantee. 
Veterans' benefits tended to build upon and expanded those offered veterans ofprevious 
wars. But Teague's insistence that Vietnam era veterans share the burden of their college 
expenses upset this progression and set the stage for some passionate fights over 
education benefits in the coming years. 
Despite the latent flaw in Teague proposal, many representatives followed him on 
the floor of the House offering praise for his bill. William Jennings Bryan Dom (D-SC) 
stated, "This bill in necessary. It is fair and it is timely. The American people are ready 
for this legislation.,,45 Paul Fino (R-NY) called the bill "a tribute to our veterans, not a 
grudging concession to national opinion. ,,46 But the praise was far from universal. 
A succession of House members rose to express their reservations over the low 
monthly allowance. Robert Dole (R-KS) called the bill "not completely satisfactory.,,47 
Richard Roudebush (D-IN) described the payments as "inadequate.,,48 Many attacked 
Johnson for pressuring the House into passing a less expensive measure. John Saylor (R­
45 Ibid., 2337. 

46 Ibid., 2335. 

47 Ibid., 2339. 

48 Ibid., 2335. 
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PA) called the bill "a disgrace" and fumed, "we are afraid to give these men who are out 
defending our lives and our country any more than $100 a month under the threat of a 
Presidential veto.,,49 Moreover, after further pressure from White House aides, the bill 
went to floor under a procedure that immunized it from amendment. This move--one 
which Teague would use repeatedly in the coming years-meant that the representatives 
that considered the bill too sparing could not offer any alternatives. Frank Horton (R-
Ny), who had submitted an earlier bill offering higher benefits, lamented that he could 
not introduce an amendment to increase the monthly allowance. Philip Burton (D-CA) 
spoke for many when he said, "Although I will support it, my one objection to the bill is 
that it does not go far enough. However, half a loaf is better than none."so Despite the 
reservations of many, the House passed the bill by a vote of 388-0. The New York Times 
carried the news on its front page under the headline "President Loses." But Johnson's 
defeat was not comprehensive. His pressure on Teague and ability to get the bill passed 
the House with no amendments had resulted in a final bill that few considered generous. 
Before the bill went forward to the White House, the Senate had to approve 
Teague's changes in a vote that took place on February 10. Yarborough expressed his 
disappointment at the "insufficient" benefits, but conceded that the reductions "are not 
yet seriously crippling to the goal ofproviding a full program ofeducational and other 
readjustment benefits.,,51 But there was little objection raised to the House changes, Peter 
Dominick (R-CO) even called them a "welcomed improvement" and praised Teague's 
49 Ibid., 2336. 

50 Ibid., 2348. 

51 Congressional Record-Senate, February 10, 1966,2875. 
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"fiscal prudence.,,52 The amended bill passed the Senate by a vote of 99-0. Mike 
Mansfield (D-MT) concluded the Senate's debate by praising Yarborough's efforts in 
securing its passage. "This action today," he stated, "represents a high mark in many 
long and arduous battles for veterans by the senior senator from Texas. Veterans are 
indeed fortunate in having an advocate ofhis great skill and tireless devotion. ,,53 
Following the passage of the bill in Congress, the administration nloved quickly 
to distance itself from its earlier opposition. Johnson had hoped for a reduced benefits 
package but he appeared to have little enthusiasm to carry the fight any further with a 
veto. White House staff members informed Johnson, "despite its obvious disadvantages, 
you will want to associate yourself fully with the benefits that will flow from this bill."s4 
The signing ceremony was delayed until Teague and Driver returned from overseas, but 
on March 3, 1966 Johnson signed the Cold War GJ. Bill into law in a public ceremony in 
the East Roonl of the White House. Yarborough and Teague were joined by the likes of 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey, and General William Westmoreland at the ceremony. In his official 
remarks, Johnson stated, "Because it is for education, I am going to sign this bill, even 
though it provides hundreds ofmillion of dollars more than I thought it advisable to 
recommend or to ask for this year. ,,ss Later on in the day he quipped, "I just had my 
52 Ibid., 2873. 
S3 Ibid., 2876. 
54 Memo to Lyndon Johnson from Will Sparks and Bob Hardesty, February 16, 
1966, Folder "Final Passage," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative 
Background, New G.1. Bill, LBJ Library. 
5S Public Papers, Johnson, "Remarks Upon Signing the 'Cold War GJ. Bill,'" 
March 3, 1966. 
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budget busted wide open this morning by my colleagues from Texas, but it was on behalf 
of soldiers who needed education. It couldn't be busted for a better purpose.,,56 
Yarborough's crusade had reached a moderately successful conclusion. The 1966 
Cold War 0.1. Bill, Public Law 89-358, did ensure that nearly four million veterans who 
had had their lives interrupted by military service since the end of the Korea Conflict 
could claim benefits to help them further their education or career objectives. Moreover, 
for the first time in the nation's history a veteran who had never served in a time of war 
or suffered perceptible injury from military service could expect generous rewards from 
the government. In a stroke, the bill overrode the objections of generations ofpresidents 
and politicians concerned with the economic effects on the nation and the moral 
implications for the nation's soldiers. The likes of Harding, Coolidge, FDR, and 
Eisenhower had feared for the consequences ofproviding a permanent system ofbenefits 
for all veterans. As the Bradley Commission had made clear, military service had always 
been an obligation of citizenship. Opponents of the 19660.1. Bill had continued to argue 
that military service was something for which every citizen should be held accountable 
and should be a matter of civic pride. But the new benefits meant that military service 
could now be a viable means for economic or social advancement and not a natural 
obligation of living in a democracy. The fear ofa more mercenary attitude among 
servicemen and women died hard. In 1968, the New York Times, called the concept of 
peacetime benefits "retrograde in its philosophy" and warned of the "creation of a 
permanent privileged class of veterans, a postwar mercenary class uncongenial to the 
56 Quoted in the New York Times, March 4, 1966, 1,4. 
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national heritage ... [that would] aggrandize and solidify the specialized status of the 
veteran and the concept of veteran versus citizen. ,,57 
Yarborough had successfully countered such arguments by placing the benefits in 
the context of the nation's perpetual Cold War preparedness and the increasing numbers 
of dangerous situations America's soldiers found themselves in. Moreover, events in 
Vietnam had persuaded many of the need for a new OJ. Bill. When Yarborough had 
fought for a Cold War 0.1. Bill in 1959 and 1961, not enough people were convinced by 
his arguments. But 1965 had been a critical year in the u.s. intervention in Vietnam. 
Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained bombing ofNorth Vietnam, had begun in 
February. In July, Johnson had raised the draft call and committed a further 50,000 
troops to South Vietnam. In October and November, the u.S. had already engaged in one 
of its most vicious battles of the war in the Ia Drang Valley_ By year's end, the u.S. had 
184,000 troops in South Vietnam. Close to 1,500 had already died with a further 5,000 
wounded.58 The need for a new GJ. Bill had become evident to all. Despite his devotion 
to more universal education benefits, even Lyndon Johnson had accepted the need for 
new benefits. Although his administration had wanted a more restricted bill, he had 
accepted the nation's obligation to those veterans under fire. 
Not everyone was happy with the amounts offered by the new bill. Many 
congressmen had raised concerns that the benefits were lower than those offered under 
the previous two OJ. Bills passed in 1944 and 1952. The government did, at least, 
recognize the limitations of the 1966 bill. Soon after the passage of the bill, both 
57 New York Times, Apri123, 1968, 46. 
58 Figures and timeline from George Donelson Moss, Vietnam: An American 
Ordeal, 2nd Edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994),427-428. 
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Congress and the administration worked to make benefits more just for the Vietnam 
veteran. In September 1966, Johnson created a Special Task Force by executive order to 
examine veteran benefits. William Driver chaired the Task Force that also included 
representatives from the DOD, BOB, and the Department ofHealth and Welfare. Their 
report, submitted on November 19, included a proposal to increase the monthly 
allowance to 130 dollars for the single veteran, up from 100 dollars with comparable 
increases for veterans claiming dependants. The Task Force also recommended that 
veterans should be allowed to finish their high school degrees without having to cut into 
the number ofmonths for which they could claim benefits for higher education. Johnson 
took the recommendations to heart and sent a special message to Congress on January 31, 
1967 on HAmerica's Servicemen and Veterans." The main purpose ofhis proposals was 
to "remove the inequalities in the treatment ofour Vietnam veterans" and, in keeping 
with the ideals of the Great Society, "to enlarge the opportunities for educationally 
disadvantaged veterans."S9 Johnson praised the nation's servicemen and women for 
"again fighting and giving their lives in the defense of freedom," and added, "It is 
essential that we convey to them ... our full recognition and gratitude for their service in 
Vietnam and in other troubled areas of the world.,,60 He put these principles into practice 
by proposing the Vietnam Conflict Servicemen and Veterans Act of 1967. The act 
incorporated most of the recommendations of the Task Force, including the thirty-dollar 
59 White House Press Release, "Remarks of the President on Submitting Veterans 
Message," January 31, 1967, Folder "Message to Congress," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative Background: Vietnam Vets Benefits, 1967, LBJ Library. 
60 White House Press Release "America's Servicemen and Veterans," January 31, 
1967, Folder "Message to Congress," Box 1, LyndonB. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, 
Legislative Background: Vietnam Vets Benefits, 1967, LBJ Library. 
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increase in veterans' education benefits and the provisions to help disadvantaged veterans 
finish their high school education without affecting their college benefits. In addition, he 
called for disability compensation at full wartime rates for those who served after August 
5, 1964 and more liberalized pensions, medical benefits, and life insurance for veterans 
and their dependants. Johnson had decided the time was right to reward the defenders of 
freedom. "With these benefits," he hoped, "we can assure them that we do not intend to 
let them down in their hour ofneed.,,61 Even in his opposition to the 1966 bill, he had 
never repudiated the veteran cause. He had always supported benefits for those serving 
in hazardous areas such as Vietnam and hoped that legislation such as the Higher 
Education Act could help all other veterans. But with his proposals of January 1967, he 
had accepted more fully the need for more generous benefits. 
While Johnson rediscovered the veteran cause, Yarborough had not been idle. In 
fact, he had preempted Johnson's proposals by introducing his own bill to increase 
benefits on January 11, another S.9. He proposed similar increase in monthly 
allowances, but his bill was much more costly because it offered farm training, on the job 
training, and flight training benefits. The previous G.1. Bills had offered these, but the 
VA considered them unnecessary because requests for farm and job training had declined 
precipitously between the 1944 and 1952 bills. Moreover, the VA decried that veterans 
had undertaken much of their flight training for recreational rather than vocational 
purposes.62 A.W. Stratton, Chief Benefits Director of the V A described the White House 
61 Ibid. 
62 Statement of A. W. Stratton, V A Chief Benefits Director before the 
Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, March 20, 
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bill as "the sounder approach" and pushed for its enactment instead ofS.9.63 On the same 
day Yarborough introduced his bill, Joseph Montoya also introduced S.16 to provide full 
wartime benefits to Vietnam veterans. These benefits would include full wartime 
disability compensation rates (roughly 20 percent higher than for peacetime veterans), 
increased medical benefits, and a 250-dollar burial allowance. For the next eight months 
the House and Senate undertook lengthy negotiations to find a compromise between 
Johnson's proposals, S.9, and S.16. 
The main arguments over the three bills in committee revolved around the costs 
ofthe various training proposals, but all agreed that the basic educational allowance 
should be raised. An amalgam of the three, under the title S.16, passed the House on 
August 17 with a 404-0 vote and the Senate on August 23 by a vote of 88-0. The new 
bill provided single veterans a monthly stipend of 130 dollars per month with 
proportional increases for dependants. Johnson's provision of allowing for a high school 
education remained, as did Yarborough's calls for training, albeit with some stricter 
eligibility requirements. Pilots, for example, had to have a private license before 
receiving benefits for a commercial license to eliminate the possibility that benefits 
would be used for recreational purposes. Farmers had to be already enrolled in an 
agricultural course or employed in agricultural position that would benefit from 
additional training. 
On August 31, Johnson held another public signing ceremony in the East Room of 
the White House, and S.16 became Public Law 90-77. He claimed that the new bill 
1967, Folder "LENA 3/5/66-9/7/67," Box 161, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, 
Legislation Ex. LENA 2 11122/63, LBJ Library. 
63 Ibid. 
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"gives those now in service the same veterans' benefits that have been granted to their 
brothers in other wars.,,64 The bill received a generally enthusiastic reception around the 
country. The Asheville Citizen commented, "This bill gives OI's especially those ofthe 
Vietnam era, a break they should have." The Wichita Falls Times observed, "When a 
young American, fresh out of high school and on the threshold of adulthood, must spend 
a year or two fighting for his COWltry, he deserves more tangible rewards than praise and 
medals. He gets them Wlder the terms of the new 'GI Bill' signed into law by President 
Johnson." The Salt Lake Tribune added, "In signing the new Veterans Bill ofRights 
President Johnson elevated the war in Vietnam to the status ofboth World Wars and the 
Korean War as far as veterans benefits are concerned. ,,65 
Despite such accolades, Johnson continued to study the veteran question during 
his final months as president. He established further commissions to study veterans' 
benefits, one in 1967 and another in 1968 headed by Robert McNamara. He also 
examined such proposals as "VIPS" (Veterans in Public Service), which sought to place 
veterans in public service roles such as teachers or firefighters, and "OlVER" (0.1. 
VolWlteer for Education and Redevelopment), which promoted the idea of training 
veterans to teach in deprived areas.66 He signed his last significant veterans' education 
legislation on October 23, 1968, several months after he had decided against running for 
a second term. The bill brought Vietnam veterans benefits even more closely in line with 
64 Press Release, "Remarks of the President Upon Signing the Cold War OJ. Bill 
ofRights (S.16)" August 31, 1967, Folder "The Bill Signing," Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Papers, 1963-1969, Legislative BackgroWld: Vietnam Vets Benefits, 1967, LBJ Library. 
65 Collected newspaper reports from April 24, 1967 to August 30, 1967, Folder 
"CalifanoNeterans Programs," Box 1, Joseph Califano Papers, LBJ Library. 
66 "GIVER" description, Folder "LENA 3/5/66-9/7/67," Box 161, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Papers, 1963-1969, Legislation Ex. LENA 2 11122/63, LBJ Library. 
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those offered their predecessors by offering them one and a halfmonths of benefits for 
every month served up to thirty-six months after they had served for eighteen months. 
The 1966 and 1967 bills offered only one month ofbenefits per one month of service. 
The 1968 bill also extended education opportunities to widows of veterans for the first 
time. Previously, only the minor dependants ofveterans killed or fully disabled could 
claim benefits. At the signing ceremony he offered his thanks to Yarborough, Teague, 
and Driver for their work over the previous five years before signing Public Law 90-631 
into law.67 
Johnson views on veterans' benefits had come a long way since taking office. 
From his initial opposition to a Cold War G.I. Bill, he had finally backed up all his praise 
for the defenders of freedom by enacting significant and wide ranging benefits pickages 
that would affect the lives ofmillions and forever change the nature ofmilitary service. 
On paper, the benefits offered to Vietnam veterans after the 1967 increases seemed to 
provide a decent opportunity for most to enter higher education. F or veterans who had 
served in peacetime conditions, the new benefits seemed like a reasonable reward for 
service. But there was a flaw in the benefits that soon became apparent. 
The relatively low amount of benefits offered in the 1966 bill reflected the fact 
that the legislation also rewarded peacetime veterans who did not expect any real 
readjustment problems. For those servicemen and women stationed in South Vietnam, 
military service took place in anything but peacetime conditions. Studies of the combat 
experience ofVietnam veterans over the last few decades have revealed the grueling and 
67 Public Papers, Johnson, "Remarks Upon Signing Bill Extending Veterans 
Education Benefits," October 23, 1968. 
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hazardous nature of wartime conditions in Vietnam that made service at least as 
damaging as it had been to veterans ofeither World War II or Korea. The Vietnam 
veterans returned home with readjustment problems every bit as great, ifnot greater, than 
veterans of World War II or Korea. Only in the years after Johnson left office did the 
majority ofVietnam veterans return home. Only when these veterans began to return en 
masse could any judgement be made on the effectiveness of the benefits as a 
readjustment tool. The generosity of the previous OJ. bills allowed veterans to get their 
lives back on track. Because debates over the 1966 bill became enmeshed in the wider 
issues over peacetime veterans, democratic obligation, and universal education programs, 
the education benefits first available to Vietnam era veterans did not provide the same 
kind ofcrutch. Although the 1967 and 1968 amendments aimed to make benefits more 
equitable, by 1968 Vietnam era veterans received only twenty dollars more than Korea 
Conflict veterans, despite the rising costs of tuition. Even though Yarborough had the 
best of intentions when he fought for a Cold War OJ. Bill, the fact that Vietnam combat 
veterans would receive the same benefits as peacetime veterans despite their far greater 
sacrifice made the OJ. Bill a less effective readjustment tool than it had been for combat 
veterans of Word War II or Korea. Those warriors who came home from Vietnam 
expecting same kind of full ride to school soon discovered that the 1966 Veterans' 
Readjustment Act proved to be the wrong bill in the wrong place at the wrong time. Had 
the bill covered just Vietnam veterans, the benefits might have been more generous. But 
because the 1966 bill offered benefits to all veterans, irrespective of where they served, 
Vietnam veterans did not receive adequate compensation for their additional sacrifice. 
As the veterans started coming home in large numbers this problem became evident. 
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Chapter 3 
A PEACETIME BILL FOR THE WARRIOR: SHORT CHANGING THE VIETNAM 
VETERAN 
One of the virtues of the World War II GI Bill was that it provided scholarship 
money for young men from working-class and lower middle-class backgrounds 
who would otherwise have had little opportunity for further education. On the 
surface, the GI Bill enacted in 1966 seemed to do the same thing, but in reality, 
the level ofbenefits was so low that participation was greatly restricted for 
veterans of lower class families who lacked additional resources to draw upon for 
support. 
Nader Report 
For millions ofVietnam vets, the present GI Bill benefits just aren't as 
good as those our fathers got thirty years ago. 
Forrest Lindey, Vietnam veteran. 
We recognize the GI Bill was not designed-and given the diversity of tuition 
charges among schools, could not be equitably designed-to cover all ofa 
veteran's educational costs. 
Olney B. Owen, Veterans Administration 
In 1969, three years after the passage of the first Vietnam era G.1. Bill, Dennis 
Rainwater wrote an impassioned letter to Richard Nixon expressing his dismay over the 
low level ofeducation benefits offered under the bill. Rainwater refused his captaincy 
after serving a tour of duty as a first lieutenant in Vietnam in order to return to Oklahoma 
and complete his education. Because of the low benefits, Rainwater had to work a forty-
hour week in order to support his wife and baby in addition to taking sixteen hours of 
classes. Rainwater asked the President, "at a time when you are trying to get support for 
your Vietnam policy, how can you expect such treatment ofVeterans to go unnoticed?"l 
1 Letter to Richard Nixon from Dennis Rainwater, November 13, 1969, Folder 
72, Box 124, Carl Albert Legislative Papers, Carl Albert Congressional Research Center, 
Norman, Oklahoma. 
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After a protracted legislative battle, Vietnam veterans finally had their own G.l. 
Bill in 1966. But in the early years ofthe program, veterans such as Dennis Rainwater 
soon found that the new bill did not provide them with the same opportunities that 
veterans of either World War II or Korea enjoyed. The first rumblings of discontent over 
the level ofeducation benefits surfaced under the Johnson administration. But as 
millions more veterans returned to civilian life during the Nixon administration, the 
crescendo of criticism rose proportionally. Significantly, it was also during the Nixon 
administration that a new cultural figure came to the fore of the American conscience, 
that of the troubled, scorned, and neglected Vietnam veteran. Newspapers and magazines 
began to carry stories of veterans returning with drug or psychological problems, unable 
to find work, and whose financial and physical readjustment needs the federal 
government ignored. Against this backdrop, debates over veteran education funding took 
on a particularly vitriolic tone. For the next several years the issue of funding levels 
became a touchstone for judging how well the government treated returning veterans. 
And although the Nixon administration enacted several new measures to aid returning 
veterans, it was never enough to quell the rising tide ofcriticism emanating from the 
press and within the veteran community. 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, press reports left the overwhelming 
impression that Vietnam veterans suffered a difficult readjustment. The New York Times, 
probably the most influential media source of the time, contained numerous stories of 
veteran hardship. Front-page headlines such as "The Vietnam Veteran: Silent, Perplexed, 
Unnoticed," and "Postwar Shock Besets Ex-O.l.'s" gave an overall impression of veteran 
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difficulties.2 Specific stories on unemployment rates, psychological problems, violent 
crimes, and drug abuse added the salacious details.3 Other print media followed suit. 
The Wall Street Journal noted that unlike the World War II veteran's return, "the boys 
are not cheering, nor the men shouting, nor the ladies turning out. ,,4 The Washington 
Post described Vietnam veterans as "Aliens in Their Land."s Newsweek highlighted 
veterans' problems in a 1971 article titled, "The Vietnam Vet: 'No One Gives a Damn. ",6 
In 1974, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs printed a collection ofSource 
Material on the Vietnam Veteran. Chairman Vance Hartke stated that the compilation "is 
intended to present a representative spectrum ofviews concerning these veterans which 
have appeared in print since the Vietnam Conflict began.,,7 Tellingly, not one press 
article contained in the 900-page collection presented a positive view of the veterans' 
readjustment. 
The overwhelming majority of newspaper, magazine, and periodical articles 
emphasized veterans' problems. But the majority ofpress reports were anecdotal. Few 
studies existed that quantified exactly how Vietnam veterans fared in their readjustment. 
By concentrating almost exclusively on the negative homecoming experiences, the press 
helped create an image of the troubled Vietnam veteran that became an iconic figure in 
2 New York Times, November 8, 1970, 1, and August 21, 1972, 1. 
3 See, for example "Court Hears Story of a Soldiers Life With Drugs," on 
September 9, 1971,32, "Job Outlook Is Bleak for Vietnam Veterans" on June 5, 1971, 1, 
and "Psychiatrist Says 'Brutalizing' Vietnam War Causes Problems for Ex-O.L's" on 
November 26, 1970, 12, all from the New York Times. 
4 Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1970, reprinted in Source Material on the 
Vietnam Veteran (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),22. 
5 Washington Post, January 27, 1971, reprinted in ibid., 37. 
6 Newsweek, March 29, 1971, reprinted in ibid., 37 
7 Source Material on the Vietnam Veteran (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1974), III. 
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American society. Television and film portrayals ofdisturbed veterans ensured that the 
image endured for decades. Not every veteran came home to such difficulties. Those 
suffering from drug problems or unable to find a job remained a small minority. But the 
circumstantial evidence did suggest that at least some veterans were suffering 
readjustment problems. Inevitably, those that did suffer problems looked to the 
government for relief. 
Most veterans entered the armed forces fully aware of the generous benefits the 
government offered veterans after World War II. Many hoped for a similar bounty 
following their release from military service. But the Vietnam era veteran found 
government assistance lacking in many respects. The unemployment insurance that 
created the "52-20" club after World War II was no longer there. Veterans could claim 
only the less generous unemployment benefits available to all citizens. Thus, they did not 
have the same opportunity to cool down, reflect, and plan out their immediate future 
without worrying about how to make ends meet. Obtaining a higher-education degree 
under the OJ. Bill offered one potential avenue to overcome many of the perceived 
economic and social problems of returning veterans. With the new OJ. Bill in place, 
many veterans looked forward to following in the footsteps of their World War II 
predecessors. But when it came time for the Vietnam era veterans to call in the debt 
owed them by the nation, their government proved far more miserly. 
The relatively low amount ofmoney offered in education benefits lay at the root 
ofmost veteran complaints. Veterans of one Texas Community College wrote House 
Speaker Carl Albert in March of 1972 to complain, "We need either increased wages or 
increased benefits for the services we rendered to our country. In these times of 
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economic adjustment, we have discovered that gainful employment is extremely difficult, 
ifnot impossible to obtain."s Another veteran wrote Albert, "I am a Vietnam veteran ... 
with combat experience. I had to endure a great deal of suffering and all I wish now is to 
have a fair reimbursement from the government for my education.,,9 Others complained 
to the Speaker of their "considerable difficulty meeting the cost of going to college," or 
that "the OJ. Bill has been a great help and has enabled us to attend college at night, [but] 
it is still not enough to live on with the high cost ofliving."lo Joseph Mulholland, 
Associate Dean at Fordham University wrote the New York Times to argue, "The 
disproportionate majority of the deprived and disadvantaged, both black and white, who 
have fought in Indochina receive stingy handouts; they deserve ... generous benefits.''! 1 
Tales of veteran hardships mounted in the press. The Washington Post carried 
news of a "Veterans Rights March" in the D.C. area where veterans carried banners with 
slogans such as "We Demand Decent Living Income for OIs, Vets, and Their Families" 12 
A New York Times article contained the testhnony from one air force veteran who stated, 
"You want to know what I think of the benefits? I think they stink, man. For the kind of 
church change they pay you in the service they ought to give you enough for an education 
S Letter to Carl Albert from the Veterans Club, Tarrant County Junior College, 
Fort Worth, Texas, Undated (Albert'S reply is dated March 1, 1972), Folder 6, Box 142~ 
Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
9 Letter to Carl Albert from Michael W. Dubrick, April 28, 1972, Folder 6, Box 
142, Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
10 Quoted from numerous letters to Carl Albert, Folder 6, Box 142, Carl Albert 
Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
II Letter to the editor, New York Times, June 1, 1972,42. 
12 "Vietnam Veterans Protest Benefit Cut With Parade, Rally," Washington Post, 
May 20, 1973, B4. 
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when you get out. ,,13 Tim 0 Brien, in a 1973 edition ofPenthouse, related the stories of 
veterans who struggled to make ends meet throughout the Nixon's tenure. One veteran 
had to borrow money and take a job in a textile factory that paid only two dollars an hour 
when he tried to use his G.I. Bill in 1969. The veteran recalled, "We ran up plenty of 
bills, just barely hanging in there ... me working like a bull all the while trying to study, 
sweating in the factory, dashing to clasS.,,14 Many veterans soon made the painful 
discovery that they could not rely solely on their benefits and had to supplement their 
income through loans or additional work. 
One of the main failings of the first Vietnam era G.I. Bill resulted from changes in 
the distribution of benefits enacted since the original bill of 1944. During the 1950 
inquiry into G.I. Bill fraud, Olin Teague's committee found that institutions often raised 
their tuition costs arbitrarily to defraud the government. This led Teague to become an 
outspoken advocate ofpaying tuition benefits directly to the veterans and not to the 
schools. His view prevailed in the 1952 Korea Conflict G.I. Bill and the 1966 G.I. Bill. 
While paying veterans directly succeeded in reducing greatly incidents of fraud, it also 
placed considerable restrictions on how and where veterans could pursue their education. 
Because Korea and Vietnam era veterans received a fixed monthly stipend from which to 
pay for tuition, fees, and books, many found that attending higher cost institutions, 
particularly private schools, left them with insufficient funds to live on. The World War 
II veteran never had these problems. The original G.I. Bill paid enough in tuition to 
13 "Most Veterans ofVietnam Fail to Seek Aid Under the G.I. Bill," New York 
Times, April 9, 1972, 46. 
14 Tim O'Brien, "The Vietnam Veteran," Penthouse Magazine, November 1974, 
77. 
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allow veterans to attend almost any school they wanted. When Vietnam veterans, the 
media, and some members ofCongress began the inevitable comparisons with the World 
War II OJ. Bill, they found the 1966 version lacking. 
Rising tuition costs compounded the veterans' financial difficulties. Although 
benefits kept rough parity with cost of living increases, veterans complained that tuition 
in many schools had as much as quadrupled since World War II. TIle University of 
Illinois and Parkland College Veterans Association pointed out to lawmakers that tuition 
at the University of Illinois had risen 307 percent since from 1947 to 1970, fees 430 
percent, books by 433 percent, and room and board 183 percent and called on Congress 
"to bring benefits up to a level comparable to successful programs of the past."lS Frank 
V. Otto, director ofNew York State Division ofVeterans affairs used his OJ. Bill after 
World War II. It paid his full tuition at Columbia State and gave him sufficient money to 
live off every month. Surveying the plight of the Vietnam-era veterans his agency 
administered, Otto told the New York Times, "There's no way a vet can go to college on 
the OJ. Bill today, unless he's got some money of his own.,,16 Similarly, John Reavis, 
assistant dean of the University ofNew York pointed out, "In 1945, the returning veteran 
could sustain himself and his family on the OJ. Bill. Today, the cost is astronomical."l7 
An additional unforeseen problem arose from the decision to make direct tuition 
payments to veterans. Differing tuition costs in different states meant that the monthly 
15 Illinois Federation ofVeterans in College: Policy Statement, Folder 6~ Box 142, 
Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
16 "Most Veterans ofVietnam Fail To Seek Aid Under the OJ. Bill," New York 
Times, A{!riI9, 1972,46. 
1 "Vietnam Veterans in Area Failing to Utilize OJ. Bill," New York Times, 
November 4, 1973, 1. 
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stipend went further in some states than in others. The monthly stipend was the same 
across all states. Therefore~ in states with a well-developed low-cost public school 
system such as California and Arizona, Vietnam veterans used their benefits in greater 
numbers compared with their contemporaries in states with high tuition rates such as 
Connecticut, New York~ and New Jersey. Because the money went further, college 
represented a more affordable option for some than others depending on where one lived. 
By one New York Times estimate, California veterans received 890 million dollars in 
federal benefits through 1972 compared with only 315 million in New York. Having a 
potentially less educated veteran population caused concern for some Northeastern 
politicians. Westchester Representative Ogden Reid noted, "Whenever educational 
opportunities are less than those ofother states, this puts you at an economic 
disadvantage." New Jersey Democrat Henry Helstoski chairman of the House Veterans 
Affairs Subcommittee on Education and Training added, "High tuition costs and high 
living costs are worst in the metropolitan area .... You're absolutely clobbered in a 50­
mile radius around New York City.,,18 By 1973,37 percent ofNew York Vietnam 
veterans had used their benefits compared with 51 percent of California's veterans. 19 
Although different regions may have different attitudes toward education, the differences 
here seem to be a consequence of the differing costs of tuition. As Helstoski commented, 
these differences "do not reflect a difference in desire-the desire goes across the 
board.,,20 
18 Ibid., 17. 

19 Ibid., 1. 

20 Ibid., November 4, 1973. 
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The sense ofpublic outrage over inadequate benefits intensified throughout 
Nixon's time in office. Incredulous newspaper editorials helped push the issue of 
education benefits to the center of the wider discourse on society's neglect of the 
Vietnam veteran. On July 4, 1969, the New York Times called for an increase in 
education aid to veterans, describing the benefits as "clearly inadequate in terms of 
today's college costs. ,,21 In a later editorial, the paper commented, 
Unlike the men who fought on World War II, the veterans of Vietnam have 
served in a war over which the country has been sharply divided. The Vietnam 
war, moreover, called for sacrifices only of those who were in the anned forces, 
while their compatriots at home have remained largely unaffected. 
The veterans of Vietnam ought therefore to receive financial benefits at 
least comparable to those afforded the veterans ofWorld War II. Yet the 
educational OJ. Bill of Rights today constituted a niggardly handout, compared to 
the full funding of college studies which made the post-World War II OJ. Bill so 
significant a landmark in the expansion of educational opportunities. 22 
Peter Braestrup of the Washington Post attacked the government for "Abandoning Our 
Vietnam Veterans" by failing to enact legislation to increase benefits?3 The Boston 
Globe cited the Vietnam veteran's "cut-rate educations," and opined, "because the war is 
unpopular, because the Vietnam veterans do not include the sons of the rich, the powerful 
and the articulate, because the veterans of this war have been unwilling or unable to 
organize on their own behalf, nobody cares. ,,24 The Oklahoma Journal added, "it is 
shameful, and our chickens are sure to come home to roost in future times when we may 
need the services ofyoung Americans to keep our country safe. ,,25 
21 New York Times, July 4, 1969,39. 

22 New York Times, April 13, 1972,42. 

23 Washington Post, June 6, 1973,21 

24 Quoted in the Oklahoma Journal, December 18,1973,12. 

25 Ibid. 

97 
The anecdotal evidence suggested clearly that Vietnam veterans experienced 
problems with their O.I. Bill. But there was little quantifiable data to back up this 
assumption. Several studies appeared during the early 1970s in an attempt to ascertain 
the extent of the problems faced by veterans under the 0.1. Bill. One of the few 
organizations looking out for the interests of the Vietnam veteran, The National 
Association ofConcerned Veterans (NACV), conducted one such study. 
Though never as powerful or influential as the older veterans lobbies, the NACV 
emerged during these troubled years as one ofthe most important and most consistent 
advocates ofVietnam veterans' rights. Formed in Mankato, Minnesota in 1968 by a 
group ofO.I. Bill users as the National Association ofCollegiate veterans, the NACV 
was one ofthe only Vietnam veteran organizations with a national focus?6 Many 
Vietnam veterans seemed reluctant to organize in the aftermath of their service. As one 
staff member of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee noted, "Today's vets, for better 
or worse, are not a highly organized group, unlike the World War II men.... They come 
home, and don't think of themselves as veterans and don't organize themselves.,,27 When 
pushing for benefit increases in the summer of 1974, the NACV complained that, 
"Currently not enough grass roots support has hit reluctant Congressmen to press them 
into influencing fellow Congressmen who are blocking Senate proposed improvements in 
the O.I. Bill.,,28 Daniel Ellsberg alluded to the differing mind set of the Vietnam veteran 
26 The organization changed its name from "Collegiate" to "Concerned" in 1973. 
Originally, the NACV represented only college veterans clubs and associations, but the 
change in name reflected a change in focus to include all Vietnam veterans. 
27 Quoted in, "Most Veterans ofVietnam Fail To Seek Aid Under the G.!. Bill," 
New York Times, April 9, 1972, 46. 
28 NACV Newsletter, July-August 1974, 1. 
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in a speech at Columbia University in October 1971. According to Ellsberg the Vietnam 
veteran represented a new kind of veteran, one less concerned with organizing for 
benefits and more concerned with "resistance to legitimate authority" and bringing an end 
to the war.29 This lack of organization resulted in a lack of lobbying power in Capitol 
Hill. The more established veterans' organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
the American Legion, and the Disabled American Veterans consistently advocated 
increased benefits for Vietnam veterans, but because these organizations represented 
veterans of all former wars, they did not direct their full attention the Vietnam veteran's 
problems. 
The NACV went some way toward filling this void. They organized effective 
lobbying campaigns for several veterans' initiatives including the establishment of 
Upward Bound Programs and brought lawsuits against the government to free up funds to 
support the federally mandated veterans programs. The NACV also promoted job fairs 
across the country to help veterans find employment and pushed for greater sensitivity in 
the V A to the plight ofminority veterans. Representatives also testified before several 
House and Senate Committees on veteran' benefits. Whenever Congress debated 
veterans benefits the NACV sent members, "flying, driving and hitch hiking in to see 
their individual Congressmen. ,,30 Despite some recalcitrance among its own constituents, 
by 1973 the NACV claimed over 30,000 dues-paying members and established 130 
chapters nationwide. Vance Hartke, Chairman of the Senate Committee for Veteran 
Affairs praised the organization on the floor of the Senate for its efforts, even though, 
29 Quoted in the New York Times, October 26, 1971,47. 

30 NACV Newsletter, July-August 1974, 1. 
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"too often some people would like to forget the Indochina war and would also like to 
forget those who fought that war." Hartke noted, "This has meant tough sledding for 
NACV.,,31 
At their 6th annual convention on February 1, 1973, the NACV issued a Special 
Programs Committee Report on education funding. Based on a study undertaken by the 
Canisius College Veterans Club ofBuffalo, New York, the study lent statistical support 
to veterans' criticisms of their benefits. Based on the average costs of education 
institutions calculated by the Educational Statistical Digest, the report conlpared the 
average financial situation of veterans attending schools during the school year 1945/46 
and 1971172. Taking into account rising tuition costs, living costs, and dollar inflation, 
the report revealed clearly that the 1971/72 benefits placed considerable restrictions on 
where a Vietnam era veteran without could pursue their education compared with the 
World War II veteran. 
Initially, the report offered some hope for the Vietnam veteran. It found that if a 
veteran used their benefits to attend a public institution at the in-state tuition rate, then the 
Vietnam era veteran fared rather well. In fact, the 1971/72 benefits paid veterans 10.6 
percent more than the 1945/46 benefits even taking the increase in costs into account. 
But if a veteran chose to attend a private institution, even at the in-state rate, the World 
War II veteran received 77 percent more than the Vietnam era veteran. According to the 
report, the average tuition costs ofprivate education had risen from 769 dollars in 
1945/46 to 1,957 dollars in 1971/72 after adjustment for inflation. This made private 
31 Excerpt from the Congressional Record reprinted in the September 1973 NACV 
Newsletter, 1. 
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schools prohibitively expensive for most of the Vietnam era veterans unless they had 
some additional funds. Similarly, if a veteran had to go out of state to pursue his or her 
education, their OJ. Bill became precipitously less beneficial. A World War II veteran 
paying out of state tuition and expenses at a public institution received 36.7 percent more 
in benefits than the Vietnam era veteran. For an out of state student attending a private 
institution, the World War II G.!. Bill paid veterans 79.6 percent more than the Vietnam 
era veteran received. The report concluded, 
In 1945, the veteran, due to the provisions of the 0.1. Bill, had freedom ofchoice 
as to which institution ofhigher education he wished to attend. The main factor 
allowing him this freedom of choice was the tuition allowance. As our study has 
revealed, the average tuition cost for all types of educational institutions, both 
public and private, fell below the $500.00 ceiling of annual tuition allowance. We 
believe that each Vietnam Era Veteran should be granted the same degree of 
choice today that his father had in 1945. 
Other, higher profile studies came to many of the same conclusions as the NACV 
report. Ralph Nader, the ubiquitous consumer rights activist, commissioned an extensive 
investigation into the Vietnam veterans' experience. Begun in June 1971 and published 
in 1973 as The Discarded Army: Veterans After Vietnam, the Nader Report studied the 
federal response to the problems faced by Vietnam veterans with particular emphasis on 
the role of the Veterans Administration. The report highlighted the acute need for a 
strong G.!. Bill in light of the difficulties faces by many veterans in securing 
employment. It noted that of all the federal programs and benefits offered, "none has 
been more prized by returning soldiers than the education benefits under the 0.1. Bill.,,32 
32 Paul Starr, Discarded Army: Veterans After Vietnam (New York: Charter house, 
1973),226. 
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The report confinned that "the major complaint of Vietnam veterans ... has been that the 
current level of benefits has lagged behind those available after World War II.,,33 
The report also confinned one of the other main criticisms against the bill, namely 
that low payments placed considerable restrictions on the type and location ofschools 
most could afford. Noting that 49 percent ofveterans had used their benefits in 
California where they could make use of a highly-developed system of low-cost public 
schools compared with just 29 percent in Pennsylvania which had proportionally higher 
number ofexpensive private institutions, the report concluded that, "Veterans from states 
that lack extensive systems of public higher education have much less opportunity to use 
the G.I. Bill.,:J4 In addition, the report noted, "While World War II veterans were slightly 
more likely to attend private colleges than the general population, Korean and Vietnam 
era veterans have been more likely to attend public institutions.,,3s The report conceded 
that this factor resulted in part from the failure of the later G.I. Bills to pay direct tuition, 
but also from the proliferation of public schools since the end ofWorld War II. 
One of the more scathing criticisms ofVietnam era education benefits appeared in 
both the NACV and Nader reports and gained growing attention from the media, namely 
that the low levels of payments adversely affected the lower classes and disadvantaged 
minorities. Because relying solely on G.I. Bill benefits left veterans with greatly 
conscribed educational opportunities, those that did not have recourse to alternative funds 
suffered disproportionately. The Nader Report concluded, 
33 Ibid., 227. 

34 Ibid., 241. 

3S Ibid., 237. 
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One of the virtues of the World War II GI Bill was that it provided scholarship 
money for young men from working-class and lower middle-class backgrounds 
who would otherwise have had little opportunity for further education. On the 
surface, the GI Bill enacted in 1966 seemed to do the same thing, but in reality, 
the level ofbenefits was so low that participation was greatly restricted for 
veterans of lower class families who lacked additional resources to draw upon for 
support.36 
African-American veterans, in particular, faced additional problems to their white 
counterparts after leaving the service. At the end ofthe 1960s and early 1970s, 
unemployment remained endemic to young black males. According to one estimate, 
almost 30 percent ofblack male veterans between the ages of twenty and twenty-four 
were out ofwork compared to less than 6 percent ofwhite veterans of the same age.37 
Stories increased in the press of black veterans struggling to make ends meet. In 1968, 
the New York Times reported on one former "tunnel rat" who, three months after 
discharge from the army could not find employment and "doesn't have much to show for 
his year under fire. He's living back home with his mother, brother and sister on a 
dreary, littered street in a battered four-story red brick tenement house. ,,38 Another such 
story detailed the post-service experience ofAfrican American veteran Sergeant Dwight 
H. Johnson, a Congressional Medal ofHonor recipient who was shot and killed whilst 
committing an armed robbery at a grocery store.39 
36 Ibid., 241-242. 
37 James Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the 
Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 171. 
38 Sol Stem, "When the Black G.I. Comes Back From Vietnam," New York Times, 
March 24, 1968, SM27. 
39 "From Dakota to Detroit: The Death ofa Troubled Hero," New York Times, 
May 26, 1971, 1. 
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A more generous G.1. Bill might have provided an avenue to economic 
advancement for black veterans, and no doubt it did help some attain an education or 
vocational training. But, as the NACV complained, "Since the enactment of the frrst G.1. 
Bill, the desires, needs, and problems of the minority veteran have seldom, if ever, been 
met to the extent ofhis counterpart.,,40 Tim O'Brien noted that, "For Black Vietnam 
veterans, many of whom think they fought a racist war, the modem GI Bill is ano1her 
piece of the white man's tokenism.,,41 One black veteran with two children commented, 
"It's been rough. I do odd jobs and things .... Ever since I've been out, it's been a hard 
time for me.,,42 Another, noting that his benefits failed to cover his living expenses 
stated, "It's really a problem .... All the food expenditures, gas and so forth are going 
Up.,,43 A veterans counselor at a New York Community College commented, "The 
average white, middle class vet, with a high school degree and some tolerance for 
bureaucracy can get what he wants out of the V.A .... For the middle-class vet who can 
get support from his parents or who has a wife who can support him, ... the benefits are 
a boon, a nice supplement. But they won't finance an education.,,44 In April 1971, New 
York veterans formed the United Black Veterans of America seeking greater benefits for 
minority veterans. One member commented, 
As blacks and minority-group members, we feel we aren't getting a fair share of 
opportunities even though we have given so much of ourselves in the service of 
America.... when we came out we discovered [America] did not seem to 
40 Quoted in Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts, 171. 

41 O'Brien, "Vietnam Veteran," 128. 

42 "Vietnam Veterans Protest Benefit Cut With Parade, Rally," Washington Post, 

May 20, 1973, B4. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Quoted in the New York Times, April 9, 1973,43. 
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recognize our role in fighting for her, as is evidenced by the lack of fair and equal 
opportunities for black veterans.45 
James Westheider points out in one of the few studies to discuss the postwar experience 
ofAfrican-American veterans, Fighting on Two Fronts (1997), many black veterans 
benefited from public service organizations such as the Urban League's Veterans Affairs 
Program and from college veterans' clubs.46 But such programs offered mere palliatives 
to the deeper-seated problem ofgovernment parsimony. 
Some African Americans faced a further complication. The military had five 
types of discharge at the end of the Vietnam War. Over 90 percent of veterans received 
honorable discharges, making them eligible for a full slate of veterans' benefits. A 
dishonorable discharge precluded a veteran from receiving any benefits. Other 
classifications required a review by the Veteran Administration to determine eligibility. 
As is well documented, by the end of the Vietnam War, morale declined as the military 
effort wore down. Incidents of indiscipline increased as no soldier wanted to be the last 
one killed in a crusade that had long since expired. For African Americans, the problem 
seemed particularly acute. Racial tension, though not pervasive, became an increasing 
feature of the military life in Vietnam. Mirroring the fractured nature of late-1960s 
American society, a combination of lingering white racism and growing militancy among 
African Americans contributed to much of the racial violence in Vietnam. A race riot 
broke out at the Long Binh stockade in 1968. At Cam Rahn Bay, outrage spread among 
black servicemen when white soldiers raised a Confederate flag to mark the assassination 
45 Quoted in the New York Times, August 29, 1971, 7. 

46 Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts, 171. 
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ofDr. Martin Luther King.47 As one veteran recalled, "There was a whole change of 
attitude. Even among those, like me who were committed to the war. You began to 
wonder, 'What am I really fighting for?' After Dr. King's death there was a greater sense 
of being black.,,48 When one white veteran responded to continuing media coverage of 
the death ofDr. King with a racial slur, one black veteran recalled, "we commenced to 
give him a lesson in when to use that word and when not to use that word. A physical 
Lesson.,,49 Such confrontations became more commonplace as the war dragged on. 
Occasionally, large-scale incidents grabbed the attention of the media. In October 1972, 
the front page of the New York Times carried a report of an incident on board the u.s.s. 
Kitty Hawk in October 1972 where forty-six sailors suffered injuries reSUlting from in a 
racial confrontation. Black sailors reportedly lashed out against their menial jobs and the 
perceived discrimination inherent in the navy.50 
Compounding the problem for black soldiers, statistically more whites were likely 
to report incidents of racial assaults than black soldiers. One House Committee on 
Armed Services report found that penalties for African-American soldiers found guilty of 
misconduct tended to be harsher where the punishment was left to the discretion ofwhite 
officers.51 Morrocco Coleman, himself a victim of a trumped up criminal charge during 
his tour ofduty, wrote Lyndon Johnson and Ebony Magazine to complain of, "the 
47 Ibid., 98. 
48 Quoted in Myra Macpherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted 
Generation, New Edition, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 555 
49 Quoted in Wallace Terry, Bloods: An Oral History o/the Vietnam War by 
Black Veterans (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 167. 
50 Herman Graham III, The Brothers' Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and 
the Military Experience (Gainesville: University Press ofFlorida, 2003), 120. 
51 Cited in ibid., 127. 
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disproportionate numbers ofblack GIs that were being court-martialed and rail roaded off 
to prison in Vietnam.,,52 
The result of this combination of increased racial tension and, in the words of 
James Westheider, a "command structure [that] was overwhelmingly white, often racist, 
and usually apathetic to blacks concerns," was that the black soldier often suffered a 
disproportionate number ofbad conduct or dishonorable discharges. 53 Consequently, 
many found that they could not obtain desperately needed benefits when they left the 
service. Given the lack ofeconomic opportunities open to them in the 1960s, 
proportionally more African Americans had entered military service for economic 
advancement than their white counterparts. 54 As one veteran recalled, "There weren't 
many opportunities for blacks in private industry then. As a graduate ofWest Point, I 
was an officer and a gentleman by act ofCongress. Where else could a black go and get 
that label just like that?,,55 But for many, a combination of low benefits and 
discriminatory discharges undermined that dream and made their post-service life less 
rewarding than they had anticipated. 
Frustrated by the government response to their problems, veterans directed much 
if their ire toward the Veterans Administration. Much of the media criticism of the VA 
centered on the medical treatment ofwounded Vietnam veterans. With advances in 
medical technology and the advent ofmedevac helicopters, Vietnam soldiers survived 
some injuries that would have proved fatal on the battlefields ofWorld War II and even 
52 Morocco Coleman, Coming Full Circle (Atlanta: Underground Epics 
Publishing, 2001), 63. 
53 Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts, 111. 
54 Macpherson, Long Time Passing, 571. 
55 Terry, Bloods, 221. 
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Korea. As a consequence, the number of severely injured veterans increased 
proportionally after Vietnam. V A hospitals sometimes struggled to cope with such an 
influx ofpatients. Again, the press quickly picked up on stories ofveteran neglect at V A 
hospitals. The New York Times opined, "Ironically, while the demands of war are endless 
for the youth called upon to risk their necks and limbs there, the wounded are not assured 
of receiving the utmost in medical care once back in the United States. ,,56 Further 
headlines such as "Crippled Veterans Find Hospitals Crowded and Attitudes at Home 
Ambiguous" and "Ex-OJ. Says Neglect Cost him an Eye" reflected a growing perception 
that the V A was failing its injured charges.57 Exacerbating the problem, the Nader 
Report claimed that the V A allocated a majority of its thinly stretched resources to the 
chronic medical problems of its older veterans, often to the detriment of the wounded 
Vietnam veteran. Life magazine, in one of the more notorious stories of the mistreatment 
ofveterans, published a series of images from the Bronx veterans' hospital in May 1970. 
The pictorial showed veterans in various states of neglect including images of 
wheelchair-bound veterans left sitting under running showers for hours at a time. Further 
charges arose in the press and in the veteran community that the V A failed to offer the 
necessary support to veterans plagued by drug addictions picked up in Vietnam. The VA 
did open up drug centers around the country to aid addicted veterans, but the perception 
grew that these efforts never went far enough. 
Veterans and educators also cited the VA for their inefficient distribution of 
benefit checks. Many veterans complained of tardy payments or bureaucratic 
56 New York Times, October 19, 1970, 39. 

57 New York Times, April 3, 1970, 19, and March 29, 1973, 51. 
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intransigence in the application process. Tim O'Brien slated the VA for, "Late checks, 
delayed checks. Unanswered telephones. Slothful, insensitive V A offices. Computers 
that stop payment on benefit checks if each item on complicated application forms isn't 
properly completed. ,,58 Joseph Mullholland, Assistant Dean of the Liberal Arts College 
at Fordham University described veterans benefits as, "inadequate [and] ... often 
delayed for months," and described the VA's bureaucracy as, "all but impenetrable.,,59 
Even more galling for most veterans, instead of acting as an advocate for higher 
veteran benefits the V A proved to be a mouthpiece for the White House's financial 
retrenchment. Chief culprit was Donald Johnson, Nixon's choice to succeed William 
Driver as head of the VA. Johnson, an imposing figure standing at six feet five inches 
tall, won a Bronze Star fighting in Europe in World War II. He also served as National 
Commander of the American Legion from 1964 to 1965. After an unsuccessful run at the 
governorship of Iowa, Johnson became an ardent supporter of Richard Nixon. In return, 
Nixon nominated him to head the VA in June 1969. But despite his military background 
and post-service experience with veterans, Johnson proved an unreliable friend of the 
Vietnam veteran. Johnson insisted, as did Nixon, that Vietnam veterans did indeed 
receive equitable benefits compared with their World War II counterparts. Claiming that 
benefits had kept pace with inflation, Johnson saw no need for blanket increases in 
education benefits and opposed any major increases that came up for debate in Congress. 
In April 1971, Johnson testified before the first ever hearings of the newly formed Senate 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Though he spent most of his time discussing perceived 
58 O'Brien, "Vietnam Veteran," 141. 

59 Letter to the Editor, New York Times, May 21, 1971,28. 
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problems within the V A medical system, he cited increasing use of the OJ. Bill among 
veterans as evidence of the program's success and noted that among recipients of 
education benefits, "Three out of five are attending college. Comparable percentages 
under prior OI Bills were 29 percent for World War II and 50 percent for the Korea 
conflict.,,60 
10hnson's testimony laid the pattern for the administrator during his tenure of 
using participation rates and cost of living indices to cast the Vietnam OJ. Bill as a 
success. The problem with using such figures, as many critics pointed out, was that there 
existed as yet little statistical evidence to show how many veterans actually completed 
their courses and how many were forced to drop out because of financial pressures. 
Similarly, these number did not take into account the fact that higher education in the 
United States had become much more widespread since the original World War II OJ. 
Bill. Higher participation rates did not necessarily mean that the OJ. Bill was performing 
one of its intended functions ofallowing veterans to catch up to their civilian counterparts 
in terms ofeducational opportunities. The original OJ. Bill gave veterans who might 
normally have not gone to college the opportunity to do so. But by the Vietnam era, far 
more Americans of all classes, colors, and creeds swelled campus rolls. Without 
corroborating data, 10hnson's claim that participation rates indicated that the 1966 OJ. 
Bill was as meaningful to recipients as the World War II bill remained tenuous. 
Moreover, 10hnson expanded the argument made by Olin Teague in deliberations 
over the 1966 bill that education benefits under the OJ. Bill should provide nothing more 
60 Briefing by Donald E. 10hnson before the Senate Committee on Veterans' 
Affairs, Folder 30, Box 254, Fred Harris Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
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than a helping hand for the veteran. Even though the original 0.1. Bill had provided ade 
facto full ride for the vast majority ofveterans, Johnson claimed that it was never 
intended to cover all of a veteran's education costs. This somewhat revisionist view of 
the 0.1. Bill provided little comfort for the Vietnam era veteran hoping that their 
education benefits would be as beneficial to them as they had been to their predecessors. 
Congressional testimony by VA officers highlighted further the VA's refusal to 
acknowledge possible problems with the 0.1. Bill. Olney B. Owen, the VA's Chief 
Benefits Director appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Education and Training 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs in November 1971 to state the VA's position on several 
bills to increase education benefits awaiting congressional action. His testimony revealed 
the surprisingly strong opposition within the V A to proposals that would-without 
question-be of great benefit to the veterans. As had Johnson, Olney crowed that 
increasing numbers of veterans entering training signified the success of the 0.1. Bill and 
added, "This impressive record results, we believe, from the motivation and drive of our 
veterans, encouraged by the active concern of the Congress and the President." Olney 
reiterated the VA's view that, "We recognize the OJ Bill was not designed-and given 
the diversity of tuition charges among schools, could not be equitably designed-to cover 
all ofa veteran's educational costs." Olney slated congressional proposals to increase 
veterans' benefits from 175 dollars a month to 220 dollars as inconsistent with Nixon's 
economic priorities. Completely ignoring such factors as rising tuition costs and the 
unfair burden placed in economically disadvantaged, he noted that the bills in front of 
Congress, "propose rate increases far in excess of price increases," and affirmed, "we 
oppose the enactment of these measures." Olney went on to state the VA's opposition to 
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proposals to make direct tuition payments to institutions for fear of "returning to the 
inequities ofthe World War II GI Bill program and the abuses which occurred," and also 
argued against a proposal to increase the period ofbenefits entitlement from thirty-six 
months to forty-eight. 61 
Few were convinced by the VA's line of argument. One New York Times 
editorial called Donald Johnson, "a proud legionnaire who has little sympathy for the 
plight of the new generation of veterans." The Times accused the VA of, "Taking its cues 
from an Administration whose idea of economy is billions for war with cutbacks at home, 
... [whilst failing] to ask for the funding necessary to make a dent in the problems 
veterans encounter. ,,62 
In an attempt to answer some of the criticisms leveled against them, the V A 
commissioned Louis Harris and Associates to conduct the first nationwide survey of 
Vietnam veterans. The study contained the responses ofover 2,000 veterans polled 
during two weeks in August 1971 as well as almost 1,500 members of the public and 
over 700 employers in an attempt to ascertain veterans' problems and the public attitude 
to their return. One major focus of the report was on "the role of the Veterans' 
Administration in facilitating veterans' readjustment after separation from the Armed 
Forces.,,63 The VA published the results in January 1972 under the title, A Study ofthe 
61 Statement ofOlney B. Owen, ChiefV A benefits Director to Subcommittee of 
the House Education and Training Committee on Veterans' Affairs, November 30, 1971, 
Folder "Transcripts," Box 21, Stanley S. Scott Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. 
62 New York Times, September 15, 1972,37. 
63 From Foreword by Vance Hartke for, A Study ofthe Problems Facing Vietnam 
Veterans on Their Readjustment to Civilian Life (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972), III. 
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Problems Facing Vietnam Veterans on Their Readjustment to Civilian Life. The results 
were somewhat equivocal. 
Despite widespread complaints that veterans faced scorn and neglect upon their 
return to civilian life, the study found that overwhelmingly "The public and prospective 
employers clearly feel that veterans are deserving of the same respect and the warm 
reception accorded to returning veterans ofprevious wars.,,64 Moreover, 79 percent of 
veterans agreed that "Most people at home respect you for having served your country in 
the armed forces," with 19 percent disagreeing. 65 The Nixon Administration received 
mixed responses for the assistance being offered returning veterans. Fifty-two percent of 
veterans agreed with the statement "The President and his Administration are doing all 
they can to help veterans readjust to civilian life," but 40 percent disagreed.66 In their 
overall evaluation, veterans responded favorably to the V A. Sixty percent ofVietnam era 
veterans gave the V A a positive rating against a 31 percent negative rating. The report 
concluded that veterans were "highly positive about the job the VA is doing.,,67 
Questions on education benefits elicited an ambiguous response from veterans. In 
general terms, education benefits ranked highest on the list of reasons given by veterans 
for their approval of the V A. Among veterans classified as "students" 66 percent gave 
the V A a positive approval. But when asked specifically about the level of benefits, the 
response told a different story. When asked if their benefits provided "More than enough 
to live on comfortably," only 1percent of student veterans replied affirmatively. 
64 A Study ofthe Problems Facing Vietnam Veterans on Their Rea¢justment to 
Civilian Life (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 2. 
6S Ibid., 10. 
66 Ibid., 11. 
67 Ibid., 230. 
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Seventy-four percent agreed that money for schooling under the G.l. Bill was "Not 
enough to live on comfortably.,,68 "Non-white" veterans were more likely to give a 
negative assessment of the education benefits than their white counterparts.69 These 
figures seemed to quantify many of the veterans' comp1aints that their benefits were 
inefficient. But Donald Johnson could, and did, take solace from the response given by 
veterans to another question. When asked for their overall satisfaction with "GI 
education benefits for school training," a surprisingly high 75 percent said they were 
"Satisfied" compared with only 23 percent that were "Dissatisfied. ,,70 The figures 
suggested, as Johnson had claimed, that most veterans did consider their education 
benefits welcome and important part of their rehabilitation and that many found them to 
be very beneficial. Veterans, it seemed, could go to college under their G.l. Bill, but 
could not live comfortably on what the government provided alone. Predictably, Johnson 
focused on the positive. He described the results of the study as "a real vote of 
confidence in the V.A. organization.,,71 
Despite Johnson's satisfaction with the results, the study did little to assuage the 
continued media criticisms of the G.L Bill and the intransigence of the VA. The 
ubiquitous focus on veterans' readjustment problems continued. Many-if not most-of 
the media reports written on these subjects contained degree ofhyperbole. Newspaper 
and magazine articles continued to concentrate almost exclusively on the negative stories 
68 Ibid., 237. 
69 Ibid., 237. The study only gave racial qualifiers for veterans not classified as 
students. Sixty-three percent of non-white veterans not classified as student agreed that 
the benefits were, "Not enough to live on comfortably," compared with 59 percent of 
white veterans. 
70 Ibid., 243. 
71 Quoted in the New York Times, January 6, 1972, 10. 
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of the veteran homecoming experience. The scorned veteran had become a hot topic. 
Sometimes the media went too far. Responding to the Life article on the Bronx Hospital, 
Donald Johnson accused the magazine of"outlandish" journalism that "provide[d] an 
utterly distorted picture ofVA care.,,72 The director of the hospital Dr. Abraham M. 
Kleinman accused the magazine of staging the pictures in order to present a negative 
image ofpatient care. Even more outrageous, the New York Times at one point suggested 
that 500,000 Vietnam veterans had attempted suicide. Considering that roughly three 
million soldiers served in Vietnam and ofthem only about 300,000 were exposed to 
combat on a regular basis, even a rudimentary application of logic should have revealed 
the error in the 500,000 figure. Several months later, the paper printed a retraction in 
which it admitted the figure had come from an unreliable source; by then, the story had 
already damaged further the public image ofVietnam veterans.73 
The press was also guilty of reporting on only the negative stories of veteran 
hardship under the OJ. Bill. As the VA study had suggested, there were millions of 
returning veterans who were grateful of their benefits and a large majority found them to 
be at least "adequate." Even the NACV and Nader reports concurred that most 
veterans-if they chose their schools carefully and perhaps had some supplementary 
72 Press Conference Remarks by Donald Johnson, May 25, 1970, Folder 46, Box 
85, Carl Albert Collection, Departmental Files, Carl Albert Center. 
73 New York Times, August 27, 1975,27. For an examination of the 
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Press, 1998), Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image: Myth Memory, and the Legacy 0/ 
Vietnam (New York: New York University Press, 1998), and Eric T. Dean Jr. Shook Over 
Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam and the Civil War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). 
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income-could fare quite well under the 0.1. Bill, especially if they chose to attend in­
state public schools. 
The continued focus on the problems ofthe G.!. Bill, if sometimes overstated, did 
at least create a greater public awareness ofthe need for improved benefits, and slowly 
Washington began to take notice. Proposed increases in veteran benefits typically attract 
a lot ofbipartisan support on Capitol Hill. The plight of the veteran can stir the 
patriotism of the hawkish Right or the nurturing instincts of the paternal Left. Moreover, 
a pro-veteran stance almost always plays well with voters. Consequently, as the 19&)s 
drew to a close, there existed no shortage ofpoliticians from both sides of the political 
spectrum, from Strom Thurmond to George McGovern, willing to stand up and fight for 
increased veteran benefits. However, motivated by various reasons--mostly financial­
some within the government believed that there existed no need to introduce generous 
benefit increases for veterans. Between 1969 and 1974, the debate over how much a 
veteran's sacrifice is worth intensified in Washington. Unfortunately for veterans, the 
debates came at a time when the country faced a severe economic downturn and when the 
White House was under the watch of two presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, 
who-despite their public statements to the contrary-placed veterans benefits low on 
their list ofpriorities. Only through concerted efforts in Congress--specifically in the 
Senate-did the more impoverished veterans find any relief in the coming years. 
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Chapter 4 
SLOUCHING TOWARD EQUITY: SLOW PROGRESS UNDER THE NIXON 
ADMINISTRATION 
our veterans have long known that they must be champions of responsible 
government. They know the basic truth that a veterans' program not good for the 
nation as a whole cannot ultimately be ofbenefit to veterans themselves. 
President Richard Nixon 
I do not believe that we should begin by depriving our returning veterans of the 
just readjustment educational training under the G. 1. Bill. I cannot in good 
conscience agree to lay this additional hardship on the backs ofmen who have 
already served our nation with such great courage. 
Senator Ralph Yarborough 
In his 1971 political satire Our Gang, Philip Roth offered a scathing indictment of 
Richard Nixon as a politician whose public pronouncements bare little semblance to his 
behind-the-scenes ruminations or the cynical policies he tries to implement.} Roth chose 
to contrast "Trick E. Dixon's" platitudes on the sanctity of life in the abortion debate with 
his continued warmongering in Vietnam to parody Nixon's contradictory character. Had 
he examined Nixon's actions in the area of veterans' benefits, he would have found 
similar degrees of absurdity in what the President stated in public and what he attempted 
to do behind the scenes. Few politicians have ever spoken such glowing public 
expressions of support for the nation's veterans working so earnestly behind the scenes to 
limit the assistance so many of them needed. Even though veterans' benefits increased 
considerably during his time in office and he did sign into law a host of measures 
designed to help the more needy veterans, most of the advances made in veterans benefits 
occurred in spite of the Nixon and not because ofhim. 
} Philip Roth, Our Gang (New York: Random House, 1971). 
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Despite Nixon's obstinacy, the government during this period did not abandon 
veterans as much of the media implied. The Senate, in particular, worked hard to ensure 
that the GJ. Bill program became more effective for Vietnam veterans than it had been 
during its first couple ofyears. The improvements to veterans' benefits resulted from 
intense negotiation between the House, Senate, and White House. All agreed that the 
problems of the GJ. Bill needed addressing, but the proscriptions for solving these 
problems varied greatly. Complicating the negotiations, the Vietnam veteran returned 
home to a far different economic landscape than their World War II or Korean 
predecessors. 
The World War II veteran returned home to an expanding economy that offered 
numerous opportunities for meaningful employment. Even though their OJ. Bill offered 
substantial benefits, many could eschew its generosity and find meaningful employment 
in the private sector. More importantly, the strength of the economy meant that the 
government could more easily absorb the enormous costs ofproviding such a generous 
benefits package. The Vietnam veteran came home at a time when the economy suffered 
its first significant downturn since the end of World War II. During Richard Nixon's first 
term, unemployment climbed from 3.5 percent to 5.6 percent and inflation rose from 5.6 
percent to 8.7 percent. Gross domestic product also slowed to its lowest levels since the 
Truman administration.2 Factors such as the enormous costs of the Vietnam War and the 
federal programs created under the Great Society as well as external factors such as the 
oil crisis during Nixon's second term compounded the nation's economic woes. 
2 Melvin Small, The Presidency ofRichard Nixon (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1990), 203. 
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Further straining the budget, the downturn in the economy coincided with 
unprecedented numbers ofveterans entering society. Questions over the sheer cost of 
benefits had frequently arisen over the previous centuries ofdebate over veteran funding. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, such concerns caused a reevaluation of the veterans' 
benefits system and led to a more systematic application of benefits for World War I 
veterans. The spiraling cost of benefits led to the Bradley Report in 1956 and caused 
considerable opposition in the Bureau of the Budget to the 1966 OJ. Bill. By the early 
1970s, such fears seemed justified as the costs ofoffering medical care, pensions, 
education benefits, etc. skyrocketed. When the Department ofDefense reduced its 
manpower needs as the country began its slow extrication from Vietnam, many more 
came home to claim their share of federal benefits. From a high of 543,000 military 
personnel in South Vietnam at the end of 1968, the United States had only 24,200 by the 
end of 1972.3 Millions more who had not served in Vietnam also reentered society 
during the same period. Between 1969 and 1972 over a million new veterans per year 
reentered civilian life.4 By mid 1972 the presence of an almost continuous draft since 
1940 created 28,804,000 veterans in society, with millions more dependants also eligible 
for benefits.5 Now the costs of a peacetime OJ. Bill were becoming apparent. By 1972, 
the VA administered 1.7 billion dollars in education assistance. In contrast, despite all of 
the new education programs brought in under the Great Society, the Department of 
3 George Donelson Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal, Second Edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1994),415. 
4 Ibid. 
5 VA statistics cited in Congress and the Nation, Volume Ill, 1969-1972 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1973),537. 
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Health, Education, and Welfare administered only 1.47 billion dollars in educational 
assistance.6 
Further draining the V A's resources, the aging Wodd War I and W odd War II 
generations began to require increased medical attention. The VA's share of the federal 
budget rose from 3.8 percent in 1968 to 4.7 percent for the fiscal year 1972. The VA 
spent 6.9 billion dollars on veterans' services in 1968; by 1973 this figure had risen to 
11.8 billion dollars.7 The precarious state of the economy and the rising costs of 
veterans' benefits occurred precisely at the time that the media began to clamor for better 
treatment of the Vietnam veteran. This combination created a fraught economic and 
political landscape for the new president. 
Nixon won a narrow election victory in 1968 by occupying the political center. In 
the eyes of many, the Great Society had exceeded its legitimacy. The Vietnam War, 
urban unrest, and the vast expansion of federal power alienated many lower and middle 
class Americans and shattered the New Deal liberal consensus. Nixon won the 
Republican Party's nomination as a moderate conservative candidate positioned between 
the more liberal Nelson Rockefeller and the more right-wing Ronald Reagan. During his 
first term, he maintained this centrist position, seeking a New Majority of Americans that 
believed the government had neglected their needs and concerns. 
Like Eisenhower before him, Nixon sought a degree of fiscal responsibility 
without entirely rolling back the New Deal or Great Society. Early on in his 
administration, he prioritized a reduction in federal spending in an effort to slow down 
6 Estimates from Congress and the Nation, Volume III, 1969-1972, (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Record Quarterly, Inc., 1973),582. 
7 Ibid., 537. 
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what he termed "the excesses of 1966, 1967, and 1968.,,8 Less than a week after his 
inauguration, he circulated a memo to the heads of all Executive departments and 
agencies, including the Veterans Administration, in which he called for "a careful and 
thorough review" of the budget. In an effort to restrain what he termed the "present 
excessive rate of price inflation in our economy," he called on federal agencies to 
"identify activities of low priority which can be reduced or phased down and perhaps, 
over time, eliminated completely.,,9 But his budget cuts were not drastic. In fact, far 
from repudiating the welfare state he expanded it in many ways during his first term. 
Despite his popular image as a conservative, Nixon's biographers point out that 
he was no great ideologue. Stephen Ambrose described him as a "moderate republican," 
Iwan Morgan calls him "the last liberal president" and the "most liberal Republican 
president in U.S. history."l0 Allen J. Matusow casts Nixon as an "enlightened centrist-a 
conservative man of liberal views. I I Finally, Joan Hoff, in Nixon Reconsidered (1994) 
points to Nixon's impressive list of social legislation and federal regulations as evidence 
that he expanded and redirected the New Deal. 12 Such initiatives included continued 
federal support to education, an expansion of the National Park System and the Rail 
Passenger Service Act that created Amtrak. He also enacted major environmental 
initiatives including the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during a 
8 Quoted in Small, Richard Nixon, 207. 

9 Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the United States, Richard M Nixon, 

"Memorandum on the Need for a Review of the Budget," January 25, 1969. 
10 Stephen Ambrose, Nixon, Volume II: The Triumph o/a Politician (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1989), 431. Iwan Morgan, Nixon (London: Arnold, 2002), 69, 93. 
II Allen J. Matusow, Nixon's Economy (Lawrence: University ofKansas Press, 
1998),4. 
12 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
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1970 cabinet reorganization, and signed the Clean Air Act, the Noise Control Act, the 
Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. He also expanded the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and signed the Indian Education Act of 1972. His proposed Family 
Assistance Plan would have expanded greatly the welfare state by guaranteeing a 
minimum income to the poorest families. 
But there were certainly limits to Nixon's liberalism. In 1971, he opposed the 
Child Development Act that would have given free childcare to the poor, and later on in 
his administration slashed funding to the EPA and many of the Great Society's social 
programs such as the Office of Economic Opportunity. He proved equally equivocal in 
his education record. In 1972 he signed into law the Education Amendments of 1972 
which greatly expanded the provisions of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and 
introduced new measures such as the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) 
which offered an annual grant of 1,400 dollars to all students with certain deductions 
made for parental contributions. 13 Early on in his administration, Nixon also called for 
federal assistance to be redirected to the needs of the poor through a series of additional 
grants and loans. 14 But Nixon also vetoed an appropriations bill for the Departments of 
Health, Labor, Education, and Welfare in January 1970 because of its cost, claiming "it is 
in the vital interests of all Americans in stopping the rise in the cost of living." Later that 
same year he vetoed an additional appropriations bill for the Office of Education for 
similar reasons. 15 
13 Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, 602-603. 

14 Ibid., 598. 

15 Ibid., 581. 
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Moreover, Congress must take much of the credit for the "liberal" proposals 
signed by the President, including the 1972 Education Amendments Act. The BEOG's 
for example came from a Senate initiative. In addition, many ofNixon's environmental 
polices aimed to steal the thunder ofpotential presidential challenger Edmund Muskie 
who had been at the forefront of the battle for environmental legislation long before 
Nixon became interested. 16 As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted, to protect his middle ground 
constituency, Nixon often just "rolled with the punches and went along with a reform-
minded Congress.,,17 It was Congress--especially the Senate-that landed the punches 
during the fights for higher veteran benefits throughout Nixon's term. The country's 
economic plight did little to dampen Congress's enthusiasm for the veteran cause. 
Supporting the nation's veterans has typically been one of the safer issues to which a 
politician can adhere. As the public awareness of veterans' troubles grew, increasing 
numbers ofpoliticians from both parties joined Ralph Yarborough in pushing for 
increased benefits. But the calls were neither uniform nor unified. 
By the end of the 1960s, a clear order emerged in how far the different parts of 
government were prepared to go in helping the veteran. The Senate regularly proves 
itself the more munificent with federal funds, and throughout the Vietnam era, 
Yarborough and other members of the Senate proved to be the best friends the Vietnam 
veteran had in government. Since the Eisenhower Administration, the White House, for 
either ideological or fiscal reasons, continued to provide the strongest opposition to the 
16 See Paul C. Milazzo "The Environment" in Julian Zelizer, The American 
Congress: The Building ofDemocracy (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2004), 611-614. 
17 Quoted in Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority 
(Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2004) 114. 
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Senate's efforts. Despite spewing more rhetoric in support ofVietnam veterans than 
perhaps any other politician, Nixon sought to keep benefits increases low. As with much 
of his sociallegislation~ he never repudiated the idea of offering federal assistance to 
those in need, he just sought to place a lower ceiling on how far that assistance should go. 
In between the generosity of the Senate and the thrift of the White House, the House, 
under the stewardship of Olin Teague, sought a middle ground that generally pleased 
neither the veterans, nor the Senate, nor the White House, but which generally proved to 
be the most politically acceptable. The debates over H.R.11959 revealed clearly the 
emergence of these roles. 
On August 4, 1969, the House voted on H.R.11959, a proposal to increase 
veterans' benefits by 27 percent, raising the monthly educational allowance to 165 
dollars. A veteran with one dependant could claim 197 dollars, up from 155 dollars. 
Concerns over the low usage of the 1966 G.I. Bill during its early years prompted this 
call for an increase. Numerous congressmen raised concerns that only approximately 20 
percent of Vietnam veterans had thus far claimed their education benefits. In the floor 
debate on the bill, several representatives claimed that passage of the increase would lead 
to many more veterans flooding into higher education. Further, Frank Annunzio (D-IL) 
crowed, "many words have been spoke in this Chamber about support for our fighting 
men overseas, and such words have not fallen on deafyears.,,18 Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) 
added, "In the face of today' s rising tuition as well as rising cost of living, the 
undergraduate veteran can hardly be said to be going to school in lavish style on his VA 
18 Congressional Record-House, August 4, 1969,22080. 
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allowance.,,19 Others suggested that the need for the increase was "clear and 
indisputable," and that the bill was "long overdue," and "the very least that we in 
Congress can do for them. ,,20 A very self-satisfied House then passed the bill by a vote of 
404-0. The House had some cause to be pleased because at least their benefits increase 
far outweighed the one sought by the White House. 
Nixon's proscription for easing the veteran's plight was considerably less 
generous than that of the House. In June 1969, he created a President's Committee on the 
Vietnam Veterans to study the veterans' readjustment needs and make recommendations 
for legislation. Donald Johnson headed the panel, which also contained then director of 
the Office of Economic Opportunity Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird, and Secretary of Labor George Shultz. After early deliberations, and long before 
they published their final report, the committee recommended a much smaller education 
rise than those currently under consideration on the Hill. The committee noted that the 
cost of living had risen only 10 percent since the last benefits increase in October 1967 
and that education costs had increased by approximately 15 percent in the same period. 
In a recommendation that Nixon could endorse with equanimity, the committee suggested 
that the benefits increase should not exceed these figures.21 In the wake of the interim 
report, he advocated only a 13 percent increase. 
Before the Senate voted on H.R.11959, Nixon went on the offensive, attempting 
to persuade Capitol Hill and the nation of the need for frugality. On October 19, he 
19 Ibid., 22080. 
20 Ibid., 22081. 
21 Public Papers, Nixon, "Letter to Senator Ralph Yarborough on Proposed 
Increases in Veterans Educational Benefits," October 21, 1969. 
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addressed the nation on "the Rising Costs of Living." Criticizing the polices ofhis 
Democratic predecessors, Nixon claimed, "The blame for the spiral ofwages and prices 
falls fundamentally on the past policies of your Government. The Federal Government 
spent a lot more than it raised in taxes. Some of that spending was on the war in 
Vietnam, some of the spending was on new social programs, but the total spending was 
very heavy." He went on to laud the reductions in federal spending that had occurred 
over the previous nine months, noting, "hardly anything has escaped some reduction." 
Veterans' benefits had avoided cuts in this period, but they had not been elevated either, 
even as the President lamented the considerable increase in the cost of living. Although 
Nixon did not refer specifically to veterans in his message, he steeled all Americans for 
further "bitter medicine" that lay ahead and pledged, "We are going to continue to 
exercise that backbone in the face of criticism by a lot ofpowerful special interests." 
Nixon had laid down his economic marker, but was politically shrewd enough not to call 
publicly for cuts in veterans' benefits. However, in private, he made his feelings known 
to Ralph Yarborough. 22 
Two days before the Senate debated H.R.11959, Nixon wrote Yarborough to 
express his "deep concerns" over the costs of the measure. Citing that the bill would cost 
an additional 393 million dollars over next year that would have to be culled from other 
important programs, Nixon informed Yarborough: 
I am in sympathy with a justifiable increase in educational allowances for 
post-Korean and Vietnam Era veterans. Yet, I consider the magnitude of the 
increases contained in H.R. 11959 to require reconsideration for two reasons. The 
proposed rates are excessive and their effect would be inflationary .... It is not 
22 Public Papers, Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the Rising Cost of Living," 
October 19, 1969. 
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easy to criticize the pending bill for it promises some appealing benefits to a most 
deserving group. But our veterans have long known that they must be champions 
of responsible government. They know the basic truth that a veterans' program not 
good for the nation as a whole cannot ultimately be of benefit to veterans 
themselves.23 
Like Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and Lyndon Johnson before him, Nixon 
seemed to believe that the best way to help the nation was to adopt universal measures 
and not favor one particular group. But whereas Roosevelt and Johnson sought give 
everyone a share of the nation's wealth, Nixon expected everyone to sacrifice. This 
negative universalism did not play well with veterans who had already sacrificed far 
more than most other members of society. 
Teague also expressed his reservations over Yarborough's attempts to escalate 
G.l. Bill benefits even further. Teague believed that the Cold War GJ. Bill had already 
proven a success and that much of the criticisms leveled against it were premature. In a 
formal statement, he launched a thinly veiled attack on Yarborough and what he deemed 
a rabid press in which he claimed: 
Recently, there were several news stories and editorials, based on the 
inaccurate statement of a misinformed critic of the GI bill. That lamented the 
alleged low numbers ofVietnam era veterans taking training under the bill. 
The entire episode was unfortunate, first because there is no factual basis 
for such criticism. The current bill is a good, workable education measure that is 
attracting a larger percentage of trainees into higher education than either the 
World War II or Korean bills. 
It was unfortunate because such unfounded, carping criticism serves only 
to do harm to a program that has proven one of the most successful and most 
beneficial to the eligible recipients, and to this Government. 24 
23 Ibid., "Letter to Senator Ralph Yarborough on Proposed Increases in Veterans 
Educational Benefits," October 21, 1969. 
24 Statement by Chairman Olin E. Teague on Post-Korean GI Bill ofRights, 
attached to a letter to Carl Albert from Olin Teague, October 8, 1969, Folder 72, Box 
124, Carl Albert Legislative Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
127 
According to Teague, the low percentage of veterans taking advantage of the bill during 
the first two and a half years of the program still represented a greater number than had 
taken advantage of the World War II bill in a comparable period. Once the program had 
run its course, he suggested, the numbers ofparticipating veterans would increase to, and 
even surpass, the levels of the previous bills. Teague also praised the efforts of the VA 
for its outreach programs and Veteran Centers, which he described as a part of "the most 
widespread program of benefit information in its history.,,25 
Teague correctly lauded the VA for getting information out to veterans. At the 
end of the 1960s, the V A made an unprecedented effort to inform veterans of their 
benefits and how to obtain them. In addition to establishing a nationwide system of 
United States Veteran Assistance Centers, or USV ACs, V A officials regularly visited 
Vietnam after January 1967 to inform future veterans of their entitlements. According to 
Donald Johnson, the V A had counseled nearly two million veterans by September 1970 
and two V A employees had already lost their lives in Vietnam. The V A sent 
representatives into their hospitals helping patients fill out benefits applications.26 The 
agency also mailed letters to all veterans upon separation informing them of their 
entitlements and then sent out pamphlets annually with updated information on what the 
veteran could receive. If these measures failed, the veteran could call V A officials in 
over thirty-four cities to obtain further information and application assistance on a toll 
free number. World War II veterans and Korea veterans had no such outreach program. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Letter to Carl Albert from Donald E. Johnson, September 17, 1970, Folder 45, 
Box 85, Carl Albert Departmental Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
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In terms ofdisseminating information, the V A had indeed surpassed itselfduring the 
Vietnam era. Referring to Yarborough's public criticisms of the VA, Teague wrote Carl 
Albert, "Senator Yarborough's observations on this subject have always been a myth, and 
I cannot understand why he continues to make public statements which are not borne out 
by facts. ,,27 
But in his public comments, Yarborough's critique of the VA centered more on 
their obstruction to increased benefits rather than the services they provided. On the floor 
of the Senate, he blamed the V A for being "largely responsible-probably under 
prodding by the Bureau ofBudget-for keeping the veterans out of school.,,28 And 
having spent the best part of a decade fighting for veterans against stubborn resistance 
from three different administrations and Teague's House Veterans Affairs Committee, 
Yarborough was in no mood to lay down the sword. He replied to Nixon's letter on 
October 22, and informed the President: 
I share your concerns for protecting the economy from the potentially damaging 
effects of runaway inflation .... However, I do not believe that we should begin 
by depriving our returning veterans of the just readjustment educational training 
under the O. I. Bill. I cannot in good conscience agree to lay this additional 
hardship on the backs ofmen who have already served our nation with such great 
29 
courage. 
The following day, Yarborough and the Senate put these sentiments into practice. On 
October 23, after the bill emerged from several months in different committees, the 
27 Letter to Carl Albert from Olin Teague, October 8, 1969, Folder 72, Box 124, 
Carl Albert Legislative Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
28 Congressional Record-Senate, October 23, 1969,31362. 
29 Letter to Richard Nixon from Ralph Yarbrough, October 22, 1969, Folder 72, 
Box 124, Carl Albert Legislative Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
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Senate voted on H.R.11959. Despite retaining the name of Teague's bill, the Senate 
version bore little resemblance to the version passed by the House in August. 
When it left committee, the Senate's H.R.l1959 had provisions from nine 
separate Senate bills attached to it that drastically changed the nature of the bill. Title I 
called for a simple increase in the monthly education allowance to 190 dollars up from 
the 135 dollars for single veterans. Yarborough had proposed an increase of this size in 
his bill, S.338. Alan Cranston (D-CA) opened the debate on the Senate floor by 
defending Yarborough's substantial rate increase. Cranston claimed that, whereas the 
Korea G.I. Bill had paid approximately 98 percent of a veteran's total education costs, the 
Cold War G.I. Bill covered only 67 percent due to the increased costs of tuition. The 190 
dollars a month, he suggested, would equate to 98 percent of the veteran's needs 
compared with the House increase to 160 dollars that equated to only 85 percent of a 
veteran's needs. He described Nixon's suggestion of a 13 percent rise as "wholly 
untenable" and called on his fellow senators to give veterans "the level ofbenefits which 
they need and deserve to help them in their educatton and training.,,30 
Yarborough supported Cranston's comments, suggesting that, based on Office of 
Education figures, his increase would make the benefits offered under the Cold War G.I. 
Bill comparable to those offered under the 1952 G.!. Bill. He also reaffirmed the 
Senate's dedication to pushing for generous benefits by revealing the bipartisan support 
the bill gained in committee and further noting that "the only question was what could we 
do to give our veterans a fair chance in life." Highlighting the difficulties the Senate had 
faced in convincing the White House of the need for the increases he lamented, "The goal 
30 Congressional Record-Senate, October 23, 1969, 31341. 
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ofgreater educational benefits for veterans has been pursued under three presidents and it 
has been a hard fight every step of the way." 31 In the Senate, at least, he met little 
opposition and no one raised any significant objections to the proposed increases. 
Title II of the Senate bill separated it even further from the original House 
measure by offering "Special Assistance for Educationally Disadvantaged Veterans." 
This section of the bill offered veterans the opportunity to take college preparation 
courses such as remedial reading at a local college without cutting into their higher 
education benefits. Veterans could also claim up to 100 dollars a month for "special 
remedial, tutorial, or counseling assistance to enable the educationally disadvantaged 
veteran to perfonn satisfactorily in the course he is pursuing.,,32 The V A would 
administer grants to participating schools to offset their costs. The Senate also called for 
a Predischarge Education Program (PREP) under which the V A would pay for similar 
preparation courses in local schools for veterans before they left the service. The final 
measure called for the VA to increase its number ofUSVAC centers to incorporate areas 
that were more rural possibly by using mobile vet centers. 
Two main factors lay behind the Title II's extensive and groundbreaking 
proposals. The first was a desire to increase the number of veterans taking advantage of 
the program. Department ofDefense studies continned a widespread suspicion that the 
less educated a veteran was, the less likely they were to use their education benefits. By 
creating programs that would increase both the desire and ability of disadvantaged or 
undereducated veterans to enter higher education, the Senate hoped to increase 
31 Ibid., 31344. 

32 As printed in ibid, 31342. 
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participation of these groups in the G.I. Bill program. The second factor in the Senate's 
proposals was the enduring legacy of the Great Society. Johnson may have vacated the 
White House, but Congress still contained plenty of adherents to his liberal crusade of 
helping the most disadvantaged in society. No previous G.I. Bill had ever offered such 
assistance to those in greatest need. World War II and Korean veterans had received 
blanket benefits without any consideration given to class or economic need. Although 
the monthly benefit level remained constant under the Senate's proposals, the new 
measures aimed to benefit those that needed additional help. The Senate passed the 
revised version ofH.R.l1959 by a vote of 77-0. Once more, the Senate had given 
veterans a more generous benefits package than either the White House or the House 
envisioned. 
Almost immediately, Nixon and Teague reverted to type and sought ways of 
reducing the Senate measure. Nixon's main concerns over the Senate's bill remained 
economic rather than ideologicaL White House aides had attempted to persuade 
Republicans to raise objections to the bill during the floor debate, but there was little 
stomach for such a fight. 33 Few wanted the political risks of opposing such a popular 
cause. In a pattern that would repeat itself in the years ahead, Nixon lacked either the 
force or finesse to impose his will on Congress in the way his immediate predecessors 
had. Eisenhower, for example, had established a legislative liaison office in the 1950s to 
keep close contact with events in Congress. Lyndon Johnson brought his own special 
"treatment" to congressional relations. But Nixon put little effort into sweet-talking 
congressional leaders. Stephen Ambrose described Nixon as "the least effective 
33 New York Times, November 5, 1969, 28. 
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President in dealing with Congress since Herbert Hoover.,,34 White House congressional 
aide Bill Timmons noted that Nixon believed that pandering to the congressional egos 
was somehow beneath him and "It was not in his personality to do it.,,35 Nixon's Senate 
liaison Patrick 0' Donnell confirmed that the President was "not comfortable dealing 
with Congress on a daily basis. ,,36 
Nixon could at least count himself fortunate that he had a fellow fiscal 
conservative like Teague in such an influential position in the House to restrain the more 
munificent sectors of Congress. In December, during House debates over the Senate 
amendments, Teague cited the threat of a presidential veto as reason to reject the Senate's 
measures and instead proposed a 32 percent increase in benefits. After failing to block 
the bill's passage in the Senate Nixon revealed that he might veto such an expensive 
package should it arrive on his desk in its present form. Senator John J. Williams (R-DE) 
believed that if the bill went forward to the White House, "the President will have no 
choice but to veto it, and I think that veto will be sustained.,,37 After the House rejected 
the Senate bill, both houses then sent H.R.11959 back into conference to reconcile the 
significant differences in cost and type of their respective bills. Three months passed 
before they could be reach a compromise. 
The report emerged from committee in mid-March. Conferees agreed on a 
monthly increase of 34.6 percent, elevating a single veteran's payments to 175 dollars per 
34 Ambrose, Nixon, Volume II, 431. 
35 Quoted in Morgan, Nixon, 164. 
36 Quoted in Karen M. Hunt and Charles E. Walcott, Empowering the White 
House: Governance Under Nixon, Ford, and Carter (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2004), 121. 
37 Quoted in the New York Times, October 24, 1969, 27. 
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month. Cranston claimed that Senate conferees "fought tenaciously" for higher rates but 
could do no better.38 The House accepted most of the Senate's proposals to help the 
disadvantaged albeit with some reductions. For example, veterans would receive a 
supplementary monthly benefit of fifty dollars for remedial courses instead of the Senate 
proposed 100 dollars. The House agreed to such measures as increasing the VA's 
outreach program, and the provision of funds to schools participating in PREP. The 
Senate dropped its calls to offer farm training under the G.I. Bill and acquiesced to the 
House request to deny payments for some more obscure vocational courses. The House 
accepted the conference report on March 18, the Senate on March 23. Cranston called 
the passage ofH.R.11959 as "a momentous day for all Vietnam veterans." Yarborough 
cautioned, ''we must continue our efforts." 39 
Nixon signed the bill without any public ceremony on March 26, 1970. Despite 
his opposition to the costs of the bill and the damage it would do to his budget targets, he 
decided against a veto simply because of the weight of support it carried in Congress. 
Having passed both houses unanimously, Nixon realized that he had no chance of 
sustaining a veto and-still clinging to his dream of a moderate New Majority-did not 
want to risk the political ramifications of such action. In announcing that Nixon had 
signed the bill, White House Press Secretary Ron Zeigler noted that it would break the 
President's budget by 107 million dollars and a further 186 million for the fiscal year 
38 Congressional Record-Senate, March 23, 1970, 8652. 
39 Ibid., 8652 
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1971. However, Zeigler conceded that the extra money was for a worthy cause and that 
the administration believed "that this is reasonable.,,40 
Here Nixon revealed his political pragmatism. He realized Congress held the 
upper hand in these debates and that the time for opposition had passed. Moreover, he 
used the occasion to announce several new initiatives designed, in part, to preempt the 
measures to aid underprivileged veterans already suggested by Congress. The President's 
Commission on the Vietnam Veteran finally submitted its report in March, just before the 
signing of the bill and almost six months after it was due. The commission shared 
Congress's view that the government ought to do more to aid veterans beyond simple 
increases in benefit levels. Based on their recommendations, Nixon liberalized the 
provisions for hiring veterans in federal positions. He also called for advanced payments 
of education benefits to help less well off veterans attend school. Up to this point, 
veterans received their checks after enrolling, which meant that they often had to have 
some upfront money to cover initial school costs. The executive order also directed the 
V A to underwrite loans for mobile homes. As Congress had desired, he also expanded 
the in-service program to help veterans prepare for college. Such a service had already 
been available to servicemen who had served more than two years, the new measure 
opened up this opportunity for those who had served only six months. Finally, the 
executive order offered business loans and training for disadvantaged veterans. The new 
initiatives covered nearly four million veterans that had served since August 1964. In 
40 Quoted in the New York Times, March 29, 1970, 37. 
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signing the order, Nixon affirmed "This nation has an obligation to assist veterans of the 
armed forces in readjusting to civilian life.,,41 
The V A took some convincing before accepting the value of the new programs to 
aid poorer veterans. They feared that the tailoring of benefits to specific social groups or 
classes might pervert the original intent of the OJ. Bill and make veterans benefits a 
force for selective social engineering. But Donald Johnson was instrumental in the 
drafting of the report of the Veterans Committee, prompting one official to state that the 
V A was now "willing to go after-I mean really go after-the poor black kid who 
dropped out of high school to go fight in Vietnam.,,42 
At least on the surface, Nixon appeared to accept the need for increased 
government assistance for veterans. His public show of support for benefit increases and 
his new initiatives suggested that he had reached an accord with congressional leaders on 
the government's obligation to Vietnam veterans. Even though he initially opposed the 
increases, he signed them into law and added additional measures not sought by 
Congress. But as with almost every other episode in Nixon's presidency, no such 
generalizations adequately reveal his true character, for even as he gave with one hand, 
he took away with another. Despite accepting significant increases in education 
spending, Nixon slashed money from the V A's hospital expansion program. In 1972, he 
pocket vetoed the Veterans' Health Care Expansion Act that would have provided an 
additional eighty-five million dollars to the V A for health care. The act, he claimed, 
41 Quoted in ibid. 

42 Quoted in ibid., March 27, 1970, 16. 
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"unnecessarily adds hundreds ofmillions of dollars to the federal budget.,,43 Throughout 
his term, Nixon attracted heavy criticism from the media, the veteran community and on 
Capitol Hill for cutting veterans' medical facilities. He still had a long way to go before 
the veterans considered him a friend. Unfortunately for Vietnam veterans, they were 
about to lose the best friend they did have in government. 
After the departure ofLyndon Johnson, Ralph Yarborough fought on for the 
liberal values they both shared. In 1969, he became chair of the Senate Labor and Public 
Welfare Committee. Having achieved so much in education he turned his attentions to 
improving nation's health care. As one of the nation's leading liberals, he launched 
regular verbal attacks on the Nixon Administration, including regular assaults on Nixon's 
Vietnam policy. Biographer Patrick Cox notes that at this time Yarborough "relished his 
role as a political maverick.,,44 The Dallas Morning Star described him as the "least 
southern Senator" for his views on social policy. Unfortunately for Yarborough, the 
nation, and Texas politics in particular, had moved away from the idealism he, Kennedy, 
Johnson, and others had brought into politics in the early 1960s. 
In the Texas primary for the 1970 Senate election, Yarborough faced Democratic 
challenger Lloyd Bentsen Jr. Few expected a strong challenge, and Yarborough spent 
much of the campaign continuing his work in Washington. But in the final few weeks 
Bentsen ran Nixon-like television advertisements promising law and order and 
connecting incumbent with violent images of the 1968 Democratic National Convention 
in Chicago. The challenger also attacked Yarborough's calls for a Vietnam War 
43 Quoted in Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, 548. 
44 Patrick Cox, Ralph Yarborough: The People's Senator (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2002), 255. 
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moratorium, his failure to support Nixon's war policy, and his support of Eugene 
McCarthy in 1968. In a move that surely rankled Yarborough given their previous run­
ins, fellow Texan Olin Teague decided to throw his support behind Bentsen. In a close 
and sometimes nasty fight, Yarborough lost the party's nomination for reelection. 
Despite all he had achieved in his thirteen years in the Senate, the same tide that had 
brought Richard Nixon to power and had already begun to wash away some of the 
foundations of the Great Society swept Yarborough from politics. The veterans had lost 
their greatest champion on the Hill. 
Few individual politicians had ever done as much as Yarborough in promoting the 
veteran cause. The Cold War G.I. Bill had been one'ofhis greatest legislative 
achievements in a career of fighting for worthy causes. He had faced concerted 
opposition to the bill ever since he first proposed it in 1959, but he never wavered in his 
convictions. Through his efforts, millions ofveterans that served since the end of the 
Korean War were able to return home and improve their lives through education and 
training. The consequences of the bill were wide ranging. The nature ofmilitary service 
changed, making it possible for citizens to enter the military as a means of obtaining 
benefits without ever having to serve during a time ofwar. Veterans had retained and 
enlarged their privileged status in society and the government now had a massively 
expensive obligation to a new generation ofsoldiers. Such concerns were always 
secondary to Yarborough. His motivation was always to give the veteran the greatest 
assistance possible. He recognized the veterans' sacrifices and accepted the 
government's obligations to those who served. He did not care about costs or the 
questions of citizenship and obligation that had surfaced in the past. The same sense of 
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humanity and crusading zeal he had carried throughout his public life and had taken into 
his support for the more enlightened Oreat Society legislation infused his fight for a new 
G.1. Bill. Few shared his views at first, but through his tireless work and against the 
backdrop of the war in Vietnam, Yarborough prevailed. 
Perhaps one of the greatest testaments to Yarborough's achievements was that 
after his departure, former colleagues continued his crusade. The culture of fighting for 
higher veteran benefits that he had created in the Senate outlived his own tenure on the 
Hill. To the fore of these battles stepped Indiana Democrat Vance Hartke. Hartke, 
another World War II veteran having served in the Coast Guard and navy, joined the 
Senate in 1959. In 1970, he became chairman of the newly created Senate Committee on 
Veterans' Affairs.45 As the next round ofbenefits proposals entered both Houses, Hartke 
ably stepped up to maintain the Senate tradition of pushing for the most liberal benefits 
package. 
The House again acted first-but cautiously-by proposing H.R.12828, The 
Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, a new 0.1. Bill proposing 
to raise veteran benefits from 175 dollars a month to 200 dollars. The bill also called for 
raises in vocational training from 108 dollars a month to 160 dollars, a 48 percent 
increase, and liberalized the requirements for spouses and children to take vocational 
courses. Several of the bill's architects claimed that the increases would fulfill the 
promise of the 1966 G.I. Bill. John Saylor (R-PA) noted that the bill provides a "much 
45 Until 1970, the Senate had discussed veteran issues in a subcommittee of the 
Labor and Public Welfare Committee and occasionally in the Finance Committee. TIle 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 created the first ever Senate committee devoted 
exclusively to veteran affairs. The House had had such a committee since 1924. 
139 
needed increase," but maintained that the 1966 bill was only ever designed to "meet in 
part the cost of obtaining an education." John Hammerschmidt (R-AR) reaffirmed, "It 
will carry out the purpose of the original 01 bill which was designed to provide an 
educational assistance allowance to meet, in part, the expenses of subsistence, tuition, 
fees, supplies, books, and equipment.,,46 But other representatives recognized the 
shortcomings of the bill. Elwood Hillis (R-IN) lamented, "I thought our Vietnam era 
veterans deserved tuition payments .... I think we can do better.,,47 Marvin Esch (R-WI), 
himself a recipient of the World War II OJ. Bill said, "I believe that we should offer the 
same benefits to our veterans today. ,,48 Esch ended his attack by issuing a plea to the 
Senate to correct the deficiencies of the House bill. The Senate duly obliged. 
The Senate waited until August 3 to vote on their version of the bill, and once 
more, their proposal was far more generous than that offered in House. The Senate kept 
the House designation H.R.12828 but attached the central features of Hartke's own 
S.2161. Hartke's bill offered veterans a 43 percent increase in the monthly allowance, 
raising the benefit from 175 dollars to 250 dollars. As with all of the OJ. Bills, the 
amount increased proportionally with the number of dependents a veteran claimed. The 
bill also created work-study programs for veterans, allowing them to earn up to 300 
dollars in an advance payment for undertaking up to 120 hours of work for the V A. The 
bill also loosened the eligibility requirements for spouses of veterans to receive remedial 
training without affecting their entitlements for secondary education. Other features 
included increased farm training benefits, the option for veterans to use their benefits for 
46 Congressional Record-House, March 6, 1972, 6954. 

47 Ibid., 6955. 

48 Ibid., 6956-6957. 
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overseas schools, and called for greater assistance to disabled veterans in obtaining 
federal employment. The most controversial feature of the Senate bill was the provision 
for low interest loans to veterans. Under Title V of the bill, veterans could claim up to 
1,575 dollars to cover costs not covered by other federally available loan programs. 
Although the provision of loans was not as generous as giving them outright grants, 
veterans could at least have another option to ease their financial concerns. 
The architects of the bill clearly believed that these proposals would bring the 
much needed and often called for parity with the benefits offered World War II veterans. 
Alan Cranston asked his fellow senators, "who would argue that the Vietnam era veteran 
should not, at long last, receive a rate of assistance under the present 01 bill which is 
comparable to the level of assistance under the World War II 01 bill?" He called the 
need for comparable benefits "a moral imperative for the Nation.,,49 Hartke claimed that 
his increase would "finally ... provide true parity of benefits with the World War II 01 
bill. He conceded the considerable costs of the bill, but added "the cost of the war which 
created these veterans is more expensive ... the question that we face today is not: 'Can 
we afford to do it,' but rather 'Can we afford not to do it.",5o The other senators clearly 
shared his views and passed the bill by a vote of 89-0. Not for the first time, and 
certainly not for the last, the Senate had passed a generous OJ. Bill and now had to wait 
for the House to launch their standard counterattack. 
Indeed, after Teague got his hands back on the bill, H.R.12828 once more became 
a far less generous measure than the Senate sought. Conferees offered a monthly 
49 Congressional Record-Senate, August 3, 1972,26745. 

50 Ibid., 26719. 
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allowance increase of only 25.7 percent, elevating payments to 220 dollars a month. 
Veterans with dependents obtained higher percentage increases to reflect their greater 
needs. The amount of extra income a veteran could earn from work-study programs 
dropped to 250 dollars for 100 hours. Significantly, the Senate "reluctantly" agreed to 
drop their provision to offer loans. The House and the Veterans' Administration claimed 
that such loans were not necessary because of other universal student loans programs 
veterans could utilize. Hartke pledged to "monitor" veteran loan claims to see if they 
were using the other loan programs.51 After several other compromises on secondary 
issues, the Senate passed the bill and sent it to Nixon. Although the compromise bill, in 
essence, amounted to little more than a simple increase in the monthly allowance, Hartke 
claimed, "the results we have obtained represent a substantial and perhaps even historic 
movement forward ... [and] a giant step toward recognizing the enormous debt we owe 
to our Nation's veterans."S2 Although Hartke seemed quite satisfied with his efforts, the 
veterans still had to wait for the kinds ofbenefits they hoped for and deserved. The 
NACV had called the original Senate bill "a clear effort toward meeting today's veterans' 
needs.,,53 As it stood, the final bill fell short of that goal. 
Once more, Nixon used the passage of a bill he had attempted to thwart to 
reaffirm his commitment to the Vietnam veteran. He had advocated an increase to only 
190 dollars a month, but Congress ignored his pleas. Nixon preempted the signing of the 
1972 G.I. Bill with a radio address in which he boasted: 
51 Ibid., October 13, 1972, 35807. 
52 Ibid., 35804. 
53 Letter to Vance Hartke from James M. Mayer, NACV president, reprinted in 
ibid, August 3, 26743. 
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As President I have done everything I can to see to it that this gratitude 
and respect is reflected by the Government's treatment of American veterans. 
Dollars, health care, educational opportunities can never fully repay the sacrifices 
our veterans have made, but they can at least serve as a beginning. I am happy to 
be able to report that America is doing more for its veterans today than ever 
before. 
Failing to mention his own continued opposition to higher benefits and slashing of V A 
funds for medical care, he crowed that "We" have raised education benefits, increased 
hospital treatments by 4 million patients and doubled the number of participants in the 
G.1. Bill program. 54 Upon signing the bill in the White House State Dining Room, the 
President told some assembled veterans that the bill "will allow you to get that education 
and that training so essential to get the jobs that you wi111ater want.,,55 The Vietnam Era 
Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 became Public Law 92-540 on October 
24, 1972. 
Straining Congress and the public's patience, for the remaining two years of his 
presidency Nixon continued his pattern of working behind the scenes to cut veteran 
funding in many areas while lauding veterans in public. In March of 1973, in a 
"Statement About the Vietnam Veteran," Nixon proclaimed, "No group ofAmerican 
fighting men was ever called on to demonstrate their bravery, their endurance, or their 
love ofcountry under more trying circumstances than those gallant Americans who 
served in Vietnam." Promising to "honor them," he went on to claim that no other 
generation of veterans had ever enjoyed such a wide range of government benefits. He 
then called on all employers to look favorably upon Vietnam veterans in their hiring 
54 Public Papers, Nixon, "Radio Address on the Vietnam Veteran," October 22, 
1972. 
55 Public Papers, Richard Nixon, "Remarks on Signing Veterans Benefits 
Legislation," October 24, 1972. 
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practices.56 But he also used one ofhis favorite tactics to undermine one of the education 
programs he had signed into law the previous October. Upsetting the Constitutional 
balance, Nixon regularly impounded money appropriated by Congress for federal 
programs, effectively killing them. He did this on over 100 occasions, most notably for 
the Clean Water Act of 1972.57 He refused to release 25 million dollars for the Veterans' 
Cost of Instruction Program, authorized under the 1972 G.I. Bill, designed to give money 
to institutions that encouraged veteran enrollment. It took court proceedings brought by 
the National Association ofCollegiate Veterans to release the money in May of 1973. 
NACV President called it "pathetic that the Vietnam veteran must seek court action to 
gain the same benefits afforded veterans ofpast wars through congressional action.,,58 
Meanwhile, Donald Johnson stubbornly supported the administration line, even as 
the public and political pressure on him increased. In March, he defended the hospital 
cutbacks in front of a House Appropriations subcommittee. In April, he wrote a stinging 
reply to a New York Times editorial that had accused Nixon ofusing "selective statistics" 
and had attacked education benefits as "pitifully short.,,59 Johnson asserted "A 
compassionate concern for these young veterans has long had top priority in 
Administration considerations." After citing the numerous measures signed by Nixon to 
assist veterans, he claimed that Vietnam veterans could claim "nearly three times the 
56 Public Papers, Richard Nixon, "Statement on the Vietnam Veteran," March 24, 
1973. 
57 James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence o/Congress (Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981),203. 
58 Quoted in the Washington Post, May 23, 7. 
59 "Age of the Viet Vets," New York Times, March 28, 1973,46. 
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World War II allowance and gives most veterans more monetary assistance than after 
World War II, even allowing for inflation and increased school costS.,,60 
Johnson's claims contradicted many of the studies undertaken on the G.1. Bill, 
and they revealed that there was a lot of confusion, misinformation, and hyperbole in the 
public debate over the O.I. Bill. Congressional leaders such as Teague and Yarborough 
had offered differing views of the success of the program than Johnson in their debates 
over funding levels on the Hill. The press continued to paint an even more damning 
picture of the program. A March 1973 editorial in the Washington Post claimed "The 
Viet vets have found that their GI bill dollars buy only one-fourth the education that their 
fathers got for the same money after World War 11.,,61 In light of such wildly 
contradictory claims, Congress sought further quantification of the effectiveness of the 
program. 
Even though the two major 0.1. Bill increases in 1970 and 1972 went a long way 
to alleviating the veteran's burden, they did not extinguish the overall criticisms against 
the program that persisted in the press. The backslapping speeches emanating from the 
White House and from some on the floors ofboth Houses indicated that the government 
was quite content with the efforts they had made thus far for the Vietnam veterans. But 
the criticism in the press over education benefits continued unabated throughout the early 
1970s. Largely because of the policies and attitude of the administration and the V A, 
many veterans continued to feel that the government could do a lot more to aid their 
return home. Congress, therefore, included a proviso on the 1972 G.1. Bill that directed 
60 Letter to the New York Times, April 14, 1973, 32. 

61 Washington Post, March 10, 1973, D31. 
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the Administrator ofVeteran Affairs to commission an independent study to analyze the 
effectiveness of the program. The study aimed to provide a comparison of the post-
Korea conflict G.I. Bills "with similar programs ofeducational assistance that were 
available to veterans of World War II and of the Korean conflict.,,62 The Education 
Testing Service ofNew Jersey won the contract to conduct the study on May 25, 1973. 
On August 30, they submitted their results, but a V A advisory committee rejected it for 
not fulfilling the requirements. The revised report arrived on September 8. 
The ETS report offered a thorough analysis of the post-Korean conflict benefits. 
The report noted that veteran participation under the 1966 G.I. Bill, and subsequent 
raises, surpassed Korean Conflict levels and would soon surpass World War II levels. 
However, the report suggested that usage levels were an imperfect indicator of success 
because no statistics existed in the V A or in other agencies that revealed how many 
veterans completed their courses. The V A had only collected data relevant to the 
administration of the program and did not keep track ofdrop out rates. No one knew if 
Vietnam veterans were using the G.1. Bill as a temporary cash boost without ever 
completing their course of study. A further problem in using participation rates was that 
they did not reveal how the veteran had fared relative to their non-veteran peers. 
Therefore, there was little indication ofwhether Vietnam era veterans had received 
benefits that compensated them fully for time lost from civilian life, one of the main 
goals of the G.I. Bills. The report also confirmed that black and disadvantaged veterans 
62 Final Report on Educational Assistance to Veterans: A Comparative Study of 
Three G.l Bills, Submitted to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs United States Senate 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), III, refered to hereafter as 
the ETS Report. 
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were less likely to use their benefits for higher education, even though no other 
generation ofveterans had had so many programs aimed at helping these groups. Federal 
efforts to assist these groups, the report concluded, needed expanding. No comparable 
data existed on disadvantaged veterans of the World War II era. 
Perhaps the most significant issue addressed in the report, the one that had been at 
the heart of the debates since 1966, was the adequacy of funding levels. Here the report 
suggested, "the average Vietnam veteran attending a 4-year public or a 2-year public 
institution has educational benefits slightly higher than his World War II counterpart 
when adjustments for changes in the Consumer Price Index are made. ,,63 But the report 
raised several variables that affected the "real" worth of the benefits to the veteran. 
When one factored in raises in tuition, for example, or the fact that colleges did not make 
low cost housing available for Vietnam era veterans as many did for World War II 
veterans, the Vietnam veteran's '''real' ability to purchase postsecondary education has 
diminished with respect to his World War II counterpart.,,64 Based on an average budget 
of a veteran's annual expenses, including all living, medical, education costs etc., the 
average single veteran needed an additional 628 dollars a year or roughly fifty-two 
dollars a month on which to live comfortably. The present levels, suggested the report, 
covered only 68.2 percent of the average single veteran's annual expenses. The average 
married veteran required an additional 1,644 dollars a year to cover all of their expenses. 
The 1973 benefits provided for only 50 percent of their needs.6s There were, of course, 
variables from this average. A veteran attending a lower cost public education fared 
63 Ibid., 30-31. 

64 Ibid., 33. 

65 Ibid., 50. 
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much better than one attending a public school. Moreover, the report confirmed that the 
differing costs of education in different states made a considerable impact on how far a 
veteran's money went. Ultimately, the report revealed that variations such as geography, 
class, and marital status made the kinds ofnegative generalizations about the program 
heard in Washington and in the press difficult to quantify. Many veterans could live 
reasonably on their benefits, but many more could use some additional aid. 
If, as the VA claimed, the G.I. Bill was designed to assist a veteran achieve their 
education goals, then the G.I. Bill did provide a massive injection of funds and covered 
the majority of the veteran's costs. The VA expected the veteran to contribute 
something, either from their own savings, from employment, or in the case of married 
veterans, their spouse's employment. Indeed, the report noted that when one added a 
spouse's income to the basic benefits a married veteran with no dependents had enough 
to cover all of their expenses. In addition, the veterans could still claim other federal 
benefits such as BEOGs, National Defense Student Loans, or federally insured student 
loans (the report found that veterans had not made use ofthese other resources in 
significant numbers). If, however, the goal of the G.I. Bill was to cover all ofa veteran's 
costs, the report revealed that there still existed shortcomings. 
The ETS report gained mixed responses from those parties most affected by its 
findings. The media and the veteran community jumped on the report's conclusions as 
further evidence for their familiar refrain that the government and the V A were ignoring 
the veterans' needs. The Washington Post called for "A Fair Shake for Vietnam 
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Veterans,,66 In its monthly newsletter, the NACV informed its readers on the front page 
that, "Educational Testing Service Reports Vietnam Veterans Get Less Aid.,,67 
Predictably, the V A took issue with some of the report's more negative assessments of 
the program. In testimony before the Veterans Subcommittee on Education and Training, 
Odell Vaughan, chief benefits director at the V A, focused on the positive aspects of the 
report and maintained, "the majority ofVietnam era veterans are better off today.,,68 
Further, he suggested, "no general restructuring of the educational program seems 
necessary or advisable, especially with reference to the present benefit system. ,,69 Donald 
Johnson criticized the report for its methodology and its conclusions. Moreover, he 
suggested that most of the variables raised in the report that stretched the veterans' 
resources lay beyond the scope of the V A's mandate. He believed the V A should not, for 
example, fully compensate veterans wanting to attend higher cost schools or wanting to 
start a family. Johnson thought that the government was doing enough by paying more 
on average per head in adjusted dollars than it had done for the World War II veteran. 
This was not an unreasonable position to take, but it offered little comfort to those 
veterans who suffered because of their own geographical or familial status and wanted 
desperately to return to school. Johnson believed the report demonstrated that the 
Vietnam veteran "does have availability to educational assistance benefits ... that are 
66 Washington Post, October 22, 1973,28. 

67 NACV Newsletter, September 1973, 1. 

68 Quoted in the New York Times, September 26, 1973,21. 

69 Quoted in the Washington Post, October 25, 1973, 44. 
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comparable to those extended to veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict.,,70 
The V A refused to endorse any further benefit increases in the wake of the report. 
Although it confirmed many of the previous observations made in private reports 
on the G.1. Bill, the ETS report was the largest federal attempt to quantify the 
effectiveness of the program and had a considerable impact on Capitol Hill. Bolstered by 
the new evidence contained in the report, Congress moved forward apace with new 
proposals to increase the veteran's monthly allowance. At the end of October, the House 
Veterans Affairs Committee considered a new proposal to give veterans a 13.6 percent 
increase, raising the monthly allowance from 220 dollars to 250 dollars. The proposal 
also sought to tie veterans' benefits to the Consumer Price Index. Significantly, the 
proposal also sought to increase the length of time a veteran could claim his or her 
benefits from eight years to ten years. This would allow veterans who had faced 
problems on coming home to have additional time to readjust before returning to higher 
education. In the Senate, Vance Hartke introduced a bill that would provide a 23 percent 
increase in benefits and provide up to 2,000 dollars in low interest loans for veterans in 
higher cost schools. Bob Dole, George McGovern, Charles Mathias Jr., and Daniel 
Inouye introduced a bill that provided a 13.6 percent increase but also paid all tuition 
costs above 400 dollars annually up to a maximum of600 dollars. Nixon began to apply 
pressure as soon as Congress began to move. He suggested that veterans should receive 
no more than an 8 percent increase and threatened to veto a more costly measure. 
70 Donald E. Johnson Letter of Transmittal to Spiro T. Agnew, September 18, 
1973, reprinted in ETS Report, XI. 
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The House did not vote on their bill until February of 1974. Their final measure, 
H.R.12628, promised veterans a far from generous 13.6 percent increase in their monthly 
allowance. William Jennings Bryan Dorn, new Chair of the Veterans affairs committee 
denounced Nixon's calls for a mere 8 percent increase and called the House proposal 
"fully justified in view of the very significant increase in living costs and school 
expenses.,,7] Every member who rose in the debate over H.R.12628 accepted the need 
for a benefits increase, but most raised concerns that the bill did not go far enough. John 
P. Hammerschmidt (R-AR) noted that the Consumer Price Index would rise to an 
estimated 13.2 percent by May, meaning that the proposed 13.6 percent increase would 
barely keep pace with the cost of living. Margaret Heckler (R-MA), one of the architects 
of the bill, added that food prices would rise by 16 percent in 1974 and called the increase 
"hardly generous-it is merely adequate."n Silvio Conte (R-MA) called for a bill that 
would pay 80 percent of a veteran's tuition costs. He conceded, "I intend to vote forthe 
veterans educational benefits package ... even though it falls somewhat short of the 
mark."73 Teague, of course, saw no such problems with the bill. Referring to a more 
costly measure introduced in the Senate, he protested, "I am distressed. . . that the public 
is being subjected to the steady barrage of propaganda calculated to support a bill which 
has been introduced in the Senate." Teague also resurrected the notion of the privileged 
veteran when he added, "After the passage of this bill, the position of the Vietnam 
veterans will be distinctly preferential." 74 Once again, when the bill went to vote, it 
71 Congressional Record-House, February 19, 1974, 3242. 

72 Ibid., 3247. 

73 Ibid., 3249. 

74 Ibid, 3261. 
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received unanimous backing. Despite the misgivings ofmany over the shortcomings of 
the bill, most considered any increase better than none. The final vote was a crushing 
382-0. 
H.R.12628 did retain the provision to raise the amount of time a veteran could 
claim their benefits from eight years to ten. Previous G.I. Bills had an eight-year 
limitation, but after World War II and Korea, veterans received generous benefits 
immediately. Vietnam era veterans did not enter the program in high numbers early on 
because of the low benefits offered under the 1966 bill. Only after the introduction of 
substantial increases did the majority of Vietnam era veterans begin to claim their 
benefits. Many who entered school in 1970 or 1972 would have run out of eligibility in 
1974 under the existing bill. In the debates over H.R.12628, many politicians revealed 
they had received floods of letters from concerned veterans as their eligibility was about 
to expire. A two-year extension would offer the veteran the opportunity to complete their 
degree and would have particular significance for one group ofveterans. 
Females accounted made up only 2.3 percent of veterans of the Vietnam era.7S 
Just over 20,000 served in the Southeast Asia Theater out of a military force of over 3 
million mostly in nursing and administrative roles. Female veterans could claim the same 
benefits as their male counterparts, but tended to use their benefits much later after 
discharge from service, sometimes seven or eight years later. According to one V A 
report, 20.1 percent of male veterans were still in school seven years after service 
7S Veterans Administration Report, Women Veterans: Use o/Education Benefits 
Under the G.l Bill (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981),2. 
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compared with 40.1 percent of female veterans.76 One major reason for this delay is that 
many left the service because ofpregnancy or to start a family. In the 1960s and 1970s 
this process still meant the female veteran had to take several years out ofher life to raise 
children.77 Many, therefore, found it difficult to complete a four-year college course 
within the allotted eight-year window to claim benefits. The two-year extension would 
allow more female veterans an opportunity to complete their degree before their 
eligibility expired. 
The Senate bill contained a similar two-year extension as the House bill, but also 
went much further in what it offered veterans. The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee 
reported out their bill, S.2784, on May 22. The Senate bill retained the central features of 
Hartke's earlier proposal by offering an 18 percent increase in benefits and the option of 
2,000 dollars in loans. In addition to the two-year extension, a veteran could also receive 
forty-five months of benefits instead of thirty-six. No previous 0.1. Bill had offered 
veterans as long to claim their benefits. As had the House bill, the Senate bill liberalized 
vocational training benefits for disabled veterans. The Senate bill also contained many 
other measures to liberalize the veteran's entitlements including offering greater 
assistance for tutorial programs and significantly raising the amount a veteran could earn 
in work-study programs. 
The most contentious element of the Senate bill was a proposal to pay 80 percent 
of a veterans' tuition, up to 1,000 dollars per year once a veteran had paid an initial 100 
76 Ibid., 7. 
77 This delay was also true for previous generations of female veterans according 
to June Willenz's study Women Veterans: America's Forgotten Heroes (New York: 
Continuum, 1983). 
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dollars. Unlike the World War II OJ. Bill, the tuition payment would go directly to the 
veteran. This change aimed to reduce the possibility of schools abusing the system by 
raising tuition costs as had happened under the first 0.1. Bill. The direct tuition proposal 
was always going to be a tough sell in the House. Since the early 1950s, Teague led 
vehement opposition to such proposals following the abuses he discovered in his 
investigation on the 1944 OJ. Bill. By 1974, Teague had stepped down as head of the 
Veterans Affairs Committee in the House, but he remained a dominant figure on 
proceedings. 
The veteran establishment offered widespread support for the Senate bill. Robert 
Eaton, National Commander of the American Legion expressed his hopes to Hartke that 
"S.2784 will be passed by the Senate without amendment and that the House will agree to 
its provisions at the earliest possible moment.,,78 The Veterans of Foreign Wars made it a 
priority in 1974 to support "the enactment into law of comparable readjustment assistance 
for Vietnam veterans, as was provided for veterans ofprevious wars." Francis W. Stover, 
the VFW's Director ofNational Legislative Service informed Hartke "the prompt 
approval ofS.2784 by the full Senate will be deeply appreciated by the more than 1.8 
million members of the Veterans ofForeign Wars.,,79 The Disabled American Veterans 
offered Hartke their "heartfelt thanks and appreciation" for the bill, while the American 
Veterans Committee noted that "the benefits of this important bill to the Vietnam-era 
78 Letter to Vance Hartke from Robert E. L. Eaton, reprinted in the Congressional 
Record-Senate, June 19, 1974,20020. 
79 Letter to Vance Hartke from Francis W. Stover, reprinted in ibid, 20020-20021. 
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veterans, to education and to society itself, far outweigh possible abuses." 80 The 
NACV's Timothy Craig informed Hartke "The NACV believes that you and the 
members of the Committee have performed [an] excellent service to Vietnam Era 
veterans in formulating the bill which you have reported to the Senate.,,81 
The Senate bill clearly went further than any previous measure to offer Vietnam 
veterans the kinds of generous benefits offered veterans ofprevious wars. Hartke 
claimed "In many ways this bill exceeds the measure under which many of us in 
Congress went to school after World War II.,,82 Alan Cranston added, "I believe that 
finally ... we will have provided a true measure of comparability ofGI bill educational 
assistance for Vietnam-era veterans with the level of benefits provided after World War 
II and the Korean conflict. ,,83 Even the press responded favorably to the Senate bill. The 
Washington Post described the measure as "generous and fair.,,84 But whether the House 
would accept such a generous bill remained in doubt. It took a long and arduous summer 
of negotiation before House and Senate conferees reached an agreement. 
While Congress moved slowly toward an accord, 1974 was hardly turning into a 
banner year for Richard Nixon. While his political career was unraveling amid the 
Watergate allegations, his erratic record on veterans failed to improve. In public, he took 
his praise ofVietnam veterans to new heights. On January 28, he sent a "Special 
Message to the Congress Proposing Veterans Legislation" in which he reiterated his call 
80 Letters to Vance Hartke from Charles L. Huber DAV National Director of 
Legislation, and from Arthur S. Freeman, AVC National Chairman reprinted in ibid, 
20021-20022. 
81 Letter to Vance Hartke from Timothy L Craig, reprinted in ibid, 20021. 
82 Congressional Record-Senate, June 19, 1974,20078. 
83 Ibid., 20057. 
84 Washington Post, June 28, 1974,30. 
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for an 8 percent raise in education benefits ''to keep pace with inflation" as well as 
increased funding in healthcare and pensions. He claimed that his administration had 
"done our best" to assist Vietnam veteran and "We owe these men and women our best 
effort in providing them with the benefits that their service has earned them.,,85 Two days 
later in his State of the Union Address he reiterated, "We must also be concerned for 
those veterans and veterans' families who remain in need." On February 26, as he signed 
legislation proclaiming March 29 "Vietnam Veterans Day," he pledged, "we do owe a 
great debt of honor to those who served.,,86 On the day itself, he commented, "We can be 
thankful that America produced such men, and we can be thankful that in the future these 
men, their courage, their continued service, will make it possible for us to achieve the 
goal that all Americans are dedicated to, peace for ourselves and for all mankind.,,87 
Such rhetoric was cheap. Even ifNixon was sincere in his support of the veteran, 
he was not concerned enough to open the government's coffers much further. Four 
senators, McGovern, Inouye, Dole, and Mathias called a press conference on Vietnam 
Veterans Day at which they described the celebration "an empty gesture without action to 
fulfill the nation's debt to Vietnam-era veterans.,,88 The bills circulating in Congress to 
increase education benefits represented the government's best chance at fulfilling that 
85 Public Papers, Nixon, "Special Message to the Congress Proposing Veterans 
Legislation," January 28, 1974. Nixon also called for Veterans' Day to be retuned to 
November 11 having been moved to the fourth Monday in October in 1968. 
86 Ibid., "Remarks on Signing a Proclamation Honoring Vietnam Veterans," 
Feb~ 26, 1974. 
7 Ibid., "Remarks at Ceremonies Commemorating Vietnam Veterans Day," 
March 29, 1974. 
88 Quoted in the New York Times, March 29, 1974, 11. 
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debt. But in the final months of his administration, Nixon and his staffers worked hard to 
ensure the debt would not be paid in full. 
A White House memo laid out the administration's objections to the Senate bill. 
The memo claimed that the Senate measure "Subverts the purpose of the OI Bill 
program" by encouraging those who might have only a casual interest in higher education 
and are "primarily interested in augmenting their own income without working." The 
memo suggested that the costs of the bill would also discriminate against veterans 
attending lower cost public schools by diverting V A funds to veterans wanting to attend 
more expensive schools. Fears of tuition abuse also fuelled the administration's 
opposition. The final objection was that the Senate bill "Balloons OI Bill costs 
unnecessarily" by "converting a cost-sharing program to an income-attractive 
program.,,89 Nixon hoped to enlist Teague in the fight against the Senate bill and wrote 
him to reiterate the main White House objections. Teague seemed more than willing to 
comply. He informed White House staffers that he was attempting to bypass Hartke's 
more expensive bill by taking one of the different less expensive Senate bills, attaching 
the House version and returning it to the Senate. But Teague warned that-in the words 
of one administration aide-"Hartke is completely berserk on this one" and he asked the 
White House for assistance "on the Senate side to trim the monster back.,,90 Nixon's 
aides then attempted to pressure Senate Veterans Affairs Committee members Strom 
89 Attachment to Memo for Bill Timmons from Max Friedersdorf, May 3, 1974. 
Box 14, Folder "Veterans," O'Donnell and Jenckes Files, 1974-1976, Subject file: 
Veterans, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
90 Memo for Bill Timmons from Max Friedersdorf, May 3, 1974, Folder 
"Veterans," Box 14, O'Donnell and Jenckes Files, 1974-1976, Subject file: Veterans, 
Ford Library. 
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Thunnond and Cliff Hansen to reduce the costs of the bill in conference. The main 
feature of the Senate bill that the White House wanted removed was the proposal for 
tuition payments. Nixon aide Bill Timmons described this feature as an "obnoxious 
provision.,,91 
At the end of July, Nixon offered a further threat that he might veto any measure 
approaching the costs of the Senate bill. On July 30, he wrote Hartke to attack the Senate 
bill, which he described as "inflationary and unnecessary. ,,92 Again, he reiterated the 
same litany of opposition to the bill he had outlined to Teague. The Washington Post 
described Nixon's letter as a strong suggestion that he might veto the bill. But Nixon had 
offered similar opposition to education increases throughout his presidency so there was 
certainly no guarantee that he would veto the bill. Ultimately, the decision was not his to 
make. By the end of the summer, the Watergate investigations swept the Nixon 
administration into the dustbin ofhistory. One of the most significant bills in the history 
of the G.I. Bill remained in conference as Nixon left the White House. Potentially, the 
bill could correct the problems of the existing program and could prove pivotal to the 
long-term success of the Vietnam era O.I. Bills. Nixon's successor, Gerald R. Ford, 
would be the one to face Congress and the veterans in a tumultuous fall in Washington. 
91 Memo for Tom Korologos from William E. Timmons, July 24, 1974, Folder 
"Veterans," Box 14, O'Donnell and Jenckes Files, 1974-1976, Subject file: Veterans, 
Ford Library. 
92 Washington Post, August 2, 1974, 12. 
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Chapter 5 
UNWILLING "SOLDIERS IN THE WAR AGAINST BRUTAL INLFATION": 

CONGRESS, THE VETERANS, AND THE FIGHT WITH GERALD R. FORD OVER 

THE 1974 GJ. BILL 

It is not my view ... that the men that dodged the bullets in Vietnam should be 
the first ones to bite the bullet back home. 
Senator Strom Thurmond 
We went, some willingly, the rest regretfully, right or wrong we went. We 
watched our brothers die or to be maimed for what? ... We believe the time is 
now to heal our Countries [sic] awful wound of Vietnam but first we ask that the 
MEN who fought and served their country be taken care of first. 
Joint statement by three Pennsylvania 
college veterans' associations 
We are all soldiers in the war against brutal inflation ... I will not hesitate to veto 
any legislation to try and control inflationary excesses. 
President Gerald R. Ford 
Just ten days after being sworn in as president, Gerald R. Ford spoke at the annual 
convention of the Veterans ofForeign Wars in Chicago. His speech contained the usual 
politically expedient platitudes towards veterans as he pledged, "As a veteran, I want 
good relations with all veterans. We all proudly wore the same Nation's uniform and 
patriotically saluted the same flag. During my administration, the door of my office will 
be open to veterans just as it was in all of my 25 years as a member of congress."} Ford 
had served as naval gunnery officer and assistant navigator on board the U.S.S. Monterey 
in the Pacific during World War II, so he was no doubt sincere when he promised, "Ifwe 
can send men thousands and thousands of miles from home to fight in the rice paddies, 
}Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, Gerald R. Ford, "Remarks 
to the Veterans ofForeign Wars Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois," August 19, 1974. 
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certainly we can send them back to school and better jobs at home.',2 But the new 
President's speech also contained ominous signs for veterans hoping for some respite 
from their financial struggles during the coming school year. Ford revealed a side to his 
political outlook that appeared to contradict his professed affiliation with the plight of 
veterans. Alluding to the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 
still tied up in Congress, Ford commented, ''your Government, of necessity, has to be 
constrained by other considerations as well. We are all soldiers in the war against brutal 
inflation ... I will not hesitate to veto any legislation to try and control inflationary 
excesses.,,3 
During his brief term as president, Ford continued Nixon's policies of fiscal 
conservatism. Three days after taking office, Ford identified inflation as "public enemy 
number one." As a former member of the House Appropriations Committee, Ford 
brought a keen interest and knowledge of economics to the presidency.4 From day one, 
he met with his economic advisors and launched a series of "Inflation Summits" 
throughout the fall to discuss ways of tackling the inflation problem.5 Ford also launched 
a voluntary "Whip Inflation Now" campaign whereby concerned citizens could express 
their support for beating inflation by writing to the White House and requesting "WIN" 
pins. Over 100,000 people signed up, but the new program represented little more than a 
symbolic gesture and attracted mild ridicule from some. Ford's more serious proscription 
2 Ibid., 26. 
3 Ibid. 
4 John Robert Greene, The Presidency ofGerald R. Ford (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1995), 68. 
5 Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making ofEconomic Policy From 
Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1984), 212. 
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for tackling inflation put him immediately in conflict with the Democrat controlled 
Congress. Ford believed that the decades ofwide-ranging government spending on 
social programs, begun under the New Deal and given renewed impetus under the Great 
Society, had led to America's economic woes. In his memoirs, Ford outlined his vision 
on the ideal role for government when he advocated, "less government intervention in the 
affairs ofcitizens and corporations, greater reliance on individual initiative and a free 
market economy, and increased local responsibility for overcoming adversities. ,.j, 
Much to Ford's chagrin, more often than not, Congress proved reluctant to share 
in his vision ofeconomic retrenchment. Throughout his presidency, Ford found hilnself 
at odds with Congress over financial matters. During his first few months, Ford vetoed a 
Railroad Retirement Act that he claimed would cost over seven billion dollars over 
twenty-five years, only to have his veto overridden by Congress. Congress also refused 
his request to defer a federal pay raise for three months. In total Ford vetoed sixty-six 
bills; Congress sustained fifty-four ofbis vetoes. In part, congressional opposition was 
philosophical. Steeped in the activist government traditions of the New Deal and Great 
Society, many congressional Democrats saw federal investment in social programs as a 
way to ease unemployment and inflation concerns. On a more mercenary note, 1974 was 
also an election year for Congress, so the kinds ofcuts in popular programs envisioned by 
Ford could imperil the reelection prospects of some if they compromised the interests of 
their constituents. 
6 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography o/Gerald R. Ford (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979), 263. 
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As a part of his economic retrenchment, Ford announced that he hoped to slash 
around five billion dollars from the budget Richard Nixon had already announced for the 
fiscal year 1975.7 As it stood, the legislation then circulating on Capitol Hill to increase 
veterans' education benefits jeopardized the revised budget target. With the 1974 fall 
semester looming, millions ofveterans waited expectantly to see whether Ford's 
dedication to helping veterans was stronger than his dedication to whip inflation. The 
signs were not good. 
One possible crumb of comfort for veterans was that V A had a new and 
potentially more accommodating leader during the political battles over veterans' funding 
that lay ahead. Criticism ofDonald Johnson and the VA from the press the public and in 
Congress escalated throughout 1973 and early into 1974 forcing him to retire in the 
spring of 1974. Under his leadership, the VA reached its nadir in terms ofpublic 
opinion. Summing up in the Washington Post, Tim O'Brien wrote that Johnson's tenure 
as head ofthe VA had been characterized by: 
complaints of late benefit payment to thousands ofveterans, politicization of the 
agency, budget cutting at the expense of V A hospitals and education programs, 
the misuse of taxpayers' dollars for junkets and conferences outside Washington, 
a lack of sophistication for generating figures on the number ofveterans who 
actually complete their schooling under the GI bill, insensitivity to the problems 
ofVietnam-era veterans, and an atmosphere ofparochialism and rigidity in the 
agency.s 
Given such a barrage of charges, most Vietnam era veterans welcomed any change in the 
VA leadership. 
7 Ford,A Time to Heal, 154-155. 
8 Tim O'Brien, "Ford Names Roudebush To Head VA," Washington Post, August 
19, 1974, 1. 
162 

To replace Johnson, Ford chose former Indiana congressman Richard L. 
Roudebush.9 Roudebush certainly seemed to possess the credentials to make an effective 
VA Administrator. He had fought in the North African and Italian campaigns of World 
War II and immediately following service worked in the Indianapolis Regional Office of 
the Veterans Administration. In 1957, he served as Commander in Chiefof the VFW. 
During his five terms in the House from 1961 to 1971 Roudebush remained a keen 
veterans advocate and served as ranking Republican on the House Veterans Affairs 
Committee. From January 1971 through January 1974, he served as a Deputy 
Administrator in the V A, after which he served as Donald Johnson's Assistant Deputy, 
the second highest position within the VA. Although some veterans groups feared that 
Roudebush might be just "another good ole boy," most welcomed his appointment. 10 
Ray Soden, head of the VFW, expressed confidence that Roudebush "provides all that is 
necessary to head the VA." NACV President, Timothy L. Craig, expressed his hopes that 
Roudebush "will demonstrate a solid commitment to reversing many V A policies toward 
Vietnam-era veterans that have been operative for the past five years. ,,11 But before 
either Ford or Roudebush had the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to 
veterans, Congress first had to agree on an appropriate package of benefits to present to 
them for consideration. This proved no easy task, but by mid-August, Senate and House 
conferees had reached a compromise agreement over their respective bills. 
9 Richard Nixon had previously indicated his intent to nominate Roudebush to 
head the VA after a protracted search for Donald Johnson's successor. Admiral Elmo R. 
Zumwalt, a popular choice among veterans, had been offered the post but declined. 
10 The view ofForrest Lindley of the Vietnam Veterans Center, as quoted in the 
Washin~ton Post, July 25, 1974, 2. 
1 Quoted in ibid. 
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Conferees struck the Senate's desire for direct tuition assistance from the bill, but 
to compensate agreed upon a 23 percent increase in the veteran's benefits, raising the 
monthly allowance for a single veteran to 270 dollars, up from 220 dollars. A married 
veteran would receive 321 dollars, an increase of sixty dollars a month. The compromise 
plan would also allow eligible veterans to claim up to 1000 dollars in loans to offset 
tuition discrepancies. The VA would administer the loans from the seven billion dollars 
in veterans' life insurance premiums held in the federal National Service Life Insurance 
Trust Fund. A veteran would have up to ten years to repay the loan at an interest rate set 
by the VA. With the deadlines for fall enrollments looming, Dom noted that it was, 
"important that the Congress act immediately so that veterans know what to expect in 
making their plans for the fall term.,,12 It appeared as though an accord had been 
achieved in Congress. Attempting to allay fears of the costs of the program and, perhaps, 
preempting the anticipated challenge from Ford, Hartke noted, "The measure we have 
agreed upon today is not inexpensive ... But past G.1. Bill expenditures have been repaid 
many times over in the higher taxes of those whose education gave them greater earning 
power. It's the best kind of investment we can make in people and our economy.,,13 
Hartke hoped that the bill would "help us keep faith with the Vietnam veterans who 
served when it was not always easy to serve.,,14 
Ifpassed, the bill would represent one of the largest ever increases in veterans' 
education benefits. The provisions for loan payments to offset tuition discrepancies 
12 Committee on Veteran Affairs Release, Folder 2, Box 59, John N. "Happy" 
Camp Papers, Carl Albert Center. 
13 Quoted in the New York Times, August 14, 1974, 16. 
14 Quoted in the Washington Post, August 14, 1974, 15. 
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addressed one of the biggest criticism leveled against the previous Vietnam era G.1. Bills. 
Even under the new bill, the Vietnam era veteran's benefits remained less liberal than 
those offered the World War II veteran in terms of tuition payments, but the new option 
of low interest loans did at least give the veteran a new source of funding to help abate 
their fmancial troubles. The extension ofbenefits to forty-five months, up from thirty­
six, gave the Vietnam era veteran a greater length of time to complete their study than 
any previous generation ofveterans had enjoyed. The increase in the monthly allowance, 
while barely outstripping the rising costs ofeducation, could convince many to return to 
school who might have previously been dissuaded by the many stories of veteran 
hardship and poverty emanating from campuses over the previous few years. 
One issue had already been resolved. In July, the House and Senate passed a 
separate act giving veterans their two-year extension. Congress had separated this 
provision so that veterans would know if they were eligible to receive benefits in the 
forthcoming school year. This act gave veterans ten years to claim their benefits, longer 
than any previous generation ofveter~s had received. 
Cautious optimism characterized the reaction from veteran community to the 
remaining bill on Capitol Hill. The National Association of Concerned Veterans 
expressed disappointment over the omission ofdirect tuition assistance, but welcomed 
the overall increase in allowances. ls Therefore, reasonably satisfied that Congress had, at 
last, done its part in the fight to increase education benefits, veterans' advocates steeled 
themselves for the next anticipated battle, getting the awaiting president to sign the bill 
into law. On August 21, the Senate passed the bill unanimously with a voice vote and 
15 Quoted in the New York Times, August 14, 1974, 16. 
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with very little debate. All that remained was for the House to follow suit. No one 
expected any surprises here. As one New York Times editorial noted, "Given the amount 
ofpatriotic speecbmaking in Congress about Vietnam in particular and war veterans in 
general one might think that this measure would be about as controversial as Mother's 
day.,,16 
The vote went to the House on August 22, the eve of a congressional recess. With 
a passing vote, the bill would have been sent to Ford for his consideration and millions of 
veterans would have a much clearer understanding of their financial future for the 
forthcoming school year. On August 21, Ford paid a visit to his "old friends" on the Hill 
and called for a spirit ofunity between Congress and the White House when he stated, 
"Together we have a big job ahead, and I emphasize 'We' on the basis oftogethemess.,,17 
The following day, the House embraced the President's desire for compromise in a way 
that few had predicted. 
After House Speaker Carl Albert and Veterans Affairs Committee Chairman 
William Bryan Jennings Dom introduced the vote on the veterans' benefits, Iowa 
representative Harold Royce Gross spoke up and stated, "Mr. Speaker, I raise a point of 
order against the conference report H.R. 12628 .... The conference report violates clause 
3 of rule XXVIII in that the conferees exceeded the scope of the conference. ,,18 Gross 
proclaimed the conference report invalid on the grounds that the agreed upon 23 percent 
benefit increase exceeded the 13.6 percent agreed in the House back in February and the 
18.2 percent agreed in the Senate in June. This seldom-invoked technicality left Carl 
16 New York Times, September 25, 1974,39. 

17 Congressional Record-House, August 21, 1974,29665. 

18 Ibid., 30050. 
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Albert with no choice but to sustain the point oforder and declare the compromise bill 
null and void. Last minute political maneuverings by the Ford Administration led to 
Gross's actions. In a hastily arranged meeting at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the vote, 
Republican leaders had crafted this strategy to kill the compromise bill, instantly wiping 
out months of negotiation. Gross was a World War I veteran who had served in Congress 
since 1949 but did not run in 1974. Thus, he could afford to take the politically risky 
move of thwarting the benefits package. His action drew immediate criticism from some 
in the House. New York Representative Lester Wolff protested, "What about these 
Vietnam veterans? If we bow to the White House, we are not meeting our responsibility 
to them .... Where are all those who so strongly supported this war now that these men 
have come home?19 
The debate then took another turn when Dorn produced an alternative GJ. Bill for 
the House to vote on. His new bill offered only an 18 percent increase in benefits and 
completely removed both the loan provision and the nine-month extension for eligibility. 
Dorn had been one ofthe architects of the compromise bill but had apparently succumbed 
to pressure from the White House to reduce the costs of the benefits increase. On board 
the flight from the VFW convention in Chicago on August 19, Ford had infonned Dorn 
that he would veto the compromise bill if the House passed as it stood.20 Dom then took 
th~ decision to yield to White House pressure so that veterans could at least have some 
sort of increase before the new school year began. On this point, many of his fellow 
representatives reluctantly agreed. Pennsylvania's John P. Murtha had a particular 
19 Ibid., 30058. 

20 Congressional Record-House, August 22,37875. 
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interest in the proceedings. Murtha had volunteered for service in Vietnam and served 
there in 1966 and 1967. He became the first Vietnam combat veteran elected to the 
House. He agreed with Dom that "the overwhelming priority at this time is that we agree 
on a bill, and that we pass and the President sign it before September so the veteran 
knows what he can count on as another school year begins. This is not a perfect bill. But 
it is an acceptable bill. And it will help.,,21 The measure passed the House by a vote of 
388-0. 
Almost immediately, many in Congress expressed their concern over the handling 
of the vote. One member of the House Veterans Affairs Committee thought that House 
members were voting on the conference report and claimed that he did not even know 
they were voting to kill certain measures of the compromise bill?2 A letter to Ford 
signed by fifty-nine representatives later pointed out, "When voting on the conference 
report, some members were not aware that these provisions had been removed at the last 
minute. Others supported the [reduced] bill because it would offer some assistance, and 
it was the sense of the House to keep the bill alive.,,23 Colorado representative Patricia 
Schroeder wrote an impassioned letter to Dom, Carl Albert, and the other members of the 
Veterans Affairs Committee in which she stated: 
quite frankly, on August 22, Vietnam era veterans were shafted by the technical 
parliamentary move mounted by opponents - including some of our own House 
conferees - of the Conference report. 
While the Conference Report was ruled out of order, a substitute measure 
was instantly produced by senior members of the Veterans Affairs Committee. 
21 Congressional Record-House, August 22, 1974,30060-30061. 

22 Don Edwards (D-CA), quoted in the New York Times, August 24, 1974, 9. 

23 Letter to Gerald Ford from 59 Congressmen, September 30, 1974, Folder "VA3 

Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
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Gone in the new version are the loan program, the nine-month eligibility 
extension from (36 months to 45 months), and the education and training 
allowance increases for many disabled veterans were reduced from 23 percent to 
18 percent. The measure must now go back to the Senate for action. Thus, the 
outcome of the backroom maneuver by senior House members at the urging of the 
White House is to leave Vietnam era Veterans slowly, slowly twisting in the wind 
- to use a recently popular political phrase.24 
Ford claimed to have played no direct part in the House decisions beyond raising 
concerns with members of the House and Senate over the "$780-some-million over and 
above the budget for this year" that the compromise bill would have added. But Ford 
clearly approved the new measure and hoped that when the bill went back into 
conference Congress would retain the "good provisions" of the revised House bill 
"because it was inflationary the way it was.',2S 
Not surprisingly, a chorus of disapproving voices arose from all comers over the 
House's actions. In the Senate, Hartke charged that, "it is evident that this point of order 
was made with full knowledge and active participation of the House Leadership and the 
Administration. Had the House had the opportunity to vote on the full conference report 
I am confident that it would have overwhelmingly been approved.,,26 A New York Times 
editorial asked a question which must have been in the minds ofmany at the time: "Why 
is it politically correct to treat Vietnam veterans in this shabby and inadequate manner?" 
Timothy Craig of the NACV stated, "Once again Vietnam veterans have been lied to .... 
24 Letter to William Jennings Bryan Dorn from Patricia Schroeder (D-Col.), Carl 
Albert, and members of the Veterans Affairs Committee, September 17, 1974, Folder 1, 
Box 172 Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
25 Public Papers, Gerald Ford, "President's News Conference," August 28, 1974. 
26 Quoted in the National Association o/Concerned Veterans Newsletter, 
September 1974,2. According to the New York Times, Hartke had also been pressured 
by Ford to reduce the costs of the benefits package following the compromise bill but had 
informed the President that the bill was, 'just too far down the road." Quoted in the New 
York Times, August 24, 1974,9. 
.. 
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The House conferees have gone back on their word by failing to approve the conference 
report they unanimously agreed to on Aug. 19.,;1.7 Carl Albert received a host of letters 
from concerned veterans and on-campus veterans' counselors lamenting the actions of 
the House and urging corrective action. The Director of the Office ofVeterans Affairs at 
Oklahoma City Southwestern College expressed his, "dismay and surprise at the failure 
of the House to approve the Conference Report" after personally witnessing "numerous 
veterans drop-out because they had to work overtime just to make ends meet.,,28 Joseph 
L. McCarter, veterans' counselor at San Diego City College forwarded Albert a petition 
ofveterans' names imploring the Speaker to, "act on their behalf ... [and] for their and 
our sake, be generous, they deserve it.,,29 Warren Johnson spent fifteen months in a 
support role for C-130 Hercules aircraft in Southeast Asia. He wrote Albert on 
September 5 to tell him that, "I and many other veterans look at the Senate version of the 
new 01 benefits as a Godsend. It looks at the needs ofthe Vietnam veteran in a realistic 
manner.,,30 Following Congress's recess, a September 30 voice vote in the Senate 
rejected the parsimonious House bill and so the OJ. Bill went back into conference. The 
veterans still waited. 
Several more weeks ofpolitical bargaining followed before the House and Senate 
conferees could once more agree on a new version ofH.R.12628. Negotiations survived 
an eleventh hour attempt by Ford to agree to a bill that limited the benefits increase to 20 
27 Quoted in the New York Times, August 24, 1974, 9. 
28 Letter to Carl Albert from Phillip L. Shorter, September 27, 1974, Folder 1, 
. Box 172, Carl Albert Legislative Files. Carl Albert Center. 
29 Letter to Carl Albert from Joseph L. McCarter, September 13, 1974, Folder 1, 
Box 172, Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
30 Letter to Carl Albert from Warren A. Johnson, September 5, 1974, Folder 1, 
Box 172, Carl Albert Legislative Files, Carl Albert Center. 
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percent while removing the loan provision and allowing veterans up to forty-five months 
to claim benefits. Ford also wanted payment of any benefit increases to be delayed until 
January 1, 1975. But the conferees risked a potential presidential veto by drafting a new 
bill that, in many respects, resembled the original compromise agreed to August 19 and 
rejected by the House. The new bill retained the 23 percent increase in the veteran's 
allowance. The bill also cemented the increase in veterans' eligibility to a forty-five 
month period but with the added proviso that the extra time must be used only to 
complete undergraduate work. The provision for loans to veterans remained in the new 
bill but the conferees reduced the maximum amount allowed from 1,000 to 600 dollars 
per year and stipulated that the veteran must first attempt to secure loans through 
generally available federal student loan programs. If passed, the benefit increases would 
be retroactive to September 1. Dom commented that in conference, "We had no 
difficulty agreeing on most major points.,,31 But Senator James McClure, indicated in a 
letter to White House Aide Bill Timmons that the new conference bill might have 
resulted from some politicking from :the Democrats. Specifically he charged that Olin 
Teague had "suddenly changed completely" from his opposition to tuition assistance and 
"not only conceded to the Senate point ofview but insisted that we go beyond what had 
been discussed in previous conferences." According to McClure, Teague seemed to be 
"following Democrat strategy to force the President to veto this bill.,,32 The implication 
31 Congressional Record-House, October 10, 1974, 35151. 
32 Letter to William Timmons from James A. McClure, October 11, 1974, Folder 
"VA3 Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
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here is that the Democrats wanted to hand Ford a political time bomb by giving him a bill 
that he would be reluctant to sign, thus casting him as a foe ofveterans. 
The second conference report went to the House and Senate on October 7 with the 
vote set to take place on October 10. Dom began proceedings in the House by outlining 
the "conferees philosophy as to the fiscal impact of this legislation. ,,:33 He agreed that the 
18 or 20 percent increase proposed by the White House was consistent with increase in 
the cost of living, but that it ignored rising tuition costs in private and public schools. He 
also stressed that the loan provision was in no way designed as a handout and that 
veterans could expect "consequences" for default ofpayment. Henry Helstoski called the 
bill a "reasonable compromise," but Connecticut representative Ella Grasso described it 
as a "mixed blessing," and lamented, "I believe we should have done better.,,34 This 
time, there were no background dealings to scupper the vote, and the measure sailed past 
the House by a vote of388-0. 
In the Senate, Jennings Randolph, standing in for the absent Vance Hartke, began 
the debates by noting that the compromise bill had shaved almost 46 percent off the cost 
of the original proposal passed in the Senate on June 19. He added, "The committee does 
not believe that we can compromise further on this crucial measure. ,,35 Alan Cranston 
spoke of the government's "moral obligation" to its veterans, and urged Ford to "put a 
stop to the waiting game veterans have been forced to play since late last spring by 
33 Congressional Record-House, October 10, 1974, 35150. 

34 Ibid., 35151, 35154. 

35 Congressional Record-Senate, October 10, 1974,35065. 
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signing this much needed bill into law. ,,36 The Senate then passed the bill with a 
unanimous vote. 
Finally, after months ofpolitical wrangling, Congress could present Ford with a 
new G.I. Bill for his consideration. The Senate held on to the bill for several weeks to 
avoid a pocket veto, but on November 18, the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974 arrived at the White House. Only Ford's anti-inflationary 
convictions stood between the Vietnam era veteran and their long-overdue benefits 
increase. On the same day the bill arrived at the White House, Ford sent an ominous 
message to Congress in which he stated, "while acknowledging the debt to those who 
served during the Vietnam era, I must insist on a fiscally responsible bill on behalf of all 
Americans.,,37 With one political battle over, another one loomed. 
The new G.I. Bill garnered almost universal support from Congress, veterans' 
organizations, public officials, and the pUblic. Throughout the debates over veterans' 
education benefits from August to November, the White House received a flood of letters 
urging Ford to sign the bill into law., From the House, fifty-nine Congressmen and 
women signed a letter to Ford stating, "While we agree that government spending should 
be cut, we do not think it fair to further burden the men and women who served in our 
armed forces in recent years .... One ofour national priorities even in battling inflation 
must be to compensate our country's veterans.,,38 William Jennings Bryan Dom told 
Ford that "The suggestions we discussed on our trip to Chicago generally have been 
36 Ibid., 35067. 
37 Congressional Record-House, December 3, 1974,37876. 
38 Letter to Gerald Ford from 59 Congressmen, September 30, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
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incorporated," and warned him that "An overwhelming majority of the Congress feels 
that the bill agreed to by the House and Senate on October lOis reasonable and is 
justified.,,39 All members of the New York State Congressional Delegation called on 
Ford to accept the increases in benefits, time limits, and loan provisions cut from the 
House bill on August 22.40 Margaret Heckler, one ofmany representatives to personally 
write to Ford urging his approval and suggested that the government "owe[s] these 
veterans the same benefits which we provided those who returned from previous wars.,,41 
John Murtha wrote Ford: 
As you probably know, I was in South Vietnam with the 1st Marines. 
Consequently, many of the young fellows who served in Vietnam come to me 
with their problems .... These young fellows who, in many cases, did not believe 
in the war served honorably under very adverse conditions. While Congress sat in 
their air-conditioned offices and debated the efforts and the righteousness of the 
war, they fought in the mud and jungles of Southeast Asia .... I believe it would 
be a real injustice to veto any legislation which is so important to the young men 
who fought for our country and are now trying to get started again.42 
The Senate proved equally firm in its support ofH.R.12628. Sixty-two senators 
from both ends of the political spectrum, including Bob Dole~ George McGovern, Bob 
Packwood, Joseph Biden, Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, and Sam Nunn, wrote of 
39 Telegram to Gerald Ford from William Jennings Bryan Dom, October 12, 
1974, Folder "VA3 Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
Executive, Ford Library, and letter to Gerald Ford from William Jennings Bryan Dom, 
Folder "VA3 Educational Programs 10/23/74-12/31/74," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans 
Administration-Executive, Ford Library. 
40Letter to Gerald Ford signed by all members of the New York Congressional 
Delegation, September 16, 1974, Folder "VA3 Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, 
Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford Library. 
41 Letter to Gerald Ford from Margaret Heckler, October 11, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
42 Letter to Gerald Ford from John P. Murtha, August 22, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
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their deep concern "about the plight ofVietnam veterans" and sought Ford's "help in 
avoiding further delays in the enactment of an improved Vietnam-era veterans education 
bill." They noted, "Thousands ofveterans have contacted us to express their frustration 
and anger over the delay which has held up enactment to date. ,,43 In a separate letter, 
Strom Thurmond joined with other members of the Senate Committee on Veterans 
Affairs to inform Ford, "We believe this country should be able to provide as 
comprehensive an education program for the Cold War and Vietnam Era veterans as it 
did for their fathers. H.R.12628 goes a long way to accomplishing this end. ,,44 
Pressure on Ford to sign the bill came from many other sectors ofsociety. 
Predictably, veterans on campus were among the most vocal advocates of the new G.I. 
Bill. Although Ford had called on all Americans to be "soldiers in the war against brutal 
inflation," the Vietnam veteran had already had their war and, for most, the new call to 
arms was every bit as unwelcome as the first had been. Speaking on behalf ofover 3,000 
veterans enrolled at Grossmont College, California, the on-campus Veterans Affairs 
Director, let Ford know that he considered H.R.l2628 "a good solid piece of legislation, 
and very supportive of the veterans at our campus and throughout the nation. ,,45 The 
President ofCalifornia State University sent a letter along with the signatures of 700 
veterans notifying the President that "This new GJ. Bill will help us keep faith with the 
43 Letter to Gerald Ford signed by sixty-two Senators, October 10, 1974, Folder 
"VA3 Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration-Executive, Ford 
Library. 
44 Letter to Gerald Ford from the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, October 
10, 1974, Folder "VA3 Educational Programs," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
Executive, Ford Library. 
45 Letter to Gerald Ford from Ed Shenk, Veterans Affairs Director, Grossmont 
College, CA, August 11, 1974, Folder "VA3 Educational Programs 8/9/74-11/30/74," 
Box 1, WHCF, Veterans Administration-General, Ford Library. 
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veterans of the Vietnam era who served at a very difficult period in American history. It 
is a great step forward in providing the necessary financial assistance to veterans who are 
attempting to complete their educational goals.,,46 Over 3,500 veterans and non-veterans 
from the University ofNew Orleans petitioned Ford to inform him, "The passage of these 
additional benefits is essential to the welfare and the continuing education of all veterans 
who have given so much to keep this country great and free.,,47 The New York Times 
reported that veterans at the University ofCalifornia had recruited students to donate 
blood "as a demonstration of their need for increased educational benefits. ,,48 From 
Pennsylvania, veterans' activists from three colleges reminded Ford, "We went, some 
willingly, the rest regretfully, right or wrong we went. We watched our brothers die or to 
be maimed for what? ... We believe the time is now to heal our Countries [sic] awful 
wound ofVietnam but first we ask that the MEN who fought and served their country be 
taken care of first. ,,49 
In one of the more colorful expressions of support for the new bill, three veterans 
confronted Ford in what the Associated Press described as a "finger waving debate" at 
the University ofUtah after he had just given a speech on campus. The three veterans, all 
members of the University ofUtah Veterans Association demanded to know whether 
46 Letter to Gerald Ford from Stanford Cazier, September 12, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs 8/9/74-11/30/74," Box 1, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
General, Ford Library. 
47 Letter to Gerald Ford from Roger Piper, October 30, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs 8/9/74-11/30/74," Box 1, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
General, Ford Library. 
48 New York Times, November 14, 1974,61. 
49Letter to Gerald Ford from Louis 1. Tullio, October 17, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs 8/9/74-11/30/74," Box 1, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
General, Ford Library . 
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Ford intended to approve the new bill. Ford informed them that he was "not in a position 
to say yes or not until it gets down to the White House." When pressed further for an 
opinion, Ford claimed that the bill would give Vietnam era veterans greater entitlements 
than any previous generation ofveterans and that the bill still "had some problems that 
are to be analyzed." After being led away from the fray, Ford told a group ofjournalists 
on board Air Force One, "I hope they understand that his bill raises some legitimate 
questions. It involves substantial amounts ofFederal dollars. 1haven't made up my 
mind yet as to what to do about the bill.,,50 
Ford also received telegrams from Malcolm Wilson, governor ofNew York to 
"respectfully urge" him to sign the bill to "help provide our Vietnam veterans with a 
greater opportunity to achieve their educational goals.,,51 Brendan Byrne, Governor of 
New Jersey toldFord that "There can be no doubt that the increase in benefit payments, 
in addition to the other provisions of this legislation, is critical to veterans living in the 
New Jersey area.,,52 Finally, the VFW's Ray Soden informed Ford, "The Veterans of 
Foreign Wars believes compassion dictates that those who have served honorably and 
have already made a sacrifice in he national interest by their service in the armed forces 
should not be compelled to make a second sacrifice in the battle of inflation.,,53 
50 New York Times, November 3, 1974,25. 
51 Telegram to Gerald Ford from Malcolm Wilson, October 15, 1974, Folder 
"VA3 Educational Programs 10/23/74-12/31/74," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans 
Administration-Executive, Ford Library. 
52 Letter to Gerald Ford from Brendan T. Byrne November 22, 1974, Folder 
"VA3 Educational Programs 10/23/74-12/31/74," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans 
Administration-Executive, Ford Library. 
53 Telegram to Gerald Ford from Ray Soden, August 21, 1974, Folder "VA3 
Educational Programs 8/9/74-11/30/74," Box 1, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
General, Ford Library. 
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Given such an outpouring of political and public support, Ford would have been 
left in no doubt as to the level of criticism he might expect if he chose H.R.12628 to 
make his stand in the fight against inflation. Before deciding on the most prudent course 
of action, Ford solicited advice from many different agencies and concerned parties 
within his administration. As director of the Office ofManagement and Budget, the 
recommendations of Roy L. Ash would have a considerable bearing on Ford's decision. 
Veterans' advocates had long criticized the disproportionate influence of the OMB in 
dictating policies of the VA under the Nixon Administration. Too often, they charged, 
the financial conservatism of the OMB had led the government to ride roughshod over 
the genuine financial concerns ofveterans. Given his commitment to cutting costs, Ford 
would pay particular attention to Ash's views on the inflationary nature ofH.R.12628. 
Ash, solicited the views of several concerned federal agencies and departments on 
behalf of the President. On October 17, VA Administrator Richard Roudebush wrote 
Ash in some detail outlining the VA's position on the specific provisions of the bill. 
Noting that since the 1972 the cost of living had "increased approximately 19.5 percent," 
Roudebush considered the tuition increase to nearly 23 percent to be "within reasonable 
reach of those increases which the president has indicated are acceptable." He also 
consented to the loan program and the nine-month extension for receiving entitlements. 
Roudebush concluded that, "I am convinced that despite the large increase in cost 
engendered by the enrolled enactment, it represents the best compromise that can be 
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reached and, on balance, is realistic .... For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the 
President approve H.R. 12628.,,54 
Other agencies proved more equivocal in their responses to Ash. Peter J. 
Brennan, secretary of Labor outlined the Department of Labor's view, "that the 
maximum feasible efforts are needed to help returning veterans find a useful and 
productive place in the society which they have helped to defend," but ultimately 
deferred their recommendation to, "other agencies more directly concemed.,,s5 Similarly, 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare despite expressing reservations over 
the loan programs, informed Ash that, "the bill contains many other features ofdirect and 
substantial impact on programs administered by the Veterans Administration. We 
therefore defer to that agency as to the desirability of the enactment of the bill. ,,56 Other 
agencies refusing to take a firm position on the bill included the Justice Department, 
Federal Trade Commission, and the U.S. Postal Service.57 
Roy Ash made his recommendation to Ford on November 22. Ash outlined the 
arguments in favor of approval for Ford's consideration. These included an admission 
54 Letter to Roy L. Ash from Richard Roudebush, October 17, 1974, Folder "H.R. 
12628 Veterans Education Bill (1) 11/26/74," Box 14, Legislation Case Files, 1974-76, 
Ford Library. Roudebush approved the loan program only after the new bill provided for 
a "revolving fund established from appropriated funds" rather than the National Service 
Life Insurance trust fund. He also consented to the nine-month extension after the new 
bill specified that it could only be used for an undergraduate education and did not fund 
graduate studies. 
55 Letter to Roy L. Ash from Peter J. Brennan, October 23, 1974, Folder "H.R. 
12628 Veterans Education Bill (1) 11126/74," Box 14, Legislation Case Files, 1974-76, 
Ford Library. 
56 Letter to Roy L. Ash from the Acting Secretary for the Department ofHealth, 
October 17, 1974, Folder "H.R. 12628 Veterans Education Bill (1) 11126/74," Box 14, 
Legislation Case Files, 1974-76, Ford Library. 
57 Memorandum for Gerald Ford from Roy L. Ash, November 22, 1974, Folder 
"Veterans Education Benefits," Box 11, William E. Timmons Files, Ford Library. 
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that the 23 percent increase was consistent with the rise in cost of living and that a more 
attractive G.1. Bill might aid the economy by reducing the unemployment rate among 
Vietnam veterans. But Ash countered that since the original act of 1944, the GJ. Bills, 
"were not intended to be an educational income security program," and that relatively 
high participation rates indicated that they had served their purpose adequately as a 
means of providing "readjustment assistance." Ash also noted that, the new bill would 
add an additional 502 million dollars to the 1975 budget. In the final analysis, Ash 
informed Ford that "Because these costs are clearly unacceptable, and because ofthe 
other unnecessary and undesirable provisions, ... we recommend that you disapprove the 
bill and reaffirm your recommendation that the Congress enact a proposal providing a 
simple 18.2 percent rate increase effective January 1, 1975.,,58 
Ash was not the only moneyman to express his disapproval of H.R.12628. Since 
July of 1974, Alan Greenspan had headed the Council ofEconomic Advisors.59 
Although their relationship had barely begun, Ford would later write of Greenspan, 
"Whenever I was under pressure to add funds to a program and he thought I might be 
influenced by the political aspects of the decision, he would caution me to hold the line. 
Usually, he won because he was right.,,60 Greenspan shared Ford's beliefs that many of 
America's economic woes could be traced back to the growing influence of government 
in economic affairs since the 1930s.61 Ford met with Greenspan several times during the 
58 Ibid. 

59 Greene, Presidency ofGerald R. Ford, 69. 

60 Ford, A Time to Heal, 153. 

61 Sloan, "Economic Policymaking," 117. 
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final week ofNovember to "discuss potential spending cuts.,,62 On November 25, 
Greenspan outlined his position on the proposed veteran benefits increase when he wrote, 
"We are concerned with easing the transition to civilian life for members of the armed 
forces. However, we oppose the creation ofpublic programs to provide long-term 
subsidies to nondisabled veterans, necessarily at the expense of non-veterans." 
Denouncing the new G.I. Bill as antithetical to the administration's "well-publicized 
policy ofbudget restraint," Greenspan declared it "in the public interest for the President 
to veto H.R. 12628.,,63 
Ash and Greenspan reaffirmed Ford's fears of the inflationary nature of the bill. 
But in addition to the VA, Congress, veterans, and the public, several ofFord's advisors 
reminded him of the political dangers of such an action in the final days leading up to his 
decision. William 1. Baroody Jr., Assistant to the President for Public Liaison, urged 
Ford's approval on the grounds that "sustaining a veto is impossible, there is no benefit to 
be gained by alienating a large number ofVeterans organizations.,,64 William Timmons, 
Assistant to the President for Legisla~ive Affairs recommended approval, again noting 
that Congress would likely override the veto. If Ford did veto, added Timmons, his veto 
62 Ford, A Time to Heal, 220. 
63 Memorandum for Warren Hendriks from Alan Greenspan, November 25, 1974, 
Folder "H.R. 12628 Veterans Education Bill (1) 11/26/74," Box 14, Legislation Case 
Files, 1974-76, Ford Library. 
64 Memorandum for Gerald Ford from Kenneth Cole, November 25, 1974, Folder 
"H.R. 12628 Veterans Education Bill (1) 11/26/74," Box 14, Legislation Case Files, 
1974-76, Ford Library. 
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message must challenge Congress to "practice what is [sic] preaches in campaign oration; 
it must join in making the tough decisions ifwe are to combat inflation.',6S 
Ford could have been left in no doubt as to the consequences ofhis actions as he 
prepared to make his final decision. The new 0.1. Bill would have given veterans a 
much-needed increase in education assistance, bringing their benefits far more in line 
with their World War II predecessors. By signing it, Ford would carry through with his 
promise of caring for veterans that would, without question, be greeted with approval by 
the overwhelming majority of the pUblic. But the new bill severely tested Ford's 
dedication to "Whip Inflation Now." His decision would be litmus test for where the new 
administration's priorities lay. At 3:00 p.m. on November 26, Ford announced his 
decision and sent the following message to Congress: 
I am returning today without my approval H.R. 12628, a bill which would 
provide what I consider an excessive increase and liberalization of veterans 
education and training benefits. 
Instead, I urge the Congress to send me a veterans' education bill along 
the lines that I have proposed. By doing so, we can avoid adding another half 
billion dollar load to the already overburdened taxpayer. Failure to do so will 
mean that the Congress will in the aggregate Federal Pay deferral, Railroad 
Retirement and Veterans Education - add over one and a half billion dollars to the 
Federal deficit in 1975. 
This bill which I am returning to the Congress provides benefits that are 
greater then those granted World War II and Korea veterans. It would cost 
taxpayers half a billion dollars more in fiscal year 1975 than is appropriate in 
view of the country's current economic circumstances. 
The decision not to sign this bill has not been an easy one. But it is 
necessary if all ofus are to operate with essential budgetary restraint. The Nation 
must reduce Federal spending if we are to stop the inflation spiral.66 
6S Memorandum to Warren Hendriks from William Timmons, November 23, 
1974, Folder "SP 2-3-27 Veto: Veterans Education Bill, 11/26/74, Box 1, WHCF Subject 
File, Ford Library. 
66 White House Press Release, November 26, 1974, Folder "Veterans Education 
Benefits," Box 11, William E. Timmons Files, Ford Library. 
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Ford went on to state, "I continue to support a responsible increase in education benefits 
for veterans," and reiterated his call for an 18.2 percent increase in monthly allowance 
instead of the proposed 22.7 percent. 67 At a press conference on the morning of his veto 
message, White House Press secretary Ronald H. Nessen further clarified Ford's position 
when he told reporters that, "two portions ofthe bill could not be justified under the 
current economic circumstances. Those two sections are the $600 loan program and the 
extension of eligibility from 36 months to 45.,,68 
As soon as Ford made announced his veto, the veteran community made their 
disappointment known. A November 26 VFW press release accused the President of 
doing "a disservice to those who performed a service for their country when called upon 
to fight. ,,69 John J. Stang, the recently elected Commander in Chiefof the VFW wrote to 
House Speaker Carl Albert to assure him "that the more than 1.8 million members of the 
Veterans ofForeign Wars and its more than 500,000 members of the Ladies Auxiliary are 
in total agreement that the veto of this Veterans education Bill must be promptly 
overridden by the Congress.,,70 The American Legion's James Wagonseller accused Ford 
of favoring "draft dodgers and deserters" (a reference to Ford's controversial draft-
dodger clemency plan) while undercutting much needed assistance for the Vietnam 
67 Ibid. 
68 White House News Conference, November 11, 1974, Folder "November 26, 
1974 (No. 81)," Box 3, Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary Briefings, Ford Library. 
69 Letter to Carl Albert from John 1. Stang, November 26, 1974, Folder 2, Box 
172, Carl Albert Legislative series, Carl Albert Center. 
70 VFW press release, attached to a letter to Carl Albert from John J. Stang, 
November 26, 1974, Folder 2, Box 172, Carl Albert Legislative series, Carl Albert 
Center. 
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veteran.71 Charles Huber of the Disabled American Veterans informed Albert, "We view 
the President's action with a deep sense of regret; and urge you, on behalf ofthe 450,000 
members of the DAV, to vote to override the veto ofH.R. 12828.,,72 
The chances of an override appeared good. Congress had already demonstrated 
its willingness to challenge Ford in its battles over the Railroad Retirement Act and 
federal pay increases. Ron Nessen told reporters that Ford made his decision to veto the 
veterans' readjustment act with the full expectation of an override. On November 30, 
Richard Roudebush told reporters, "1 have no question in my mind that Congress will 
take the necessary action to override the veto. I'm sure the President is just [as] aware of 
it as I am.,,73 Republican leaders on the Hill such as John J. Rhodes, the Republican 
leader of the House, informed reporters that he intended to vote to override Ford's veto. 
Republican senator John G. Tower stated that "There was virtually no sentiment for 
sustaining [the] President's veto, and 1 would predict there would be very little support 
for it. 74 Strom Thurmond added, "It is not my view that those who bit the bullets in 
Vietnam should be the first ones to bite the bullet back home.,,75 
The vote to override Ford's veto took place on December 3. Just hours before the 
vote, Ron Nessen stated the White House's view that "when Congress votes, the 
President feels that it will not be voting simply to uphold or override a veto, but what it 
will be doing is voting on whether to increase the Federal Budget by over a half billion 
71 Quoted in the New York Times, November 27, 1974, 15. 
72 Letter to Carl Albert from Charles L. Huber, November 27, 1974, Folder 2, Box 
172, Carl Albert Legislative series, Carl Albert Center. 
73 Quoted in the New York Times, December 1,1974,61. 
74 Quoted in ibid., November 27, 1974, 15. 
75 Quoted in ibid., December 4, 1974,25. 
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dollars above the Administration's proposal.,,76 That afternoon, on Capitol Hill, a 
succession ofHouse representatives and senators stood up to make forceful arguments for 
overriding Ford's veto. On the floor of the House, William Jennings Bryan Dorn opened 
the deliberations by systematically attacking the key points contained in the veto 
message. He called the President "simply misinformed" for claiming that the new 
benefits package would give Vietnam era veterans greater benefits than their World War 
II predecessors.77 He went on to claim that previous G.I. Bills had yielded a return of 
between three and six dollars in increased taxes for every dollar spent. New Jersey 
representative Henry Helstoski followed Dom, arguing that it would be "grossly unfair to 
our Vietnam veterans to provide a penny less than that called for in the bill now before 
the House.,,78 Numerous other representatives spoke after Helstoski, each one pointing 
out errors in Ford's logic and reiterating the urgent need for an override. No one spoke 
up in defense of the veto. 
In the Senate, Vance Hartke began the assault on the veto message. In addition to 
echoing the criticisms made in the House, Hartke noted that Ford had ignored the 
considerable compromises already made in conference to the original bills. Hartke also 
pointed out that despite the veteran population increasing by about six million in the 
previous few years, federal expenditure on veterans' benefits had remained around 5 
percent and would remain as such under the new proposals. Attacking Ford's economic 
philosophy, he went on, "to focus on Government spending as the principal cause of 
76 White House News Conference, December 3, 1974, Folder "November 26, 
1974 (No. 86)," Box 4, Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary Briefings, Ford Library. 
77 Congressional Record-House, December 3, 1974,37876. 
78 Ibid., 37879. 
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inflation is to indulge in a fantasy that may comfort traditional mythology, but does little 
to deal with its true causes.,,79 Strom Thurmond followed, adding, "I think he [Ford] is 
going to be a great leader for this country. However, I feel he is in error in vetoing this 
particular bill. ,,80 In between comments from Alan Cranston, Bob Dole, Edward 
Kennedy, George McGovern, and others in support of the override, Charles Mathis Jr. 
reminded his fellow senators that this bill was not "some vast pork barrel program," but 
"a commitment to the men and women who fought in our most recent war.,,81 
By late afternoon, both houses were ready to vote. In the end, the outcome was 
not even close. The House voted for an override by a margin of394-1 0, with thirty not 
casting votes. Nine of the ten dissenters were lame ducks following the November 
elections. The Senate passed the measure by an equally resounding 90-1 vote with nine 
not voting. Only Michigan senator and deputy Republican Leader Robert P. Griffin sided 
with the White House. 
With palpable relief, the veteran community expressed their appreciation for the 
override. June A. Willenz, Executive Director of the American Veterans Committee told 
Carl Albert, "A victory for justice and equality was won last week with the override of 
the veto of the GI Bill for Vietnam veterans. Your leadership helped make this GI Bill a 
reality.,,s2 In a December 12 meeting with Richard Roudebush, Timothy L. Craig 
thanked the new V A Administrator for his support of the benefits bill. Craig also noted, 
79 Congressional Record-Senate, December 3, 1974,37839. 
80 Ibid., 37843. 
81 Ibid., 37849. 
82 Letter to Carl Albert from June A. Willenz, November 26, 1974, Folder 2, Box 
172, Carl Albert Legislative series, Carl Albert Center. This folder contains many other 
letters from appreciative veterans and veteran organizations. 
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"during the brief period in which Mr. Richard L. Roudebush has been the Veterans 
Administrator, there has been a marked change in the VA's attitude and policy toward 
Vietnam era veterans.,,83 
H.R.12628, the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 
became Public Law 53-508 on December 3, 1974. On December 15, the VA started 
mailing out over 1.2 million checks for benefits retroactive to September 1, in the hopes 
that most of the eligible veterans would receive them before Christmas. For the single 
veteran claiming no dependants the checks amounted to 200 dollars, a veteran claiming 
one dependent could expect 240 dollars. 
In its final form, the 1974 G.!. Bill represented a compromise between competing 
branches of government and competing economic philosophies. The liberal provisions of 
the original Senate proposal passed on June 19 had been greatly reduced, but not in the 
drastic way envisioned by the White House. Ford had to look elsewhere in his effort to 
reduce the federal budget. Although many at the time viewed Ford's obstructionism as a 
sign of callousness and indifference, the President saw the fight over veterans funding as 
an earnest crusade against an inflation problem that he genuinely believed could 
undermine the fabric of American society. Despite the political drawback of being the 
first president to ever veto a veterans' education benefits bill, Ford made what he 
considered to be a stand vital to the national interest. Ford later wrote that he had hoped 
83 Priority Views of The National Association of Concerned Veterans Presented to 
the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, December 12, 1974, Folder "National Association 
of Concerned Veterans (1-3)," Box 49, Theodore C. Marrs Files, Ford Library. In 
fairness to his predecessor, Roudebush indicated to Roy Ash in his October 17 letter that 
Donald Johnson would also have approved a 23 percent increase for veterans had he 
remained as VA Administrator. 
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that "If the executive branch could set an example of fiscal restraint by trimming its own 
proposals the Congress might be persuaded to follow suit. ,,84 
Congress did not follow suit. Although the process had been a protracted and 
often contentious one, the combined efforts of the House and Senate ensured that for 
Vietnam era veterans schooling under the G.I. Bill now represented a more realistic 
option to aid their transition back to civilian life. And if Ford remained concerned about 
the inflationary effects of the new benefits, the news was about to get worse. Roy Ash 
resigned as director ofOMB in December 1974. His successor, James T. Lynn, landed 
the unenviable task of informing Ford early in 1975, "[The] VA has alerted us to a recent 
spurt in veteran benefit applications. By the end ofFebruary, the 01 Bill education 
program was paying 91,000 trainees over that estimated in the FY 1976 President's 
Budget. ... However, the increases seen thus far are just the tip of the iceberg. From the 
sparse data thus far available in March, it appears that the trend may go even higher."s5 
Vietnam veterans had waited a long time-too long-to receive a reasonable reward for 
their service and to gain an opportunity to return to school. Now that the government had 
finally extended this opportunity, they took full advantage. In the years following the 
passage of the 19740.1. Bill the Vietnam veterans began to claim their education benefits 
in unprecedented numbers. Although the costs to the government exceeded Ford's worst 
fears, the benefits to the lives ofveterans would be far greater. 
84 Ford, A Time to Heal, 220. 
8S Memorandum to Oerald Ford from James T. Lym, March 24, 1975, Folder 
"VA3 Educational Programs, 1/1/75-4/30/75," Box 2, WHCF, Veterans Administration­
Executive, Ford Library. 
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Chapter 6 
BACK TO SCHOOL, FINALLY 
Most ofus were not walking around publicizing the fact that we were veterans ... 
. I just think many ofus wanted to get on with out lives. 
Dave Hollingsworth, Vietnam veteran 
In part because of the publicity surrounding the political battles over the 1974 G.I. 
Bill, but more importantly because benefits had finally reached a level where veterans 
could now realistically pursue a higher education degree, Vietnam veterans flooded back 
to school throughout 1975 and 1976. The numbers of veterans in higher education had 
increased gradually since 1966 as a natural result ofmore veterans reentering society, but 
the upward curve spiked noticeably after the passage of the 1974 OJ. Bill. In 1967, less 
than 500,000 veterans used their benefits for higher education. In 1971, the number had 
reached a million. In 1976, fully ten years after the first eligible veterans came home, 
over 2.9 million veterans received education benefits under the OJ. Bill. About one third 
ofveterans in 1976 used their benefits for vocational training, leaving almost two million 
in institutions of higher education across the country. The number of veterans enrolled in 
1976 alone exceeded the number ofveterans that attended schools during the entire 
course of the Korean OJ. Bill (1.2 million) and almost equaled the entire number of 
World War II veterans that entered higher education under the original 1944 program (2.2 
million). Not every veteran enrolled in 1976 served during the Vietnam era. Some 
earned their benefits for service before 1964. But the percentage ofjust Vietnam era 
veterans alone that claimed their education benefits reached 63.6 by 1973. Already, this 
number was far above the 50.5 percent of World War II veterans that participated under 
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the original program. Moreover, whereas only 2.2 million out of 15.6 million World War 
II veterans used their benefits for higher education, 3.6 million out of6.5 million eligible 
veterans used their benefits to train at the college level since the passage of the 1966 bill. I 
As earlier critics of the program had pointed out, usage percentages remained an 
imperfect test of the program's success or failure. But at the time because the VA kept 
no data on a veteran graduation rates or how the program affected their lives the levels of 
usage remained one of the few points of comparison with previous programs. Certainly, 
these figures took away one of the early main criticisms thrown at the Vietnam era bills 
in Congress, namely that low participation indicated that the program had failed. 
The established veterans groups seemed to believe that the government had done 
enough to compensate Vietnam veterans with the 1974 bill. When Congress debated a 
1976 proposal to allow Vietnam veterans even more time to claim their benefits they 
made their opinions known. The 1974 bill already allowed Vietnam veterans longer than 
any previous generation ofveterans to claim benefits by allowing them ten years from 
departing the service to complete their degree. The 1976 proposal sought to provide an 
additional year of eligibility. Proponents of the extension argued that benefits had been 
so low at the start of the program that many needed the extra time because they could not 
have previously afforded to go to school. For the American Legion, VFW, and DAV, 
which still had the interests of the aging World War II generation at the forefront of their 
concerns, the extension went too far. Thomas C. Walker, Commander in Chief of the 
VFW called on Carl Albert to oppose the measure and added, "We believe, all things 
1 Veterans Administration Annual Report, 1976 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1976), 73. 
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considered, the current GI Bill is the most generous ojall three GI Bills [emphasis mine] 
and, again, there is no tenable justification for a further extension of the delimiting 
period.,,2 The American Legion supported only a cost of living increase for disabled 
veterans and education benefits but opposed the eligibility extension. The Legion urged 
Albert to "insist that these funds be directed to higher priority programs for millions of 
war veterans and their dependents, which in addition to needed costs of living increases 
in education programs would include improved compensation and pensions, and sorely 
needed changes in medical and hospital programs.',) The Disabled Veterans of 
America's constituents had a more obvious reason to oppose excessively liberal 
education payments. The DA V expressed initial opposition to the original 1944 bill for 
fear that it would divert funds away from disabled veterans whose needs clearly exceeded 
the returning able-bodied veteran. A similar fear of guided the thinking ofDAV National 
Director ofLegislation Charles L. Huber when he expressed the organizations concerns 
that the proposed increase "will make it impossible for the Congress to pass legislation of 
a much higher priority within the limits of the budget for Veterans' Benefits and 
Services." Specifically, Huber called for increased disability payments, pensions, and 
2 Letter to Carl Albert from Thomas C. Walker, Commander in Chief, Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, July 15, 1976, Folder 11, Box 211, Carl Albert Legislative papers, Carl 
Albert Center. 
3 Letter to Carl Albert from Mylio S. Kraja, Director National Legislative 
Commission of the American Legion, July 19, 1976, Carl Albert Legislative papers, Carl 
Albert Center. 
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medical treatment and added, "We believe there is no justification to reduce funding for 
these programs in favor ofan extension of educational benefits.,,4 
The Ford Administration clearly believed the 1974 G.I. Bill had gone far enough 
in compensating Vietnam veterans. In 1975 Ford even proposed reducing the time 
veterans could claim benefits back down to eight years. V A Administrator Richard 
Roudebush outlined the administration's justifications for the proposals. He suggested 
that the G.I. Bill constituted a temporary readjustment tool and not an ongoing 
entitlement program. He also noted, correctly, that Vietnam veterans enjoyed far more 
generous eligibility terms than had veterans ofprevious wars. The current bill, 
suggested Roudebush "has the effect ofdiscriminating against veterans serving in earlier 
periods."s Despite Ford's continued foot dragging and the waning of interest of some 
veterans' organizations by the mid-1970s, Congress continued to do just enough to keep 
the veterans coming back to school throughout the remainder of the decade. 
In October 1976, Congress passed S.969, Public Law 94-502, which gave 
veterans an 8 percent cost-of-living benefits increase. The bill allowed disabled veterans 
an indefinite period in which to claim their education benefits. S.969 also established a 
new experimental education program to cover veterans of the new All-Volunteer Force 
entering service after January 1, 1977. The new program required participants to pay up 
to seventy-five dollars a month into a fund that the VA would then match at a rate of2­
4 Letter to Carl Albert from Charles L. Huber, National Director ofLegislation of 
the Disabled American Veterans, July 16, 1976, Carl Albert Legislative papers, Carl 
Albert Center. 
S Memorandum for Roger Semerad from Richard Roudebush, March 27, 1975, 
Folder "VA3 Education Program, 8/9/1974-11/30/1974," Box 1, WHCF, Subject File VA 
General, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
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to-I. A more generous and veterans' education bill passed through Congress the 
following year. 
H.R.8701, Public Law 95-202, signed by President Jimmy Carter on November 
23, 1977, provided veterans a 6.6 percent increase in benefits and increased the amount 
of loans available to 2,500 dollars. Veterans could also claim loans for an additional two 
years after their ten-year eligibility expired if they needed the extra time to fInish their 
degree. The bill also liberalized the requirements for a school to secure approval from 
the V A. One of the bill's provisions, adopted by a voice vote from an amendment by 
Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), finally made Women's Air Force Service Pilots of World War 
II, eligible for veteran benefits. This provision affected nearly 900 surviving WASPs. 
The most contentious debates over the bill remained, again, those surrounding 
direct tuition payment, and, again, Olin Teague proved to be the biggest obstacle to the 
passage ofa direct tuition payment measure. As he entered the final few years ofhis life, 
Teague remained as adamant as ever that the government had done enough for Vietnam 
veterans and as stubborn as ever in rebuking overtures to offer more generous increases. 
Despite proposals from over 100 congressmen to add direct tuition payment to the G.!. 
Bill amendments, Teague, backed by House Veterans' Affairs Committee Chairman Ray 
Roberts (D-TX) brought their bill to the floor without such a provision. Much to the 
chagrin ofmany of his fellow representatives, Teague also circumvented a full discussion 
ofthe bill in the Veterans Affairs Committee where the members could have debated the 
issue or debated a compromise with a more generous bill circulating in the Senate. He 
also sent the bill to the floor under a procedure that denied any amendments, preventing 
any representative from bringing the tuition issue to a vote. The House bill, H.R.870 1 
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offered only the 6.6 percent benefits increase. One representative called Teague's 
measure the "anti-Vietnam-era veteran" bill.6 
In the Senate, Alan Cranston proposed a novel and convoluted way of offering 
veterans relief from high tuition. Under S.457, a veteran paying more than 1,000 dollars 
per year in tuition could put any remaining funds from their forty-five month eligibility 
toward their tuition if they finished their degree before the forty-five month limit. In 
debates on the floor, the Senate lowered the eligibility ceiling to veterans paying over 700 
dollars a year. The Senate rejected overtures from Jacob Javits (R-NY) and Daniel 
Moynihan (D--NY) to lower the benefits increase to 4 percent and distribute the money 
saved to veterans who needed relief from high tuition. 
Both bills passed their respective houses unanimously. The House and Senate 
thrashed out their differences informally and without conference. The final version of the 
bill offered only a slight relief from tuition costs. Veterans could use any unused benefits 
from their forty-five month eligibility to reduce a portion of their V A loans but only ifa 
state or local government agency matched the amomt. Complicating things further, the 
amount of the loans forgiven had to be less than two thirds of the tuition a veteran paid 
above 700 dollars per year. 
Once the bills passed Congress, they found a more receptive audience in the 
White House than previous veterans' legislation encountered. Jimmy Carter did incur the 
wrath of some of the older veterans groups with his blanket pardon ofVietnam War draft 
deserters and his attempts to streamline the V A medical system. Carter also questioned 
the practice ofgiving veterans preferential treatment in federal employment. Echoing 
6 William Ford (D-MI), quoted in the Washington Post, November 21, 1977, 19. 
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some of the same sentiments expressed by Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, both 
ofwhom questioned the limits of the veteran's privileged status, Carter suggested that 
giving veterans preference in government jobs "unduly interferes with employment 
opportunities for women and minorities and with efficient and businesslike 
management.,,7 He attracted much criticism for this stand from the veterans lobbies. On 
most other veterans' issues, including education benefits, Carter proved more willing 
than either Nixon or Ford to sign the bills sent forward by Congress. Carter also 
increased the education opportunities available to all Americans, including veterans, by 
expanding Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, and liberalizing both the work-study 
program and federal subsidies to student loans.8 Moreover, Carter's choice of Veterans 
Administrator ensured that the Vietnam veteran had one of their own in one of the most 
important federal positions in veterans' affairs. 
Max Cleland headed the VA from 1977 through 1981. Cleland earned Bronze 
and Silver Stars while fighting in Vietnam. He survived the siege at Khe Sanh in 1968, 
but days later lost both legs and one arm attempting to pick up a dropped grenade. He 
described the incident as a "freaky war accident" and downplayed his bravery in trying to 
shield other soldiers from the blast.9 In 1969, Cleland had criticized the VA medical 
establishment in Congressional hearings where he revealed his own struggles to receive 
7 Quoted in the Washington Post, December 7, 1978,39. For a summary of 
Carter's record on veterans' issues, see Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977-1980 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981), 177-190. 
8 Congress and the Nation, Vol. V, 665-666. 
9 Washington Post, April 18, 1977, B6. See also Max Cleland, Strong At the 
Broken Places: A Personal Story (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1989). 
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artificial limbs or even a wheelchair. lO The Washington Post described him as 
"handsome and articulate. Imaginative and tough, a hell-raising witness on Capitol Hill 
for OI rights, driving his own car to work despite his physical handicaps, surrounding 
himself with other Vietnam veterans as advisors, fanning the fire in his gut to fulfill a 
passion for public service." I I He became the youngest ever head of the VA at the age of 
thirty four, and promised to "institutionalize hope, caring, sensitivity" that had been 
starkly absent under his predecessors.12 Speaking of his own disability, Cleland saw 
himself as "a public reminder of the price that's been paid."I3 Cleland helped steer 
through much-needed legislation for Vietnam veterans including a new psychological 
counseling program for Vietnam veterans that the Senate had passed on four previous 
occasions only for the House and previous administrations to cut them down. 
Vietnam veterans also gained new allies in Congress. After being elected the 
Democratic representative for Michigan in 1977, air force veteran David Bonior formed 
the Vietnam Veterans in Congress group. By 1980, the caucus had nineteen members, 
all Vietnam veterans, from both parties and from both Houses. Decrying previous 
government treatment ofVietnam veterans, Bonior stated "Part of the problem lies in 
under-representation. Although 19 of the 28 members ofthe House Veterans Committee 
are veterans, only one is a Vietnam-era veteran. Anyone claiming that the Vietnam vet 
has been adequately cared for simply ignores the facts.,,14 The Vietnam veteran caucus 
made their concerns known to Max Cleland over such issues as the continued geographic 
10 Washington Post, April 18, 1977, B1. 

II Ibid., August 28, 1977, B4. 

12 Ibid. April 18, 1977, B1 

13 Ibid., August 7, 1977, 3. 

14 Ibid., May 8, 1978, 22. 
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inequalities of the OJ. Bill and the lack ofassistance for veterans with drug, 
psychological, or employment difficulties. 
Cleland and the Vietnam Veterans' in Congress fought for better benefits and 
services for Vietnam veterans as the 1970s drew to a close. But their influence came too 
late for the OJ. Bill. By the end of the decade, most Vietnam veterans had already used 
their education benefits and the program was entering its final years. The OJ. Bill had 
become just one of a number of contentious issues for Vietnam veterans in Washington. 
Increasingly, the issues ofPost Traumatic Stress Disorder and the use ofAgent Orange 
began to dominate the attention of the veterans' affairs committees and the veteran 
community. The OJ. Bill no longer represented the hot topic it had been during the first 
halfof the decade. Several cost of living increases followed in 1980, raising the monthly 
allowance to 327 dollars for the single veteran, and 1981 increasing it to 342 dollars, until 
the last major increase in education benefits for the Vietnam era veteran became law on 
October 17, 1984. The 1984 law gave the single veteran 376 dollars a month to live off. 
The initial low amount ofbenefits offered and slow rate of benefit increases 
undoubtedly contributed to the delay in many veterans using their education benefits. 
But factors other than lack ofmoney also accounted for the relatively sluggish rate at 
which some came back to school. Many Vietnam veterans returned home with a 
different mindset and attitude toward their service than previous veterans. Unlike many 
World War II veterans, some Vietnam veterans did not want to bother with the 
bureaucratic process associated with claiming benefits and in particular wanted nothing 
to do with the government that had sent them to such a confusing and controversial war. 
One veteran commented, "One big problem, is their [veterans'] mistrust of bureaucrats. 
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When you were in Vietnam, you never saw anything accomplished.,,15 Victor Rodriguez, 
a navy veteran adds, "What happens is, when a guy gets out of the service, he doesn't 
want to do anything with the government. When I got out, I just wanted to relax for a 
while. The guys on the streets told me the VA was just a hassle.,,16 
Many sought to forget their military experience and eschewed anything associated 
with the veteran community including the established veterans' organizations. 
Immediately after service, few Vietnam veterans entered the Veterans ofForeign Wars or 
the American Legion. For some, veterans' organizations seemed like places where old 
guys sat around, drank, and reminisced about what they did in the war. Understandably, 
this held little appeal for Vietnam veterans, many ofwhom were trying to forget their 
wartime experience. Fred Hart, a truck driver in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, never 
really felt his service was worth "worth something" until decades later. Hart never joined 
a veteran organization and recalls, "the country didn't much want to bother with us, so 
we really didn't feel a part of the veteran community ... I don't know why. I never had 
no desire to join.,,17 After returning from service in a combat engineering battalion in 
Vietnam and Germany in 1972, Dave Hollingsworth took several years to come to terms 
with his veteran status and never considered joining a veteran's organization. He notes, 
"there was a bit of a climate in those years that ... with some of the traditional service 
organizations that we may not fit in .... And the other thing was that if I had joined a 
IS New York Times, October 4, 1973,95. 
16 Ibid., April 9, 1972,46. 
17 Fred Hart, interview with author and G. Kurt Piehler, Knoxville, Tennessee, 
April 21, 2001. 
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service organization, I would have had to realize my 'vetness. ",18 Given their antipathy 
toward their service, the government, and to their veteran status, some needed a cooling 
off period before facing the bureaucracy associated with the V A and with universities. 
Others might also have been concerned with the way students and faculty would receive 
them when they returned to campus. Few would have looked forward to the same 
receptive environment World War II veterans faced when they returned to school. 
The World War II veterans transformed campus life when they returned home. 
Long lines for registration, overcrowded classrooms, and rows of temporary housing 
units became the norm in many institutions. The University of Wisconsin at Madison 
erected "Camp Randall," a trailer park housing married veterans adjacent to their football 
stadium. Similar "OJ villages" cropped up across the country. World War II veterans 
became eminent members of their university communities, assuming leadership roles in 
campus organizations and fraternities. Seventy percent of the University ofMichigan 
Rose Bowl-winning team of 1947 went to college on the G.1. Bill, as did the Heisman 
trophy winner that same year, Notre Dame's Johnny Lujak.19 Their sheer weight of 
numbers ensured that the World War II veterans maintained a visible presence on campus 
throughout the late 1940s and into the 1950s. At Rutgers University, by 1948 veterans 
comprised 9,000 of the schools 16,000 students. At the same time, Stanford's 
enrollment reached 7,200 up from 4,800. In 1947, veterans comprised 49.2 percent of all 
18 Dave Hollingsworth, interview with author, April 15, 2005. 
19 Milton Greenberg, The G.l Bill: The Law That Changed America (New York: 
Lickle Publishing, 1997), 50-51. 
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enrolled students across the nation and nearly 70 percent ofall male students?O As was 
true of the reception most veterans received throughout society, students and teachers 
alike treated the World War II veteran with respect for the services they had rendered 
their country. But Vietnam veterans had every reason to fear that they would not receive 
such a warm welcome when they returned to campus. 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, college campuses remained the focus of 
much of the nation's anti-war protests.21 From Berkley's Free Speech Movement and the 
nationwide Students for a Democratic Society's attack on American indolence to the 
nationwide teach-ins and student strikes, campuses seemed ablaze with unrest. By the 
end of the 1960s, many of the students who had agitated for civil liberties at the start of 
the decade directed their ire toward the war in Vietnam. Students helped fuel the 
Vietnam Summer in 1967, a movement to "educate" the public about America's Vietnam 
policy. Riots broke out at Oakland in the fall of 1967 in protest to the draft. Soon after, 
violent clashes erupted between police and students at the University of Wisconsin when 
protesters blocked a recruiter from napalm and Agent Orange manufacturers Dow 
Chemical. 22 Three years later protestors exploded a bomb at a research facility at the 
University of Wisconsin, killing a graduate student. By 1969, a Gallup poll indicated that 
69 percent of students considered themselves "doves" and opposed the war. Protest 
marches and student strikes became more commonplace as the decade wore on, many of 
20 Keith Olson, The G.l Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges (Louisville: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1974). 
21 Marc Jason Gilbert, The Vietnam War on Campus: Other Voices, More Distant 
Drums (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001). 
22 David Maraniss, They Marched Into Sunlight: War and Peace, Vietnam and 
America, October 1967 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
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them turning violent in nature. During the academic year 1969-70, police had to 
intervene and arrest students in 731 separate incidents nationwide. Four hundred and ten 
of these incidents incurred property damage and 230 resulted in physical violence?3 One 
hundred and ninety seven attacks on ROTC buildings confirmed the anti-military timbre 
of the protests. 
The most dramatic and violent student protest took place in the aftermath of 
Richard Nixon's announcement of the Cambodian incursion on April 30, 1970. Almost 
immediately, strikes broke out on campuses throughout the country. Protestors attacked 
thirty ROTC buildings in the first week ofMay alone, including the ROTC building at 
Kent State University, Ohio.24 On May 4, as the turmoil continued at Kent State, Ohio 
National Guardsmen opened fire on a crowd of students, killing four and wounding nine 
others. Ten days later, police opened fire on students at Jackson State, ?vIississippi, 
killing two. The combined outrage over Cambodia and the subsequent killings turned up 
the heat on campuses across the nation throughout the month ofMay. 
The vast majority ofVietnam veterans that used the G.I. Bill did so after the 
benefits increases of 1972 and 1974 so they would have been well aware of the anti-war 
sentiment on many campuses. But not every school suffered the same kind of turmoil as 
Ohio State, or Berkley, or Wisconsin. The campus reception for veterans would have 
varied depending on when and where the veteran returned to campus. The South, for 
example, saw few violent large-scale anti-war protests. Southern students did offer up 
some anti-war resistance. After 1966, the Southern Student Organizing Committee 
23 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years ofHope, Days ofRage (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1987), 409. 
24 Gitlin, The Sixties, 409-410. 
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(SSOC) diverted some of its attentions from the Civil Rights struggle to organize 
numerous anti-war activities across the South including a Peace Tour across southern 
campuses between February 1967 and December 1968. But southern anti-war activities 
never reached the same intensity as some other regions of the nation. Indeed, the SSOC 
encountered much hostility on several campuses. At the University of South Florida, 
students seemed ready, as one SSOC member recalls, ''to rip us apart." At Erskine 
College, South Carolina, one student pulled a gun on an SSOC member and told him, "I 
just might kill you" because ''those damn gooks" killed his brother while serving in 
Vietnam. 25 The experience of the SSOC serves as a reminder that---contrary popular 
mythology-" many campuses retained a strong conservative presence throughout the 
1960s. Such schools might have given veterans a far warmer greeting than the more 
radical schools. 
Time, in addition to location, would also have affected the veteran's campus 
experience. Veterans choosing to attend school from 1966 through 1971 would clearly 
have expected more opposition than the veterans returning to school after the passage of 
the 1974 G.I. Bill. With the war winding down rapidly, violent student protests subsided 
after reaching a crescendo from 1969 to 1970?6 Doug Simon, an air force intelligence 
officer in Vietnam from April 1965 to May 1966 returned to Drew University in 1972 
and encountered a "post-sixties depression. There was a period of enormous activity," 
recounts Simon, "from about 1968 to around 1971, and then I think it began to get old ... 
. The counterculture was getting tired .... This campus didn't have a great deal of vitality 
25 Gregg L. Michel, Struggle for a Better South: The Southern Student Organizing 
Committee, 1964-1969 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 149, 151. 
26 Gitlin, The Sixties, 411. 
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to it. ,,27 With the potential for such variation, every veteran's experience may have been 
unique. But anecdotal evidence suggests that many were able to return to school without 
facing much hostility. 
Before returning to the University ofTennessee, Dave Hollingsworth traveled to 
Ohio State the day after the campus shootings at Kent State. He recalls watching students 
running across campus with handkerchiefs over their faces, and then "All of a sudden, the 
tear gas started drifting our way.... The bells and whistles went off and I knew there had 
to be some sort ofdemonstration nearby.,,28 The unrest led the authorities to evacuate 
Ohio State and send in over 6,000 national Guardsmen to patrol the campus?9 Although 
he bore no grudge against the protestors, Hollingsworth feared that many had blurred the 
line between the war and the warrior. But ifhe had anticipated a rough reception on 
campus he need not have worried. 
The University ofTennessee, Knoxville, like most Southern schools, saw few 
widespread protests against the war or against veterans during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Three thousand protesters took to the street in the wake of the Kent State shootings.3o 
The most celebrated protest at the university occurred several weeks later on May 28 
during a Billy Graham crusade at Tennessee's Neyland football stadium. Richard Nixon 
decided to attend, his first public appearance since the Kent State shootings. The 
administration considered Knoxville one of the nation's few "safe" campuses. After 
visiting the campus for a football game, one Los Angeles Times reporter described UT as 
27 Doug Simon, interview with Kurt Piehler, November 12,2003. 
28 Dave Hollingsworth interview. 
29 Mark Delman Boren, Student Resistance: A History o/the Unruly Subject (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 187. 
30 UT Daily Beacon, May 6, 1971, 1. 
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"another world, a place where kids listen instead of shout,,31 Several hundred students 
and staff did use Nixon's visit to protest his Cambodia invasion. The protestors marched 
from the University Center into the stadium, held signs aloft, and chanted anti-war 
slogans as Nixon gave a speech. Although many arrests followed in the coming days, 
Knoxville authorities dropped the charges against most of the protestors. The protest 
caused a few waves on campus for several months, but thereafter the campus remained 
quiet. Some veterans may have experienced individual acts of opposition at UT, but 
Hollingsworth suffered no adverse reaction to his veteran status. 
Similarly, when Fred Owens used his GJ. Bill to attend Columbia State 
University in 1975 and finished up his degree at Troy State in Georgia, the students never 
questioned his service. Most never knew the horrors he had witnessed fighting in the 
Central Highlands in 1965 and 1966, because most never asked. As many veterans 
discovered throughout society, even if people did not treat veterans with outright 
hostility, most simply did not want to knoW?2 
Even at the University ofWisconsin, when Tom Deits returned to Law School in 
1970 he suffered no backlash from his fellow students. Deits served as a combat 
infantryman in Vietnam in 1969 and 1970 and won the Bronze Star and a Purple Heart 
after suffering wounds from a fragment grenade. He chose to wear his fatigue jacket 
every day and recalled that he "never received a second look." Again, as with the general 
response many Vietnam veterans received from society at large, Diets fellow students 
31 Quoted in an excerpt from the "Vignettes" boxes of Milton Klein's Papers at 
the University ofTennessee's Special Collections Library, collected for his Volunteer 
Moments, Vignettes ofthe History ofthe University ofTennessee, 1794-1994 (Knoxville, 
Tenn.: Office of the University Historian, University ofTennessee, 1996). 
32 Fred Owens, interview with author, May 19,2004. 
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treated his veteran status with a resounding "'So what?' You're a veteran ofa war but it's 
not that big of a deal.,,33 Another veteran attending Wisconsin, a combat engineer 
wounded in Vietnam in 1967, did think that the Campus was "not very friendly" toward 
veterans when he attended from 1969 through 1974, but personally never experienced 
any problems.34 Roger Stephen Boeker also suffered no adverse reaction from students 
when he attended Santa Ana College in 1975 and City College of Seattle from 1976 to 
1977, although he concedes, "1 was aggressive enough that most persons did not dare to 
share their feelings about my very personal and traumatic experiences in Vietnam.,,35 
Finally, Tom Crane, a former air force intelligence veteran feared that when he returned 
to Michigan State that his fellow students might "consider me a 'Fascist Pig' because 1 
was a vet." Crane's worst fears never materialized and he enjoyed a quiet and successful 
first semester back in schoo1.36 
Some veterans did receive some abuse when they came back to school. At the 
University ofOregon, Doug Simon recalls one student yelling "Baby Killer" at one ofhis 
classmates, even though the recipient of the abuse had served only in Europe and had 
never set foot in Vietnam. Simon narrowly avoided being blackballed from the 
University after one professor feared he might use his military intelligence background to 
33 Tom Diets, correspondence with author, July 2004. 
34 Greg Vodak, correspondence with author, July 2004 
35 Roger Stephen Boeker, correspondence with author, July 2004. 
36 Quoted in Terence Shea, "Back to School From the Wars-Gls on Campus 
Find Their Battles are Not Over," The National Observer, February 15, 1971, reprinted in 
Source Material On the Vietnam Veteran (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1974), 323. 
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inform the CIA or Pentagon on anti-war activities. Overall, however, Simon recalls, "I 
was treated well" by the Oregon students?7 
A 1980 VA commissioned Louis Harris and Associates poll on Vietnam veterans 
adds further credence to the suggestion that veterans returned to campus without too 
much disruption. The poll-a follow up from their 1971 study-represented the largest 
effort to quantify the veteran experience ever undertaken. In addition to interviewing 
Vietnam veterans and the public, the poll also included the views of over 500 educators 
in colleges and campuses across the country. The educators overwhelmingly agreed that 
other students associating veterans "with the war in Vietnam" represented "Not A 
Problem At All" (66 percent) or "Not Much OfA Problem" (23 percent). Similarly, 
students associating veterans "with the military" represented "Not A Problem At All" (73 
percent), or "Not Much OfA Problem" (18 percent). None of those polled considered 
the military association to be "A Great Problem." 38 
Faculty members at institutions of higher education seem also to have avoided 
confrontation with returning veterans. Dave Hollingsworth recalls that professors "were 
sensitive on things that could push our buttons ... and really, if anything, leaned over 
backwards to try to be accommodating.,,39 The Louis Harris and Associates poll 
confirmed 89 percent of educators believed that faculty associating veterans with their 
participation in the Vietnam War represented "Not A Problem At All" (73 percent) or 
"Not Much Of A Problem" (16 percent). The educators also believed that veterans being 
37 Doug Simon interview. 
38 Louis Harris and Associates, Myths and Realities: A Study ofAttitudes Toward 
Vietnam Era Veterans (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 179. 
39 Dave Hollingsworth interview. 
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"so changed by their military experience that they don't fit in on campus" represented 
"Not A Problem At All" (61 percent) or "Not Much OfA Problem" (20 percent).40 
Perhaps part of the reason most veterans avoided the ire of students or faculty that 
might have opposed the war was that many maintained a low profile when they did return 
to campus. Unlike the World War II veterans who wore their uniforms with pride, many 
Vietnam veterans wore no outward symbols to indicate their veteran status. 
Hollingsworth notes, "Most ofus were not walking around publicizing the fact that we 
were veterans .... I just think many of us wanted to get on with out lives." Hollingsworth 
grew out his beard and his hair "to just try to blend back in" and adds, "I think that's what 
many vets did." 41 Hollingsworth did not even realize that he shared a classroom with 
about ten other veterans until during one cold spell they all wore their field jackets to 
class to keep warm. When Morocco Coleman returned to Atlanta's Morris Brown 
College in 1977, he noted that veterans had "very little presence" on campus. He recalls 
that his fellow students "didn't know I was a vet. I wanted to put all that behind me and 
catch up with my peer group in the life experience. ,,42 Some veterans, as has been well 
documented, did become vocal opponents of the war speaking at protest marches or 
joining the Vietnam Veterans against the War organization, but most just sought a way to 
get on with their lives. 43 Once Vietnam veterans did decide to return to campus, once 
they had come to terms with their service, once the money was adequate, and once 
40 Myths and Realities, 179. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Morrocco Coleman, correspondence with author, April 2004. 
43 Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: A History ofthe Vietnam Veterans' Movement 
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2001). 
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campus violence had subsided, most veterans made excellent students. In excelling in the 
classroom, they shared a common heritage with their World War II predecessors. 
Following the announcement of the original GJ. Bill in 1944, many educators 
feared the effects ofmillions ofveterans flooding the nation's campuses. In a famous 
Colliers article, University ofChicago President Robert Hutchins argued that an influx of 
veterans with low education levels and little preparation for college life might lead to 
"Colleges and universities ... converted into educational hobo jungles" and called the 
GJ. Bill "a threat to American education.,,44 Harvard's Seymour Harris agreed that the 
G.1. Bill "carried the principle of democratization too far.,,45 Veterans soon proved the 
naysayers wrong and became some of the more mature and academically proficient 
students of their generation. In 1947, the New York Times education editor wrote, "the 
most astonishing fact in the history ofAmerican higher education .... Far from being an 
educational problem, the veteran has become an asset to higher education.,,46 In 1949, 
Fortune magazine called the Class of 1949 the "best, ... most mature, ... most 
responsible, ... [and] self-disciplined" in the history ofhigher education. Life magazine 
praised Harvard's veterans as the "the best in Harvard's history." James Conant the 
Harvard president who initially expressed doubts about the potential of veterans as 
students described them as "the most mature and promising students Harvard has ever 
had.,,47 Several factors contributed to the quality ofveterans as students, including their 
44 Quoted in Kenneth Starr, Discarded Army: The Nader Report on Vietnam 
Veterans and the Veterans Administration (New York: Charterhouse, 1973), 234. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came True: The G.l Bill and the Making of 
Modern America (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1996), 245. 
47 Quoted in Olson, G.l Bill. 
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age, level ofmaturity, and the perspective on life they had gained from military service. 
Living through the horrors ofwar led many to eschew traditional hi jinx of campus life 
and as a group veterans tended to be far more focused and dedicated to their studies than 
their non-veteran peers. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the education community geared up for another massive 
influx of veterans under the Vietnam era G.l. Bills. But this time, academics offered far 
less public debate over the potential impact of this new cadre ofveterans on higher 
education and offered far fewer frightening statements on their potential quality as 
students. Few expected the Vietnam era bills to have the same dramatic impact on higher 
education than the original O.I. Bill. By 1960s, higher education was already 
democratized and an established part ofthe lives of far more Americans than it had been 
in 1944. By the 1970s, the later O.I. Bills represented just one more in an ever-expanding 
list ofpost-Great Society sources of federal funding to higher education. Likewise, the 
returning veterans constituted a much smaller percentage of the nation's college level 
students and so would likely require less specialized attention. Tim O'Brien took a more 
cynical view ofthe lack ofacademic attention to returning veterans, commenting, 
"Perhaps the educators' silence is rooted in fear. After all, who wants a swarm of smelly 
junkie-wierdo-killer freaks invading their serene campuses?,,48 
The Veterans Administration attempted to warn educators of the potential 
problems they might encounter when the veterans returned to school. In an April 1972 
commentary in the Journal ofHigher Education, V A officials E. Robert Stephens and 
Charles A. Stenger wrote of"The Opportunity and Challenge ofthe Vietnam Era Veteran 
48 Tim O'Brien, "The Vietnam Veteran," Penthouse, November 1974, 78. 
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to American Educators. ,,49 Stephens and Stenger noted that the veteran presence could 
easily be overlooked because they did not return en masse as did the World War II 
veteran. Based on a 1970 survey of the interaction between V A facilities and Vietnam 
veterans, the authors highlighted five distinct characteristics ofVietnam veterans of 
which educators ought to be aware when dealing with them in the classroom. Eachone 
suggested that the Vietnam veteran might make a rather volatile classmate. The 
characteristics included: 
-The young veteran is less willing than earlier veterans to accept authority in a 
compliant manner. 
-An expectation that authority in any form will be unresponsive to his intense 
desire to be treated as an individual. 
-A general sense ofuncertainty and pessimism toward the future with a resultant 
greater concentration in immediate gratification. 
-An intense, positive identification with his own age group that is more than the 
typical sharing of common interests and activities. 
-A tendency to exercise less control over emotions and feelings and to react with 
impatience and impulsivity. 
The commentary went on to suggest that although many students suffer from similar 
dispositions, military service, especially service in Vietnam "adds a special type of reality 
experience" that can lead to alienation "doubts and fears about the worth of society and 
the meaning of life that he had earlier shared with others his age." so 
The 1973 VA report on veteran funding, conducted by the Education Testing 
Service (ETS) ofNew Jersey, also carried a warning ofhow military service might 
manifest itself differently in the Vietnam veteran than the World War II veteran. The 
49 E. Robert Stephens and Charles A. Stenger, "The Opportunity and Challenge of 
the Vietnam Era Veteran to American Educators," Journal ofHigher Education Volume 
43, No.4 (April 1972), 303-307. 
so Ibid., 304-305. 
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ETS suggested that the World War II veteran retuned home with a more conservative 
devotion to their country and their family and with their religious faith reaffirmed by their 
experience. The Vietnam veteran, the report cautioned, had a greater propensity toward 
"deep-seated psychological damage" and a far weaker devotion to their country or their 
family and were generally unsure of their position in society .51 The warnings of the VA 
and the ETS suggested that Vietnam veterans would face difficulties fitting in on campus. 
No doubt, some veterans found returning to school difficult because of their service. 
When Mike Robinson, a medical officer attached to an artillery battalion, returned to 
school he discovered "I couldn't relate to the young people. Some things 1 believed in--­
they were all against. There were several instances in which 1 was ready to fight." 
Despite such differences in outlook, Vietnam veterans never became the "smelly junkie­
wierdo-killer freaks" some may have feared. 
Military experience invariably has a profound effect on most veterans, but for the 
Vietnam veteran returning to school the effect was not always negative. Because of their 
years of military service, Vietnam veterans were likely to be several years older than their 
fellow students, more likely to be married, and probably more eager to finish their studies 
to make up for lost time. This extra level of maturity often manifested itself in a positive 
way because when the Vietnam veteran did return to the classroom, many brought with 
them the same positive qualities displayed by World War II veterans. Despite his 
difficulties relating to some students, Robinson found "With the maturing 1 had done, 
plus the military service-the exposure to life-I felt 1 was ready for college." John 
Finneran, a former helicopter pilot in Vietnam, remembered steering clear of "the kids" at 
51 ETS Report, 75-88. 
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college who seemed more interested in the frivolities of campus life and less concerned 
with studying.52 
The 1980 Louis Harris and Associates poll confirmed the high level of maturity 
displayed by returning veterans. The educators surveyed in the poll placed the quality 
and commitment ofVietnam veterans as higher than their peers. Sixty-one percent of 
those polled stated that Vietnam veterans displayed more "emotional maturity" than other 
students in their classes. 53 Twenty nine percent placed them "About The Same" while 
only 6 percent considered veterans less mature than their peers. Forty-eight percent 
considered veterans more "conscientious about their coursework," only 8 percent 
considered them worse. 54 Vietnam veterans had higher grades and rated higher than their 
peers in "Seriousness with which they take their coursework," "knowing what they want 
out of life," "Prospects for completing the program," "Motivation to learn," and 
"Commitment to education." In all categories less than 11 percent of respondents 
regarded Vietnam veterans as worse than non-veterans in terms. of classroom 
performance. The only area of classroom performance where veterans scored worse then 
their non-veteran peers was-as the VA had warned-their "Tolerance for unpopular 
ideas." By these accounts, Vietnam veterans came home and not only went to school, but 
went to school and excelled in the classroom. Many veterans had taken a long time to 
return to school, but when they did, like their World War II predecessors, they became 
some of the best students of their generation. 
52 Quoted in Shea, "Back to School," Source Material On the Vietnam Veteran, 
320-322. 
53 Myths and Realities, 181. 
54 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF THE VIE1NAM ERA G.1. BILLS 
By the time Vietnam era G.1. Bills had run their course, more veterans had gone 
to school under them than under any previous veterans' education program. By the 
passage of the fmal benefits increase in 1984, the Veterans Administration claimed that 
72 percent ofVietnam era veterans had claimed their education benefits with more than 
half training at the college level. Even more veterans trickled into college after 1984 
until the program finally expired on December 31, 1989. The costs to the government of 
the program were enormous.1 Judged by these raw numbers alone, the Vietnam bills 
seem to have been highly successful, but these numbers masked some real problems that 
continued to compromise the program's effectiveness right up until its demise. Although 
every veteran had access to benefits, as long as the government failed to pay tuition 
directly to institutions, not every veteran could afford to attend the school of their choice 
without some extra funds. How much additional income a veteran could rely on dictated 
the type of school they attended and ultimately the quality of education they obtained. 
Where a veteran lived continued to affect the quality ofeducation they could afford. 
Veterans' education benefits went much further in some states than in others. Some 
veterans could afford to go to school without much financial worry if they lived in a state 
with lower tuition rates and chose their school wisely. Those that lived in higher tuition 
states or who had other obligations such as dependants tended to have to find additional 
1 Veterans' Administration Annual Report, 1984 (WasbingtonD.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office), 81. 
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work just to make ends meet. Of course, many civilian students faced similar financial 
struggles., and the G.I. Bill did at least give a considerable boost to the veteran's income. 
But it did not always cover the entire costs of every veteran's education in the same way 
the original 1944 bill had done. 
Attempts to ascertain exactly what the G.1. Bill meant to the life course of 
Vietnanl and Vietnam era veterans have raised some contradictory conclusions. In 
March 1979, the New York Times lauded what it termed the "Successful Vet" in reference 
to the Vietnam veterans who returned home from Southeast Asia and reintegrated with 
ease back into civilian life. The editorial stated, "Despite the hostile political and 
economic climate in which they returned, Vietnam veterans as a group became 
remarkably productive civilians." Citing the claims of Max Cleland, head of the 
Veterans Administration, the Times suggested that the Vietnam veterans "are better 
educated than their World War II and Korean predecessors-having taken greater 
advantage ofthe G.I. Bill-and their family incomes are higher than those who avoided 
service.,,2 In contrast to the stereotype of the maladjusted veteran, the Times suggested 
that most Vietnam veterans-in part because of the G.1. Bill-returned to successful 
lives. 
VA figures seem to confirm this suggestion that the G.1. Bill helped Vietnam era 
veterans catch up and even surpass their non-veteran peers. The 1984 Veterans 
Administration Annual Report revealed that Vietnam era veterans had attained an average 
education level of 13.2 years compared with 12.9 years for non-veterans. As the report 
notes, "greater educational attainment results, almost without exception, increased 
2 New York Times, March 30, 1979, 22. 
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earnings." Indeed, the median earnings for male Vietnam era veterans reached 21,670 
dollars a year, compared with 18,730 dollars for non-veterans. Significantly, the report 
also found that Vietnam era veterans had attained a slightly higher level ofcollege 
degrees than their non-veteran counterparts. According to the VA, 24.4 percent of 
Vietnam era veterans possessed a college degree by 1984 compared with 24.2 percent of 
non-veterans in the same age group. Again, if the purpose of the G.1. Bill was to allow 
veterans to catch up from time lost to civilian life, the bill would appear to have done its 
job. Additionally, ifone considers that many who avoided military service in the 1960s 
and 1970s fled to college to avoid the draft, one might have expected non-veterans to 
have higher levels ofcollege training. They did not. 3 
The Veteran Administration figures did not distinguish between those veterans 
that had served in the Vietnam and those stationed elsewhere during the Vietnam era. 
Given the additional psychological and physical strain of serving in a combat zone one 
might reasonably expect some variation in the education levels ofVietnam veterans and 
Vietnam era veterans. However, in one of the few studies that address this issue, Josefina 
Card's Lives After Vietnam: The Personal Impact ofMilitary Service (1983), found no 
significant differences in the educational attainment ofVietnam theater veterans and non-
Vietnam theater veterans.4 Card's study did reveal, however, differences in the kinds of 
education the veterans received. The study examined the life course of 500 civilians, 
Vietnam veterans and non-Vietnam veterans all ofwhom finished high school in 1963. 
3 Veterans Administration Annual Report, 1984 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1984), 81-82. 
4 Josefina J. Card, Lives After Vietnam: Personal Impact ofMilitary Service 
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983). 
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The differences between the three groups were noticeable but not considerable. Over 32 
percent ofnon-veterans had completed a college degree compared to 28 percent ofnon-
Vietnam veterans and 26 percent ofVietnam veterans. Both Vietnam and non-Vietnam 
veterans were much more likely to have attained a vocational or less than four-year 
degree. Among the Vietnam veterans, 23.3 percent had completed a vocational degree 
compared with 21.7 percent of Vietnam era veterans and only 11.5 percent ofnon­
5veterans. 
Similarly, Sharon Cohany's more recent study "The Vietnam-era Cohort: 
Employment and Earnings" suggests that while Vietnam veterans and Vietnam era 
veterans have gone to college in greater numbers than their non-veteran peers, 
proportionally more have attained only one to three years ofcollege training compared 
with non-veterans. Cohany claims that 23 percent ofVietnam veterans have four or more 
years of college compared with 29 percent of Vietnam era veterans and 31 percent of 
non-veterans. However, 29 percent ofVietnam veterans and 2.6 percent ofnon-Vietnam 
veterans had between one and three years of schooling.6 The higher number ofveterans 
obtaining lower level degrees or training might result from the fact that the OJ. Bill 
benefits would probably have covered all of a veteran's education expenses in these 
lower cost programs. But even under the generous 1944 bill, many more veterans 
preferred vocational training to higher education raising the possibility that veterans 
might be more attracted to training or shorter-tenn courses so they can reenter the 
5 Ibid., 39. 
6 Sharon Cohany, "The Vietnam-era Cohort: Employment and Earnings" Monthly 
Labor Review, 1992, 115 (6): 3-15. 
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workforce more quickly. Many may also have chosen vocational schools to develop the 
practical skills they learned in the military. 
Card's study found other variations in veterans' education attainment. Not every 
eligible veteran used their 0.1. Bill entitlements, but those who did attained a higher 
"average academic aptitude score," greater "socioeconomic status," and completed 
roughly 1.5 years additional education. These figures reveal the OJ. Bill's potentially 
positive impact on veterans' readjustment. The study also reveals variations in education 
resulting from branch of service. Air force veterans are more likely to have the highest 
education level, followed by the navy, army, and marines. These differences most likely 
result from the more speciali~ed training air force and navy personnel tend to require for 
their service.' 
Several more recent studies have placed further qualifiers on the success of the 
Vietnam era bills. In contrast to the V A figures, Joshua Angrist, in two articles written in 
the early 1990s, suggests that white Vietnam era veterans have earned 15 percent less 
than their non-veteran counterparts ten years after service.8 Other studies have found 
similar results; several articles by Jere Cohen, David Segal, and Lloyd Temme claim that 
Vietnam era veterans have not achieved the same educational and employment levels as 
non-veterans.9 They suggest that employer discrimination accounts in part for this 
7 Ibid., 56. 
8 Joshua D. Angrist, "Lifelong Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: 
Evidence from Social Security Records," American Economic Review, 1990,8 (3): 313­
336, and "The Effect ofVeterans Benefits on Education and Earnings," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 1993,46 (4): 637-652. 
9 Jere Cohen, David Segal, and Lloyd V. Temme, "Military Service Was an 
Educational Disadvantage to Vietnam-Era Personnel," Sociology and Social Research, 
1986, 70(3): 206-208 and "The Impact of Education on Vietnam-Era Veterans' 
-
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deficiency. This claim is tenuous at best because veterans had preferential treatment in 
government jobs and surveys, such as those conducted by Louis Harris and Associates in 
1971 and 1980, repeatedly show that employees had no problem with veteran status. The 
government also encomaged companies to actively recruit Vietnam veterans. 
Given the discrepancies between the V A statistics and some of these other 
studies, ascertaining the exact impact of the G.1. Bill on the lives ofveterans remains 
elusive. The scope ofthis project, however, is not to ascertain the effectiveness ofthe 
programs, but merely to provide a context in which to understand why the Vietnam 
legislation had its distinct and controversial character. By doing so, this project provides 
a starting point for a more dispassionate and objective understanding ofthe Vietnam era 
bills and what they reveal about the veteran homecoming experience and the often heard 
claim that the government stabbed its veterans in the back. Clearly, the Vietnam era GJ. 
Bills did have problems, especially in the early years following the passage of the 1966 
bill. The initial low benefits reflected the fact that the government, for the first time in its 
history, decided to offer wide-ranging benefits to peacetime veterans. Because ofwhat 
seemed at the time a generous offer to all veterans, those that faced fire in Vietnam, those 
that would suffer from readjustment problems, found their benefits to be far less than 
those offered veterans ofprevious wars. The 1966 bill made no distinction between a 
veteran that fought in the jungles ofVietnam or flew bomber missions over Hanoi and 
those veterans that drove a truck in Germany or who guarded a base in Georgia. For the 
veteran that never faced a combat situation, the benefits represented a reasonable reward 
Occupational Attainment," Social Science Quarterly, 1992, 73(2): 397-409. See also 
Peter MatHia, "GJ. Bill Benefits and Enrollments: How did Vietnam Veterans Fare?" 
Social Science Quarterly 1978 59(3): 535-545. 
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for sacrifice. As the Bradley Commission and previous generations ofpoliticians had 
often argued, the government owed fewer obligations to those veterans that never 
suffered any physical or mental harm from military service. But the 1966 bill changed 
the equation and changed the nature ofmilitary service in the United States. Because the 
bill made no distinctions in type of service, many Vietnam veterans that might have 
hoped for a generous education benefits package to help them get on with their lives 
found that they had to find additional work or alternative funds to supplement their 
income. The irony of the 1966 bill is that because the government decided to be more 
generous than at any other time in its history in lavishing benefits on veterans that 
previous centuries of gove~ent had deemed unworthy, those veterans that were the 
most worthy-those that had suffered as much ifnot more than any other generation of 
veterans-did not receive the support their sacrifices deserved. 
Ralph Yarborough began his push for a peacetime O.l. Bill long before hostilities 
in Vietnam became full blown. He had the best interests of the veteran at heart when he 
attempted to provide them with benefits that would reward them for time lost from 
civilian life. Although he won a victory in 1966, the amount ofbenefits offered never 
reached the levels he sought. In part, the low benefits resulted from Lyndon Johnson's 
attempts to pass universal education benefits as a cornerstone ofms Great Society. 
Drawing on the ideological precedents established by Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson did 
not want to enlarge the specialized status of veterans at a time when so many other 
sectors of society demanded greater federal investment. Not wanting to siphon offany 
more money than was absolutely necessary from other social programs, Johnson sought 
to keep benefits low. He had a willing ally in his fight in the fonn of fellow Texan Olin 
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Teague in the House. The Texas triumvirate of Yarborough, Johnson, and Teague drew 
the battle lines for the political battles to increase benefits that lay ahead. The Senate 
continued to fight for higher benefits, the White House remained obstinate, and the 
House trod a middle path. 
Once the problems ofthe 1966 bill became evident, the Senate pushed hard for 
increases that would have given Vietnam veterans more equitable benefits. But when 
Richard Nixon became president, he continued to seek ways of limiting the amount of 
benefits offered. Nixon acted not out ofany great social vision or ideological convictio~ 
but more from a desire to limit federal spending at a time when the economy faced its 
first significant downturn since the Great Depression. Despite continuing to praise 
veterans in'public, Nixon clearly believed that there were limits to what the government 
owed them. Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford went further in capping the government's 
largesse by becoming the first president to ever veto a veterans education benefits 
package, the 19740.1. Bill. Congress overrode his veto by a ~rushing margin, a 
testimony to bipartisan desire on Capitol Hill to rectify the problems with the 1966 bilL 
Without question, the government did a lot for Vietnam veterans. It never did 
turn its back on them. The Senate in particular fought hard to give veterans a generous 
reward for their service. But because of ideological or economic convictions in the 
White House, the Vietnam bills did not offer all veterans the same quality of education 
that the World War II veteran could afford. Whatever the costs, the government could 
and probably should have done more to ensure more equitable benefits for every Vietnam 
veteran. Despite their failings, the Vietnam era bills certainly did more good than harm. 
They did provide millions with an opportunity to better their lives access to higher 
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education. Even though the bills did not cover every veteran's education cost fully, they 
did provide every veteran with a welcome boost in their education funds and undoubtedly 
allowed many to graduate debt-free. Many could, and did, receive a quality education if 
they chose their schools carefully. As the high participation rates in the program reveal, 
the Vietnam and Vietnam era veterans welcomed the benefits. 
Nearly three out ofevery four Vietnam and Vietnam era veterans used their 
education benefits in some capacity. As newer studies begin to reexamine the Vietnam 
veteran experience, the GJ. Bill needs to be incorporated more fully into the narrative. 
Most went to school after returning home and did not end up on the streets or with rifles 
in bell towers. There was and is a "silent majority" ofVietnam veterans that came home 
and reintegrated back into society with little trouble. They did not attract the attention of 
the media, or Oliver Stone, or 60 Minutes. Fonner Secretary of State and Vietnam 
veteran Colin Powell said recently that Vietnam veterans, "Have done just fine ... most 
were able to return home and get on with their lives." Senator John McCain adds, "The 
overwhelming majority went over, served their country, came home and resumed their 
lives.,,10 The GJ. Bill played a significant role in helping these veterans get on with their 
lives. Stories ofveterans going to school may not be particularly sexy, but they may be 
more representative of the homecoming experience ofthe Vietnam veteran than the 
Hollywood and media archetypes. These stories need to be told. 
IOQuoted in a USA Today Article, November 16,2000 reprinted in "Welcome 
Home," newsletter of the Kettle Moraine, Wisconsin chapter of the Vietnam Veterans of 
Ameri~ May 2001. 
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